DRDO's Air Defence system destroying a simulated hostile projectile in Eno-atmosphere regime

Iranian Saturation Attack

Recent Iranian ballistic missile attacks against Israel have demonstrated the evolving threat landscape that modern missile defence systems must counter. Iran's deployment of approximately 300 ballistic missiles in multiple waves, with reports indicating that most missiles successfully penetrated Israeli air defences despite the country's advanced multi-layered defence systems, underscores critical vulnerabilities in contemporary missile defence architectures.

Despite Israel's sophisticated multi-layered defence system incorporating Iron Dome, David's Sling, and Arrow systems, several missiles successfully breached air defences, striking residential areas in Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan, and other critical locations. The Israeli Defence Forces acknowledged that while most missiles were intercepted at rates similar to previous attacks, dozens were deliberately allowed to strike open areas to conserve interceptors, highlighting the resource management challenges inherent in defending against saturation attacks.

China's Ballistic Missile Threat To India

This analysis becomes particularly relevant for India, given China's substantially larger ballistic missile arsenal estimated at over 1,300 Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs), 500 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), and extensive Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) capabilities. The strategic imperative for India lies in developing comprehensive countermeasures against potential Chinese saturation attacks that could overwhelm current defence systems through sheer volume and sophisticated coordination.

China's strategic positioning along the Tibetan plateau allows DF-21 missiles to reach Delhi and densely populated regions of northern India, while India's current SRBM and MRBM inventory lacks comparable range to effectively counter Chinese installations. The deployment of Multiple Independently-targetable Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRVs) and advanced decoy systems further complicates interception scenarios, potentially overwhelming existing defence capabilities.

Critical Vulnerabilities In Current Indian BMD Architecture: Phase-I System Limitations

India's current Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Phase-I system, designed to intercept missiles with ranges up to 2,000 km, operates through a two-tiered architecture comprising Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) for high-altitude interception and Advanced Air Defence (AAD) for lower-altitude engagement. While this system has demonstrated successful interception capabilities in controlled testing environments, including the August 2018 test where the AAD successfully destroyed a medium-range ballistic missile target amid multiple electronically simulated dummy warheads, the system faces significant scalability challenges when confronting large-scale saturation attacks. The current inventory of interceptor missiles remains insufficient to counter the potential volume of incoming threats that China could deploy in a coordinated assault.

Radar Network Deficiencies

India's BMD network relies heavily on the Swordfish long-range tracking radar and Multifunction Fire Control Radar systems to provide detection, tracking, and guidance capabilities. However, the current radar configuration exhibits critical gaps in coverage and processing capacity when handling multiple simultaneous targets. The existing command and control architecture, while incorporating Israeli-derived technology from the Arrow system, lacks the distributed processing power necessary to manage hundreds of incoming threats simultaneously. The centralized Mission Control Centre approach creates potential single points of failure that adversaries could exploit through targeted strikes or electronic warfare attacks.

Strategic Recommendations For BMD Enhancement: Distributed Radar Network Architecture

The enhancement of India's BMD capabilities requires a fundamental shift toward distributed sensor architectures that can provide comprehensive coverage while maintaining operational resilience. A distributed air and missile defence layer based on smaller, less costly radars should supplement existing systems to provide enhanced surveillance and tracking of ballistic and air-breathing threats. These smaller, relocatable land- and sea-based radars can be deployed in greater quantities to improve coverage, particularly against low-flying threats, while operating cooperatively to provide equivalent coverage to large, fixed-site radars. The implementation of the Distributed Imaging Radar Technology (DIRT) program concept, which develops technology to continuously track and identify moving and stationary battlefield targets through distributed platforms, offers a viable framework for expanding India's radar network.

