India's increasingly network-centric weapons systems, ranging from the BrahMos cruise missile to the proposed Sudarshan Chakra air defence shield, will remain exposed to strategic vulnerabilities as long as the semiconductors powering them are imported, senior defence scientists have warned, The Hindu reported.

Speaking at the Semiconductor Summit 2026 in Chennai, they argued that India must establish complete domestic capabilities across semiconductor design, fabrication, packaging, equipment manufacturing and critical materials.

Former DRDO Director General VK Saraswat said modern warfare has evolved from platform-centric operations to network-centric warfare, where success depends on command, control, communications and intelligence systems built around advanced semiconductors. Referring to Operation Sindoor, he said India is now "more or less equipped with complete network-centric capability".

Dr. Saraswat explained that the proposed Sudarshan Chakra air defence shield will integrate information from satellite, maritime, aerial and land-based sensors through artificial intelligence-enabled software. However, he cautioned that future conflicts, particularly prolonged engagements and saturation attacks, will require far greater technological self-reliance and resilience.

Highlighting emerging threats, he noted that drone swarms now arrive "in hundreds and thousands", making advanced countermeasures essential. Alongside ballistic missile defence systems, he stressed the growing importance of directed-energy weapons in future battlefields.

A Sivathanu Pillai, Founder, CEO and Managing Director of BrahMos Aerospace, said semiconductors are at the heart of precision-guided weapon systems. He explained that a BrahMos missile can alter its flight path within milliseconds after receiving a target update, enabling a "bullseye hit". "How has the intelligence come to that? It is a processor and the software. So semiconductors play a very important role there."

Dr. Pillai added that the TEJAS MK-2 is expected to process more data during a single mission than the entire MiG-21 fleet handled during the 1971 war. He also pointed out that Chandrayaan-3's successful landing relied heavily on imported semiconductor systems, remarking that "was all imported, you know; that was our problem".

According to Dr. Pillai, most Indian defence platforms currently rely on 28-nanometre chips, while the global semiconductor industry has advanced to 3-nanometre technology. He said India has partly compensated through sophisticated software solutions, such as combining signals from multiple GPS sources to improve accuracy, but warned that this approach would not be sufficient for future hypersonic systems.

Expressing concern over India's semiconductor roadmap, he stated: "The government has said that 3 nanometre we will achieve sometime around 2030 to 35. That is too late in the present situation." He warned that restrictions on semiconductor materials, devices and manufacturing equipment are tightening globally and argued that India must not only build foundries but also develop the machinery needed to support them.

Dr. Saraswat agreed that advanced semiconductor nodes at 5, 3 and 2 nanometres will be critical for artificial intelligence applications, including large language models and edge AI systems. While today's Sudarshan Chakra requirements could still be supported by 28-nanometre and potentially 14-nanometre technologies, future systems will demand far greater performance.

Discussing India's fabrication gap, Deleep Nair of IIT-Madras noted that India received CMOS technology from the Radio Corporation of America before Taiwan did. However, the Semiconductor Complex Limited facility in Chandigarh suffered a major setback after a fire in the late 1980s and remained inactive for an extended period.

As a result, the most advanced production technology currently operating there remains at 180 nanometres, a level comparable to what Intel, AMD and IBM used in the mid-1990s.

He added that DRDO's Gallium Arsenide Enabling Technology Centre is working on gallium arsenide and gallium nitride technologies, which are especially important for high-frequency defence applications.

Dr. Saraswat warned that imported chips create significant security risks. Recalling the early Prithvi missile program, he said supplies of the 8086 and 8087 processors became restricted after the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program was announced and tightened further under the Missile Technology Control Regime.

He cautioned that supply-chain compromise could directly threaten national security. "These devices, if they are compromised while they are being manufactured, then your weapon is compromised," he said.

Referring to the Stuxnet incident, he argued that vulnerabilities introduced during manufacturing can be exploited remotely. He also warned against dependence on foreign cloud infrastructure and navigation systems, saying, "If the cloud is sitting outside, the entire information going through my network-centric warfare system through the cloud, I am compromised."

The panel's central recommendation was the creation of an end-to-end semiconductor ecosystem under the India Semiconductor Mission. This would encompass raw materials, chip design, fabrication facilities, manufacturing equipment, advanced packaging, testing infrastructure and skilled manpower development.

Particular emphasis was placed on compound semiconductors such as gallium nitride and silicon carbide, which are essential for radar systems, imaging equipment, power electronics and advanced military sensors. Dr. Saraswat observed that the waiting period for extreme ultraviolet lithography machines required for advanced-node manufacturing has already stretched to four or five years.

Both Dr. Saraswat and Dr. Pillai urged the establishment of semiconductor research and development fabs within IITs and other universities, modelled on Belgium's Interuniversity Microelectronics Centre. They argued that without strong domestic research infrastructure, India will remain dependent on foreign technology for future breakthroughs, including neuromorphic computing.

Dr. Pillai highlighted India's strength in semiconductor design, stating that the country already accounts for around 20% of global chip design capability. "Why not go in a big way to develop the manpower? Instead of 20%, let us take 50% of the design we should do for the world," he said. He also encouraged universities to expand into packaging and testing activities.

Looking ahead, Dr. Nair noted that TATA's semiconductor fabrication facility in Gujarat, being established with technology licensed from Taiwan's Powerchip Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation, is expected to introduce 40-nanometre manufacturing capability. He added that several packaging facilities are also being developed under the semiconductor mission.

Addressing China's lead in the sector, Dr. Saraswat attributed its success to decades of sustained investment beginning in the 1980s and its strategy of bringing back Chinese-origin engineers trained in American universities and semiconductor companies. "Till 2021 we never made any major investment in semiconductors, and hence we are at this stage," he said.

On the issue of critical minerals, Dr. Pillai said India remains at an early stage of identifying and stockpiling strategic resources required for semiconductor manufacturing. "We don't even stockpile … China has done it very effectively, and there is going to be a big control coming on us; before that, we should do it," he said, adding bluntly: "We are behind many, many years."

The discussion underscored a growing consensus within India's strategic and scientific community that semiconductor sovereignty is no longer merely an economic objective.

As military systems become increasingly dependent on artificial intelligence, high-speed data processing and autonomous operations, domestic semiconductor capabilities are being viewed as a core pillar of national security, technological independence and future battlefield dominance.

Agencies