The Pakistan Mili Muslim League (MML), the political arm widely believed to represent the banned Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), has postponed its annual workers’ convention, which had been scheduled for Sunday, 2 November, at Minar-e-Pakistan in Lahore.

Sources within the Lashkar confirmed that the decision was made following intelligence warnings about “external threats” to the organisation’s top leadership. The announcement was not made publicly but communicated in a series of discreet corner meetings by senior Lashkar figures. Group chief Hafiz Saeed personally approved the decision, according to those familiar with the matter.

Although the MML did not officially link the postponement to India’s ongoing Exercise Trishul 2025, insiders privately acknowledged that the military manoeuvres “could be one of the reasons”. The large-scale joint exercise, involving the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force, has been interpreted in Pakistan’s security circles as a show of force coinciding with the Lahore event.

No new date has been announced for the MML gathering. Officials close to the group’s leadership described the mood within as one of “heightened alert”, suggesting deep unease about recent developments along the western sector and in the Arabian Sea.

Adding to the atmosphere of tension, Pakistan’s aviation authorities issued a second Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) within five days—an uncommon move.

The new advisory, effective from 1 to 30 November, restricts significant portions of airspace across southern and coastal Pakistan. Intelligence sources interpret this as a precautionary measure reflecting anxiety over the ongoing Indian tri-services exercise.

Additionally, a navigational warning covering 2–5 November has been issued by Pakistan for live weapon firing in the Arabian Sea, indicating the military’s elevated readiness posture.

India’s Exercise Trishul 2025 continues across multiple theatres, including the western sector and the maritime domain.

Politically, the deferment of the MML convention underscores a spill over effect, where domestic Islamist organisations have adjusted their public activities in response to external military developments. The connection drawn between the exercise and Hafiz Saeed’s security not only hints at Pakistan’s nervous calculation but also shows how non-state networks remain sensitive to military posturing across the border.

Within India’s operational framework, Trishul 2025 was designed to validate rapid mobilisation, cross-domain synchronisation, and maritime control under realistic combat conditions. Yet, its regional impact has extended beyond tactical training—triggering visible anxiety within Pakistan’s security architecture and political networks, a phenomenon that analysts are now referring to as the “Trishul Effect.”

The operation emphasises integrated tri-service combat drills, maritime dominance, and high-tempo warfare coordination. While officially described as a routine exercise, its timing has clearly unsettled Islamabad’s security establishment, reinforcing the persistent mistrust that characterises Indo-Pak relations.

Agencies