Artificial Intelligence Integration For Command And Control

The integration of artificial intelligence into India's BMD architecture represents a critical force multiplier for managing saturation attacks. India's Akashteer system demonstrates the potential of AI-powered automated air defence, having successfully intercepted Pakistani drone and missile attacks through real-time target identification and engagement coordination. The system's ability to automate detection, tracking, and engagement of enemy aircraft, drones, and missiles while integrating various radar systems, sensors, and communication technologies into a single operational framework provides a foundation for scaling defensive capabilities. Advanced AI algorithms can significantly reduce kill chain execution time-frames by expediting threat prioritization, trajectory prediction, and interceptor allocation decisions.

Multi-Target Tracking And Engagement Capabilities

Contemporary missile defence systems must evolve beyond single-target engagement paradigms to address simultaneous multiple threat scenarios. The development of advanced multiple sensor, multiple target tracking algorithms becomes essential for managing the complex threat environments characteristic of saturation attacks. These systems must incorporate sophisticated assignment algorithms that can process tracking data from distributed sensor networks while maintaining accuracy across numerous concurrent engagements. The integration of machine learning algorithms enables continuous improvement in threat assessment and engagement strategies based on previous encounters.

Enhanced Interceptor Inventory And Capabilities

India's interceptor missile inventory requires substantial expansion to address potential Chinese saturation attack scenarios. The Indian Air Force has acknowledged that while existing systems possess superior capabilities compared to systems like Iron Dome, current inventory levels remain insufficient for complex, saturated attack scenarios. The development of the Akash NG system with extended range, improved accuracy, and enhanced capabilities provides a foundation for expanding defensive capacity. The BMD Phase-II program, featuring AD-1 and AD-2 interceptors designed to engage intermediate-range ballistic missiles and ICBMs with ranges up to 5,000 km, addresses longer-range threats but requires accelerated development and deployment.

Immediate Priority Actions (1-2 Years)

The most urgent requirement involves expanding India's interceptor missile inventory through accelerated production of existing systems while enhancing radar network density through deployment of additional mobile radar units. The integration of AI-powered target tracking and engagement systems based on the Akashteer framework should be prioritized for critical defensive zones. Upgrading communication infrastructure to support high-speed data transmission between defensive elements represents a foundational requirement for network-centric operations.

Medium-Term Development Goals (3-5 Years)

The completion of BMD Phase-II development and deployment should focus on providing comprehensive coverage against intermediate and long-range ballistic missile threats. The establishment of distributed radar networks incorporating counter-stealth capabilities requires coordination between DRDO and industry partners to achieve operational deployment. The development of hypersonic threat countermeasures, potentially including glide-phase interceptors, addresses emerging threat categories that conventional systems cannot effectively engage.

Long-Term Strategic Objectives (5-10 Years)

The evolution toward fully integrated, AI-enabled missile defence networks capable of autonomous threat assessment and engagement coordination represents the ultimate objective for India's defensive architecture. The integration of space-based sensors with ground-based systems provides comprehensive tracking capabilities from boost phase through terminal engagement. The development of indigenous hypersonic interceptor systems ensures technological sovereignty while addressing the most advanced threat categories.

Conclusion

The strategic imperative for enhancing India's ballistic missile defence capabilities has been starkly illustrated by recent conflict dynamics, particularly the Iranian saturation attacks against Israel and more importantly during Pakistan's swarm drone attacks during Operation Sindoor.

The transformation of India's BMD architecture from its current two-tier system to a comprehensive, distributed, AI-enabled network represents both a technological challenge and a strategic necessity. Success in this endeavour requires coordinated development across multiple domains: expanding interceptor inventories, deploying distributed radar networks, integrating artificial intelligence for automated engagement, and developing specialized capabilities against emerging threats including stealth and hypersonic weapons.

The timeline for implementation must balance urgent operational requirements with long-term technological development, ensuring that India maintains credible defensive capabilities against evolving threat scenarios while building toward next-generation defensive architectures capable of addressing future challenges. The lessons learned from contemporary conflicts demonstrate that passive defensive postures are insufficient; modern missile defence requires proactive, intelligent, and adaptable systems capable of evolving with the threat environment.

IDN