TEJAS Naval MK-1 Jet As An Indigenous Electronic Warfare Aircraft: A Viable Alternative To The EA-18G Growler?

by Darpan Sanjay Agarwal
India’s ambitions to modernise and indigenise its military aviation capability have taken a significant leap forward with the development of the TEJAS MK-1. Originally conceptualised as a carrier-based light combat aircraft, the Naval TEJAS now shows promising potential to evolve into a specialised Electronic Warfare (EW) platform, similar to the role of the American EA-18G Growler. As India seeks to boost its naval presence in the Indo-Pacific region and counter growing electronic threats from adversaries, an EW version of the TEJAS could prove to be both strategic and transformative.
Why Consider An EW Variant of TEJAS MK-1?
The Indian Navy currently lacks a dedicated, indigenous electronic warfare aircraft capable of jamming enemy radar, interfering with communications, and defending naval task forces against electronic and missile threats. In an era where modern warfare is increasingly dominated by control of the electromagnetic spectrum, EW capabilities are no longer optional—they are essential.
The TEJAS MK-1, being a STOBAR-capable platform with extensive flight testing experience on both aircraft carriers and land-based facilities, offers a solid foundation for such a variant. While lighter than the EA-18G Growler, its smaller logistical footprint and compatibility with Indian systems make it a strong candidate for development into an indigenous EW platform tailored to regional needs.
Key Advantages of TEJAS MK-1 As An EW Platform
1. Indigenous Development And Technological Autonomy
Transforming the Naval TEJAS into an EW aircraft supports India's 'Atmanirbhar Bharat' vision by creating a home-grown capability without relying on foreign imports. It also provides critical experience in integrating electronic warfare systems with indigenous platforms.
2. Integration With Indigenous Weapons
The TEJAS MK-1 has successfully integrated the Rudram-1 anti-radiation missile, essential for Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD). Future variants can incorporate Rudram-2 and Rudram-3 for extended range. Additional indigenous systems such as:
- Astra MK-1 and MK-2 (Beyond Visual Range air-to-air missiles)
- Smart Anti-Airfield Weapon (SAAW)
- DRDO-developed ECM pods and electronic intelligence sensors can be seamlessly integrated, allowing for a fully indigenous EW weapons package.
3. Strategic Use of Andaman & Nicobar Theatre
With its strategic location and existing airbases, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands offer ideal deployment zones. TEJAS MK-1 can operate from these longer runways with a full load-out of sensors, missiles, and fuel, compensating for any limitations faced during carrier-based take-off.
4. Cost-Effective Fleet Expansion
Ordering 40–60 EW variants of the TEJAS MK-1 would provide India with a cost-effective solution while supporting local industry. It also allows the Indian Navy to field a dedicated EW force without the expense of importing foreign aircraft.
5. Enhanced Interoperability And Fleet Synergy
Sharing infrastructure, training programs, and logistics with other TEJAS variants across the Air Force and Navy will increase operational efficiency and reduce lifecycle costs.
Challenges And Limitations
1. Payload And Power Constraints
The TEJAS MK-1’s single-engine design limits the available electrical power and payload capacity. Advanced EW systems, which are power-hungry, may reduce its effective range or weapon load.
2. Limited Range And Endurance
Without mid-air refuelling, the TEJAS MK-1's operational endurance may fall short in long-range EW missions. However, this can be mitigated by forward-basing in the Andaman & Nicobar region.
3. Carrier Suitability And Deck Space
The limited size of Indian carriers like INS Vikrant and INS Vikramaditya restricts the number and size of onboard EW aircraft. This makes efficient deck management critical.
4. Short Take-off Power Requirements
Carrier take-off requires high thrust within short deck lengths. This restricts take-off weight, which may limit EW system payloads. However, airbases in Andaman & Nicobar allow full-spectrum deployment, providing flexibility in mission load-out.
5. Developmental Complexity And Timelines
Developing a capable EW variant involves substantial R&D in EW pods, sensor fusion, and avionics. Indigenous systems are still maturing and may take 5–7 years before becoming operationally ready.
The Strategic Vision: A Force Multiplier For The Indo-Pacific
A dedicated EW fleet of 40–60 TEJAS MK-1 variants would greatly enhance India's ability to control and dominate the electromagnetic spectrum in the Indian Ocean. With deployments from both aircraft carriers and forward bases like Port Blair, these aircraft could conduct SEAD, electronic intelligence (ELINT), and communications disruption missions.
The Andaman and Nicobar Islands serve as a linchpin. Long runways and secure locations allow TEJAS aircraft to carry full EW and combat loads—Rudram missiles, Astra BVRAAMs, fuel tanks, and DRDO’s jamming pods—without sacrificing performance.
With successful development, India will become one of the very few nations fielding a completely indigenous carrier-compatible EW aircraft, significantly boosting its deterrence posture and export prospects.
Conclusion
Although TEJAS MK-1 may not rival the EA-18G Growler in brute strength or capacity, it offers a viable, scalable, and sovereign path for India to build its own electronic warfare capability. Through indigenous integration of Rudram, Astra, SAAW, and DRDO-developed EW systems, and by leveraging strategic airbases like the Andaman & Nicobar Islands, the platform can overcome its limitations.
A committed order of 40–60 aircraft not only supports development but ensures India remains self-reliant, technologically advanced, and combat-ready in the rapidly evolving Indo-Pacific security landscape.
This piece from the originating author might be of the point-in-time nature, and edited for clarity, style and length. IDN does not take institutional positions or sides, and all views, positions, and conclusions expressed herein are solely those of the author