Prime Minister Narendra Modi is poised to undertake a significant diplomatic journey to China later this month, marking his first visit to the country since the deadly Galwan Valley clash between Indian and Chinese troops in June 2020.

This visit, centred on the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit scheduled for August 31 to September 1, 2025, signals a major development in the ongoing—yet fraught—India-China relationship.

According to reports, Modi’s China visit will directly follow his trip to Tokyo, where he will meet Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida for the annual India-Japan Summit on August 30.

The decision to attend the SCO summit in China comes after a prolonged period of tensions between the world’s two most populous countries. The Galwan incident in 2020 had frozen high-level bilateral visits, intensified mistrust, and brought border infrastructure and troop deployments into sharp focus. Since then, both nations have engaged in multiple rounds of diplomatic and military talks, striving for incremental de-escalation but falling short of a complete normalization of ties.

Modi’s upcoming travel is therefore being watched closely not just by stakeholders in Delhi and Beijing, but by the wider international community that is keenly aware of the ripple effects India-China relations have on regional security architecture.

Notably, the SCO summit will bring together heads of state from its member countries: China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iran, and Belarus. Originating from the Shanghai Five, established in 1996 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, the SCO has expanded its mandate to focus on political, economic, and security issues across Eurasia.

This diplomatic initiative coincides with growing geopolitical turbulence globally. Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping last met in October 2024 at the BRICS summit in Russia, where multilateral platforms attempted to navigate mounting polarization.

This is now magnified further, as US President Donald Trump has publicly accused BRICS nations of undermining the global dominance of the US dollar—especially via ongoing purchases of Russian oil—stoking new tensions and adding complexity to cooperation in forums like BRICS and SCO.

Within the SCO itself, India faces unique diplomatic challenges. Although Defence Minister Rajnath Singh attended the SCO Defence Ministers’ meeting in Qingdao, China, earlier in June, he notably refused to sign a key draft document.

The reason was India’s objection to language in the text that it perceived as diluting New Delhi’s uncompromising position on terrorism, particularly after the devastating attack in Pahalgam that claimed 26 lives.

India’s refusal led to the abandonment of a joint statement by the SCO, with insiders attributing the deadlock to efforts by China and Pakistan to insert references seen by Indian officials as hostile—including a mention of Balochistan, which India interpreted as an attempt to insinuate its involvement in destabilizing the region.

Against this backdrop, Modi's planned visit is laden with both symbolic and strategic weight. It signals an attempt by Delhi and Beijing to shepherd bilateral ties out of persistent deadlock, but also exposes the underlying mistrust and divergent priorities that continue to haunt the SCO’s consensus-driven model.

The outcome of the summit, and the high-level interactions surrounding it, could redefine the path forward not only for India-China relations but for the broader regional equilibrium in Eurasia.

Agency