China has sharply accused the United States of distorting its defence policy in a deliberate bid to sabotage any thawing in relations between Beijing and New Delhi.

This claim emerged during a routine press briefing on Thursday, where Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian addressed concerns over Beijing potentially exploiting recent border de-escalations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Lin emphasised that China views its ties with India through a strategic, long-term lens. He insisted that the border dispute is an exclusively bilateral matter between the two nations, firmly objecting to any third-party interference or judgement on the issue.

The accusation stems directly from a comprehensive US Department of Defence report released on Tuesday, titled ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2025’. This annual assessment to Congress portrays China as seeking to leverage the easing of LAC tensions to stabilise Sino-Indian relations and thereby curb the growing strategic convergence between Washington and New Delhi.

The report highlights a pivotal agreement announced by Indian leadership in October 2024, focused on disengaging troops from the remaining friction points along the LAC.

This development came just two days before a significant sideline meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the BRICS Summit.

That Xi-Modi encounter signalled the launch of monthly high-level dialogues between the two powers. Discussions reportedly covered border management protocols, alongside practical steps to revive bilateral ties, such as resuming direct flights, easing visa restrictions, and fostering exchanges among academics and journalists.

US analysts, as per the report, assess that China aims to capitalise on this reduced friction to prevent deeper US-India alignment. Yet, it cautions that India harbours lingering scepticism regarding China's intentions, with mutual distrust and persistent irritants likely constraining any rapid rapprochement.

This episode unfolds against a backdrop of prolonged Sino-Indian border standoffs, which escalated dramatically in 2020 with the deadly Galwan Valley clash that claimed the lives of 20 Indian soldiers and an undisclosed number of Chinese troops. Subsequent negotiations yielded partial disengagements, but full resolution has remained elusive.

The October 2024 pact represents a tentative breakthrough, patrolled by both militaries to verify compliance amid harsh Himalayan terrain. It aligns with broader diplomatic overtures, including Modi and Xi's last in-person summit in 2019, before pandemic disruptions and border flare-ups intervened.

From Beijing's vantage, the US report exemplifies a pattern of narrative warfare aimed at driving wedges in Asia. Lin Jian's retort underscores China's preference for managing India relations independently, free from external pressures that might amplify quadrilateral groupings like the Quad—comprising the US, India, Japan, and Australia.

India's strategic calculus adds nuance. New Delhi has deepened defence ties with Washington through initiatives like the Quad and iCET (Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology), procuring advanced weaponry such as MQ-9B drones and exploring co-production of jet engines. Yet, it maintains a multi-alignment posture, engaging Russia for S-400 systems and BRICS for economic leverage.

The US perspective, embedded in its annual China military report, frames Beijing's overtures as opportunistic. It argues that stabilisation along the LAC serves China's broader aims: diverting Indian focus from the Indo-Pacific, easing resource strains on the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and diluting New Delhi's role in US-led containment strategies.

Evidence from the report points to China's military build-up opposite India, including new airbases, missile brigades, and infrastructure in Tibet and Xinjiang. Despite disengagements, satellite imagery reveals sustained PLA presence, fuelling Indian apprehensions of salami-slicing tactics.

India's response has been measured but firm. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has repeatedly stressed that normalised ties with China hinge on restoring pre-2020 border peace, while bolstering domestic capabilities like the Tejas Mk2 fighter and BrahMos missile exports to counterbalance dependencies.

Geopolitically, this dynamic intersects with escalating US-China rivalry. The Biden administration—now transitioning amid domestic politics—views India as a linchpin in its Indo-Pacific strategy, evidenced by $20 billion-plus in defence deals since 2008 and joint exercises like Malabar.

China's counter-narrative portrays the US as the aggressor, accusing it of inflating the ‘China threat’ to justify alliances that encircle Beijing. Lin Jian's briefing aligns with this, rejecting third-party meddling while signalling openness to India on non-security fronts like trade, where bilateral volumes hit $136 billion in 2023-24.

For India, balancing these powers tests its strategic autonomy. Recent border calm has spurred economic dialogues, with China easing investments in select sectors, yet trust deficits persist over issues like stapled visas for Indians and blocked UN listings of Pakistan-based terrorists.

Looking ahead, the monthly Xi-Modi channels could yield incremental gains, but the US report's scepticism resonates with Indian hawks wary of Chinese dual-use infrastructure near the LAC. Beijing's dismissal of Washington’s analysis may stiffen India's resolve to diversify partnerships.

Ultimately, this triad of accusations reveals the intricate interplay of trust, power projection, and pragmatism shaping South Asian security. As 2025 unfolds, the LAC's fragile peace will test whether rhetoric yields to restraint, or if great-power competition reignites old fault lines.

Agencies