The reported revival of the World War II-era Lalmonirhat airbase in Bangladesh, with significant Chinese involvement, has triggered deep strategic anxieties in India due to the airbase’s proximity-just 12-20 kilometers-to the Indian border and only about 135 kilometers from the Siliguri Corridor, also known as the ‘Chicken’s Neck’.

This corridor is India’s sole and narrow land link (22 km at its narrowest) connecting its north-eastern states to the mainland, making it one of the country’s most critical and vulnerable geostrategic choke points.

Originally constructed in 1931 by the British as a forward Allied base during World War II, the Lalmonirhat airfield has been largely dormant for decades, though it retains substantial infrastructure, including a four-kilometer runway and expansive tarmac.

Recent years saw Bangladesh’s government establish an aviation and aerospace university on the site, but the current interim administration under Mohammed Yunus has accelerated plans to redevelop the airbase, explicitly seeking Chinese assistance for the project. Reports indicate that work may begin as soon as October 2025, with China’s involvement possibly extending to engaging Pakistani sub-contractors-further complicating the regional security calculus.

While Bangladesh officially frames the redevelopment as a civilian airport project, Indian analysts and intelligence agencies warn of the site’s potential dual-use nature. The airbase’s strategic location means it could be rapidly adapted for military logistics, surveillance, or even force deployment, enabling China to closely monitor Indian military movements and infrastructure in the Siliguri Corridor and the broader Northeast.

This concern is amplified by China’s recent pattern of upgrading and expanding airbases along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India, enhancing operational reach and readiness through improved infrastructure and the deployment of advanced platforms such as drones and stealth fighters.

China’s growing footprint in Bangladesh is not limited to military infrastructure. Chinese companies are also heavily involved in economic projects near the Indian border, including factories, a solar power plant, and a planned satellite city, often staffed predominantly by Chinese personnel. This multifaceted engagement increases Beijing’s leverage in the region and aligns with the broader “string of pearls” strategy-developing strategic assets in South Asian countries to expand geopolitical influence and military reach.

The evolving trilateral dynamic also involves Pakistan, whose intelligence and military delegations have recently visited Bangladesh, raising the specter of renewed ISI-backed activity in India’s Northeast-a region historically vulnerable to cross-border insurgency. The convergence of Chinese and Pakistani interests in Bangladesh, particularly so close to the Siliguri Corridor, is viewed by Indian security experts as a potential attempt at strategic encirclement.

India has responded by upgrading its own military infrastructure in the region, including airbases and defensive deployments, but faces a qualitative gap as China rapidly inducts new-generation stealth fighters and develops “airbase clusters” for operational redundancy and flexibility.

The situation is further complicated by provocative rhetoric from Bangladesh’s interim leadership, which has asserted Dhaka’s role as the “guardian of ocean access” for India’s landlocked Northeast-statements that have fuelled political and strategic unease in New Delhi.

The Chinese-backed revival of Lalmonirhat airbase near the Siliguri Corridor is emblematic of a broader, intensifying contest for influence and strategic advantage in South Asia. It underscores India’s acute vulnerability at its north-eastern gateway and highlights the urgent need for New Delhi to reinforce both its military posture and diplomatic engagement with neighbouring countries to safeguard its territorial integrity and regional stability.

Agencies