by Adithya M Nair

During a joint commission meeting held on 16 and 17 September 2026 in Islamabad, China and Pakistan officially operationalised their 2013 bilateral border agreement.

This pact is based on the historic 1963 China-Pakistan boundary agreement, through which Pakistan illegally ceded occupied Indian territory, specifically the Shaksgam Valley to China.

This happened just four days after the BRICS summit, where Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping discussed the issue of border stabilisation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). 

While there has been some progress, like China pulling back an estimated 40,00 - 50,000 troops from forward positions along the LAC, tensions have not yet receded. This is further evident from the fact that China continues to see the Kashmir issue through the eyes of Islamabad, treating it as a bilateral issue rather than recognising Indian sovereignty.

The real question remains why a China-Pakistan border agreement had to happen now, especially given the recent thaw in India-China relations. One major reason may be because of the worsening conditions in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and the so called 'Gilgit Baltistan', where protests have erupted against the Pakistani government. For China, this unrest is a threat to its China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), with it being its only direct land route to the Arabian Sea.

The recent operationalisation could help give Pakistan more incentives to crack down on the protestors and allow for more Chinese presence in the region. Allowing more Chinese presence into a highly unstable territory might be strategically disadvantageous to India.

Another reason could be a deliberate counter weight to the recent thaw in India-China relations and the pulling back of Chinese troops along the LAC, as mentioned before. Instead of directly facing the Indian military, China is now cementing the reality that it will continue to use Pakistan as a proxy against India, a playbook it has relied on for decades.

By shifting focus to institutional frameworks, China can project a posture of de-escalation in Ladakh while reinforcing its nuclear armed proxy.

Furthermore, this move could be an attempt to normalise an illegal annexation of Indian territory and pre-empt India's new assertiveness regarding Kashmir. India has consistently maintained that Pakistan and China do not share a shared a legitimate land border, repeatedly stating that Pakistan has no rights to cede or negotiate terms over occupied Indian territories.

What this manoeuvre proves is that despite renewed relationship between India and China, the strategic outlook China has towards India has not fundamentally changed. It still sees India as a power to be contained.

China would continue to use its rhetoric of "peaceful cooperation", but India must be wary of its true intentions and must build up strength and work closely with countries similarly wary of China's intentions like Japan, Russia, Vietnam and Philippines.

As China continues to build a legal and physical shield around its investments in occupied territory, India will have to navigate a complex, two-front challenge where a step back by Chinese troops on one side is instantly met by a deeper push through Pakistan on the other.

Adithya M Nair is a seasoned analyst and commentator on foreign policy and defence affairs, with a reputation for incisive insights into the shifting dynamics of global security