India’s Operation Sindoor has dramatically exposed the critical vulnerabilities in Pakistan’s defence infrastructure, which has become heavily reliant on Chinese military hardware. The operation, launched in retaliation for a major terrorist attack in Pahalgam, saw India execute deep and precise strikes against terror camps and military infrastructure across Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), destroying nine terror camps and damaging 20% of Pakistan’s air force infrastructure, including key airbases such as Nur Khan, Rafiqui, Murid, Sukkur, and Jacobabad.

These actions marked a doctrinal shift in India’s counter-terror strategy, signalling that any future acts of terrorism would be met with overwhelming and direct military consequences.

A central revelation from Operation Sindoor is the inadequacy of Pakistan’s Chinese-supplied weapons systems. Despite the volume of arms imports-81% of Pakistan’s total arms imports are from China-these systems are often downgraded versions of what China fields domestically. For example, the HQ-9P air defence system supplied to Pakistan has a range of only 125 km, compared to the 250–300 km range of China’s own HQ-9B.

Similarly, the PL-15E air-to-air missile exported to Pakistan has a 145 km range, while China’s domestic PL-15 can reach 200–300 km. The JF-17’s KLJ-7A AESA radar, with its smaller aperture, is outclassed by the RBE2-AA radar on India’s Rafale jets, resulting in inferior detection and tracking capabilities.

During the conflict, Chinese air defence systems such as the HQ-9B and HQ-16 failed to intercept Indian SCALP stealth cruise missiles and HAMMER glide bombs, struggling particularly with low-altitude, terrain-hugging threats due to limited detection ranges and susceptibility to jamming. Indian SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences) tactics further exploited the lack of redundancy and layered coordination in Pakistan’s air defence network, targeting radar nodes and crippling the entire system. The operational inflexibility of Pakistan’s fighter jets, which rely on pre-programmed flight paths, made them predictable and vulnerable to India’s technologically superior and more adaptable air force.

Pakistan’s use of Chinese drones, including the Wing Loong II and CH-4, also proved ineffective. These drones were easily intercepted by India’s Akash SAMs and SMASH-2000 counter-drone systems due to poor maneuverability and lack of stealth features. Maintenance issues plagued these systems as well, with defective drones reportedly crashing during missions and a lack of specialized technicians causing significant downtime.

The technological gap was compounded by Pakistan’s limited defence budget ($10.2 billion compared to India’s $86 billion), which led to maintenance shortfalls and reduced operational readiness. Pakistani pilots, often trained on simulators rather than in real-world combat scenarios, struggled to match the performance of Indian pilots, particularly those trained in France on the Rafale platform.

India’s diversified procurement strategy-blending Russian, Western, and indigenous technologies-has reduced dependency risks and enhanced adaptability, in stark contrast to Pakistan’s overwhelming reliance on Chinese arms. The result, as demonstrated in Operation Sindoor, is a Pakistani defence apparatus that is not only technologically outmatched but also operationally brittle, with downgraded Chinese systems unable to withstand the precision and sophistication of Indian attacks.

Operation Sindoor has not only delivered a decisive blow to Pakistan’s terror infrastructure but also exposed the severe limitations of its Chinese-supplied military hardware. The episode has underscored the risks of overdependence on a single supplier-especially when that supplier withholds its most advanced technology-and has established a new strategic reality in the region, with India demonstrating both the will and the capability to respond forcefully to terrorism and military provocations.

Based On A News18 Report