Donald Trump’s recent threats to “substantially” raise tariffs on Indian goods due to its continued purchases of Russian oil have triggered strong reactions and highlighted notable inconsistencies in U.S. trade and foreign policy, particularly when comparing India’s treatment to that of China.

Several expert commentators and Indian officials have openly questioned why Trump’s administration is targeting India with heightened intensity, while China—which buys even more Russian oil—is not facing similar public threats or punitive measures.

The core of the criticism canters on the fact that, as highlighted by the Global Trade Research Initiative and multiple trade analysts, China remains the largest buyer of Russian oil, having imported $62.6 billion worth in 2024, compared to India’s $52.7 billion.

Yet, Trump appears to have reserved his most aggressive rhetoric and concrete tariff actions for India. Foreign policy experts suggest this is a clear case of geopolitical selectivity; by not “pressing down on China with the same intensity,” the U.S. signals it is using trade policy as a lever of broader strategic posturing rather than one of universal principle.

Trump’s public statements have focused on accusations that India is reselling Russian oil for “big profits” and disregarding the humanitarian cost of the war in Ukraine. He wrote that he would substantially raise tariffs against India because he believes the country is indirectly supporting Russia’s war effort through its energy policy.

India, however, has firmly rebutted these allegations, with the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) calling the criticism “unjustified and unreasonable.” The MEA argues India’s oil imports are compelled by necessity: traditional suppliers redirected exports to Europe after the Ukraine war began, and discounted Russian oil was needed to maintain predictable and affordable energy prices for Indian consumers.

The ministry also drew attention to the fact that both the U.S. and the European Union have continued their own trading relationships with Russia, including in strategic sectors like energy, chemicals, and machinery.

Experts and Indian officials further highlight a perceived hypocrisy in Western policy: while India’s energy trade with Russia is vilified, much larger flows of Russian LNG and other goods continue to Europe, and the U.S. itself maintains significant trade in sectors like uranium and chemicals.

The statement from India’s MEA pointed out that in 2024, EU-Russia bilateral trade in goods reached 67.5 billion euro, with additional billions in services, and that the U.S. continues to import Russian goods essential to its own industries.

The lack of equivalent action against China is thus widely interpreted as being rooted in geopolitical calculations and the complex economic interdependence between the U.S. and China. China’s economic scale, its critical role in global supply chains, and the high stakes of U.S.-China competition appear to constrain the intensity of U.S. actions.

In contrast, targeting India—despite its rapidly growing significance—may be seen as less risky domestically and internationally.

Trump’s approach exposes significant inconsistencies in U.S. sanctions and tariff application. While India is being threatened with material economic penalties for its Russian oil policy, China—despite its even larger purchases—has not been subject to the same intensity of pressure.

This differential treatment is broadly viewed as a function of geopolitical strategy, selective enforcement, and the realities of global economic dependencies, rather than a principled or uniform application of foreign policy.

India has vowed to adjust to these measures as it has with other economies, while underscoring that it will continue to prioritize national interest in its trade and energy policy.

Based On ANI Report