Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s scheduled meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi represents a significant moment in the gradual resumption of dialogue between the two Asian powers after years of strained ties.

The meeting carries weight not only because of the strategic significance of the India-China relationship but also due to the broader geopolitical context in which both nations currently find themselves. 

Beijing’s top diplomat arrived in New Delhi to engage with Modi, National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, and other senior Indian officials, with talks expected to focus primarily on border disengagement, troop reduction, and the resumption of limited cross-border trade.

The very fact that such high-level discussions are taking place highlights cautious optimism on both sides about easing longstanding tensions, particularly in the aftermath of the 2020 Ladakh border clashes that triggered the sharpest downturn in India-China relations in decades.

Relations between the two nuclear-armed neighbours had been frozen since that confrontation, with both sides deploying tens of thousands of soldiers across the contested Himalayan border. Though violence has since receded, it left long-lasting implications on bilateral trust, military posturing, and regional diplomacy.

Over the past year, however, progress has slowly emerged. Both countries signed an agreement on coordinated border patrols and partially withdrew troops at certain stand-off points along the Line of Actual Control. Infrastructure development continues on both sides, with China and India expanding road, rail, and forward-post networks, which underscores their reluctance to entirely ease defensive preparations.

Despite these structural challenges, new confidence-building measures are also evident — ranging from China’s decision to allow Indian religious pilgrims into Tibet, to talks on resuming suspended direct flights and trade through three major Himalayan border crossings.

From New Delhi’s perspective, the timing of these engagements reflects broader strategic recalibration amid deteriorating ties with Washington. The Trump administration’s tariffs on Indian exports, coupled with penalties for India’s discounted purchases of Russian oil, have created economic and diplomatic frictions in what was traditionally a strong India-U.S. partnership.

At the same time, Washington’s renewed outreach toward Pakistan, including high-profile military and energy agreements, has left India wary of over dependence on American support. In this context, India’s engagement with China may represent an effort to balance competing external pressures, avoid encirclement by two adversarial neighbours, and extract some breathing space at a time of shifting power dynamics in Asia.

Strategic experts, however, caution that this rapprochement is fragile and deeply constrained. Analysts like Manoj Joshi of the Observer Research Foundation describe the normalisation as uneasy since neither India nor China has yet demonstrated readiness to compromise politically on the core boundary dispute.

Even while engaging, both sides continue to “talk past each other,” highlighting just how intractable issues of sovereignty and territorial security remain. Similarly, Lt. Gen. DS Hooda, a former Indian military commander, argues that India must remain conscious of China’s intertwined relationship with Pakistan — one in which Beijing continues to provide military and economic support to Islamabad. For India, this dynamic adds complexity to its regional calculus, making it difficult to reduce dependency on Washington while also mitigating risks from its western and northern borders simultaneously.

On the other side, China’s messaging has been more conciliatory, with Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning framing Wang Yi’s visit as an opportunity to “properly handle differences” and restore stability in the bilateral relationship. Beijing has emphasised the importance of joint efforts to ensure peace along the border, positioning itself as willing to engage constructively.

The signal here is partly tactical: China, under President Xi Jinping, faces mounting challenges in its relations with the U.S., Japan, and Southeast Asian states, which makes reducing friction with India important for regional calculations.

Similarly, India’s participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), set to be hosted in China later this month, reflects Beijing’s interest in stabilising ties at least temporarily. Modi’s confirmed attendance at the SCO meeting would mark his first visit to China since 2018, and his anticipated bilateral meeting with President Xi could serve as the next benchmark in defining the trajectory of relations.

The symbolism of leaders resuming personal diplomacy cannot be understated. For both Modi and Xi, cultivating an image of being able to manage one of Asia’s most consequential rivalries serves domestic and international purposes.

Xi’s previous call for a “dragon-elephant tango” metaphor — suggesting coexistence and collaboration between the two civilizations — resonates with Beijing’s strategic vision of a multipolar Asia less dependent on U.S. leadership. For India, a pragmatic thaw with China provides breathing room, diversifies diplomatic alliances, and limits strategic overstretch at a time of turbulence with Washington and economic headwinds at home.

Still, despite the renewed optics of engagement, the fundamental asymmetries and rivalries remain unresolved. Both New Delhi and Beijing continue asserting competing territorial claims, employing economic tools as leverage, and enhancing military partnerships with other powers in Asia. India remains firmly invested in the Quad security partnership with the U.S., Australia, and Japan, which Beijing views with suspicion.

At the same time, China’s unwavering support for Pakistan’s defence and infrastructure development poses persistent challenges to India’s security environment. Thus, while current efforts signal willingness to stabilise relations, the sustainability of this thaw depends on whether both sides are prepared to pursue genuine compromises beyond temporary de-escalation.

Conclusion: India and China are currently navigating an uncertain, tactical rapprochement driven partly by external circumstances such as India-U.S. frictions and regional realignments.

While steps like troop disengagement, renewed trade channels, and cultural exchanges suggest progress, the underlying disputes — particularly the border question and the China-Pakistan nexus — remain far from resolution. 

Prime Minister Modi’s upcoming visit to China and dialogue with President Xi Jinping will provide an important test of whether this momentum can evolve into durable normalisation, or whether the thaw is merely a short-lived strategic pause amid deeper, unresolved mistrust.

Agencies