US Arm-Twisting On TEJAS Engines: Should India Turn To France Or Russia?

HAL technicians integrate GE-404 engine into TEJAS MK-1A fighter jet
The Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) TEJAS program stands at a critical juncture, with engine supply bottlenecks once again highlighting India’s dependence on foreign manufacturers.
Although Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has managed to deliver ten TEJAS MK-1A aircraft, future production schedules are under strain due to delayed deliveries of the U.S.-supplied General Electric F-404 engines.
The issue reflects broader concerns about Washington’s influence on India’s strategic choices, which have extended from defence procurements to energy imports in recent years.
HAL is struggling to synchronise its production pace with the availability of engines. GE had initially promised two engines by August, but delays meant the company supplied one in March, another in July, leaving the program short-stocked.
Although GE has assured 3–5 engines could be delivered by October, the numbers remain insufficient against India’s fleet requirements. Current projections suggest only seven more engines may arrive by December, with around 20 expected in 2026, while bulk deliveries would not materialise before 2027. This lag poses a direct threat to the timely execution of the ₹45,000 crore contract signed in 2021 for 83 TEJAS MK-1A aircraft.
Despite these setbacks, India is deepening its engagement with GE. Negotiations are in the final phase for a $1 billion contract to acquire 113 additional F-404 engines to support the expanded TEJAS fleet after the Indian government recently cleared the acquisition of 97 more aircraft.
At the same time, discussions on the more advanced F-414 engines, essential for both the TEJAS MK-2 and AMCA projects, are intensifying. An Indian delegation will head to the U.S. later this year to press forward negotiations, with a view to finalise an agreement by 2026. While this reflects continuity in Indo-U.S. defence ties, it also embodies India’s growing vulnerability if delays persist.
Analysts argue that New Delhi needs to broaden its power-plant options. France’s Safran, already supporting the Rafale program, has shown readiness to co-develop advanced engines with India. This would align with India’s longer-term strategic objective of joint production, technology transfer, and greater autonomy in manufacturing.
Russia, despite facing its own economic and industrial pressures due to the Ukraine conflict, continues to be an experienced supplier of aero-engines, including those that power Su-30MKIs and MiG-29s in service with the IAF. Choices like these could help India hedge against disruptions caused by over-reliance on a single supplier.
The Indian Air Force has recognised the urgency of breaking external dependence in critical technologies like turbofan engines. Air Marshal Awadhesh Kumar Bharti recently underlined that India’s aim is to field an indigenous fighter engine within the next 10–12 years. Institutions like the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE), in collaboration with industry partners, are being tasked with achieving this long-awaited breakthrough. However, the time horizons involved — stretching into the next decade — mean that India must balance immediate operational needs with long-term self-reliance.
The TEJAS MK-1A program symbolises more than fleet modernisation; it represents India’s drive toward indigenisation in aerospace. Yet, as the engine delays illustrate, key nodes of vulnerability remain.
With MiG-21 squadrons retired and the Air Force pressed to maintain its strength, delays in TEJAS production could hamper operational readiness at a critical time when regional security challenges from both Pakistan and China remain acute.
For India, the solution lies not in severing partnerships but in recalibrating them. The U.S. remains a valuable defence partner, but India must pursue parallel tracks with France and Russia while accelerating domestic development projects.
Diversification of suppliers and sustained investment in indigenous R&D can reduce exposure to geopolitical pressure while strengthening autonomy. In effect, managing this engine crisis may serve as a reminder that true strategic independence requires not just advanced platforms, but also mastery over the engines that power them.
IDN (With Agency Inputs)
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