by Purusharth Arora

At the Farnborough Air Show, Godrej demonstrated its credibility as a global supplier. Domestically, however, it assembles an engine designed by the state. The distinction between these relationships poses significant questions about the nature of market participation.

Between 20 and 24 July 2026, at Hall O, Booth 0030, Godrej Enterprises Group presented its message to the Farnborough audience: as aerospace manufacturers seek to diversify supply chains, India has developed as a significant location for manufacturing high-value aircraft and aero-engine components. 

The company mentioned a more than 30 percent increase in aerospace exports, highlighted four decades of expertise in precision machining, hot forming, brazing, and welding, and referenced the establishment of a new design office in Bangalore focused on actuation systems.

However, Godrej did not present an engine at the event. The Kaveri Derivative Engine (KDE), frequently associated with Godrej in Indian media, is not owned by the company and therefore cannot be marketed independently. The disparity between what Godrej can offer international buyers and its role in assembling the KDE domestically is a central issue.

Assessing The Pace of Progress

The prevailing story that Godrej transitioned from assembling kits to producing complete engines faster than any previous DRDO program needs correction. The timeline is as follows: in September 2022, DRDO awarded Godrej a contract for eight modules of the dry Kaveri engine, making it the first private Indian company to receive such an order. By April 2025, Godrej had delivered two modules.

The first serial engine, D1, was delivered to GTRE in September 2025. In March 2026, GTRE instructed Godrej to deliver fully assembled engines from D3 onward. Transitioning from module assembly to full engine production in less than a year is a noteworthy success.

However, attributing greater speed to Godrej than to DRDO misrepresents the situation. The KDE is essentially the Kaveri core without the afterburner, originating from a program initiated in 1989. Godrej's recent progress represents the final phase of a process that has spanned thirty-seven years. The private sector did not contribute to the first invention; its contribution consists in achieving repeatability. 

The D-series engines signify a transition from prototype-driven P-series engines to units manufactured to consistent industrial standards, a task suited to factories rather than laboratories. This is the more accurate and policy-relevant claim for Godrej: the value of private industry is not in surpassing state-led design, but in changing unique prototypes into reproducible products.

Where Things Actually Stand

D1 and D2 are currently undergoing endurance trials of up to 150 hours, as well as a high-altitude testing at Russia's high-altitude facility and on India's INDIRA test bed. In March, the Defence Procurement Board reportedly recommended procuring 60 Ghatak UCAVs, giving the KDE a substantial production pipeline. Certification was targeted for 2026. As of this writing, confirmation of certification has not been found, and all figures should be interpreted with this caveat.

It is also important to consider the process by which Godrej secured its current position. Public reports indicate that the contract was awarded directly, without a published tender or identified unsuccessful bidders.

This observation is not intended as criticism; sole-sourcing is often necessary for high-risk, low-volume, and sensitive projects. However, this means that the most convincing evidence of Godrej's capabilities is not a domestic competition, but rather the export growth announced at Farnborough, which was achieved through transactions with independent international customers.

International markets evaluate Godrej's performance, while domestic authorities provide directives.

The Ownership Gap

The next phase of development has already been outlined. In January 2026, GTRE issued an expression of interest seeking a Development-cum-Production Partner for an Advanced High Thrust Class Engine with an yielding about 120 kilonewtons.

The selected partner will be responsible for manufacturing components, sub-assemblies, and modules, while GTRE will retain design authority. The partner is required to deliver at least eighteen engines. According to Alpha Defence's interpretation of the terms, intellectual property will remain with the Government of India or may be shared with the partner at the discretion of DRDO-GTRE. The partner may receive restricted manufacturing rights, but will not have independent commercial ownership of the design.

This situation contrasts with recent celebrations in India. When the Defence Minister announced Safran as a partner in August 2025, the main advantage cited was full technology transfer and complete intellectual property ownership for India. While this arrangement benefits national sovereignty, it does not automatically strengthen the domestic industrial base. Equating state ownership with industrial sovereignty is a misconception; a state may possess all technical documentation yet oversee firms that are unable to innovate, adapt, or commercialize these assets.

Consider the perspective of a corporate board evaluating whether to invest in a decade-long engine manufacturing facility under these conditions. Such an investment would involve committing resources to a product that cannot be independently modified or commercialized. The firm would function solely as an execution agency.

It is important to apply consistent standards to all parties involved. Godrej and L&T have reportedly requested that the Ministry of Defence fund the development of an upgraded 90-kilonewton KDE derivative with a new afterburner. In this arrangement, private firms seek state funding for development while aiming to share in the resulting product, whereas the state desires ownership of the design but expects industry to bear the capital costs.

Neither party has proposed a merit-based system that corresponds risk with equity. If a firm finances development independently, it should share ownership of the resulting product. Conversely, if the state provides funding, it should retain ownership and allocate production through competition. The current ambiguity benefits all stakeholders except the long-term industrial base.

Concentration Is Not An Ecosystem

India's emerging engine industry consists of a limited number of key players: Godrej for the KDE, Azad for the expendable turbojet (with a second source currently being sought), BrahMos Aerospace's Thiruvananthapuram unit for the Manik, and PTC Industries, which received a GTRE order in October 2025 for post-cast work on single-crystal turbine blades. Each company is uniquely associated with its respective engine. Rather than developing a strong ecosystem, India is currently establishing a series of single points of expertise, each vital yet vulnerable to disruption.

Recent developments around Azad indicate that GTRE is recognising the need to diversify. This raises a critical question: who serves as Godrej's second source? As orders for the KDE increase to support a UCAV fleet, dependence on a single integrator becomes a strategic risk rather than a benefit.

Four Questions The Booth Should Have Asked

1. Will the AHTCE partner selection be a real contest, with published criteria and named bidders, or another award?
2. Will the intellectual-property terms be disclosed before the winner commits capital? Investors price what they can see.
3. On the 90-kilonewton derivative, who pays and who owns? Risk for equity is the only rule that survives scrutiny.
4. Who is the KDE's second source, and will GTRE decide that before the Ghatak order, not after the first supply shock?

Conclusion

Godrej merits recognition for its achievements, which are often understated in simplified accounts. The company transformed a laboratory-developed engine into a product suitable for mass production, leveraging four decades of manufacturing expertise, and assumed responsibility for whole-engine assembly in less than a year. This accomplishment addresses a longstanding gap in India's engine development efforts.

Farnborough is an appropriate platform for a revealing reason: it shows that Godrej, as evaluated by discerning international customers, can manufacture highly complex components. However, India has yet to show that it will give its leading firms the same opportunities foreign clients offer, such as competitive selection processes, ownership of developed products, and the autonomy to commercialise their work.

A nation aspiring to develop a sovereign engine industry must determine whether it also seeks to cultivate sovereign firms. The distinction between these objectives will steer the trajectory of companies like Godrej in the coming decade.

Purusharth Arora is a defence analyst, whose expertise explores global power shifts, strategy, diplomacy transitions, and the geopolitics of systemic risk. Views expressed are personal