by G H Kumar

Pakistan's Ababeel missile, touted as MIRV-capable with a 2,200 km range, faces persistent technical failures and engineering hurdles that undermine its claimed effectiveness against India's ballistic missile defences like the S-400 and Akash Air Defence System.

Recent tests, including a July 2025 crash in Balochistan due to propulsion or structural issues, highlight a pattern of unreliability since its 2017 debut. Pakistani officials often claim success despite evidence of malfunctions, fuelling scepticism about its operational readiness.​

Test Failures

The Ababeel has endured multiple setbacks, with the July 2025 test veering off course and crashing near a civilian area, following a 2023 attempt that also fell short of goals. Earlier flights in 2017 and 2023 did not fully validate the 2,200 km range or MIRV deployment, indicating guidance and control deficiencies. U.S. intelligence monitored these via assets like RC-135S aircraft, confirming observed failures contradicting official narratives.​

Dependence on China's Beidou GPS limits accuracy for dispersed Indian targets, while limited testing hampers re-entry vehicle durability. The design, based on older Ghaznavi with a dummy fairing, overcomplicates a short-range system better suited for simpler MRVs, not full MIRVs like India's Agni-V.​

MIRV development demands overcoming intricate engineering hurdles due to the need for precision in a high-stress environment. Key challenges include miniaturizing nuclear warheads to fit multiple units atop a single booster while retaining yield, alongside crafting a reliable post-boost vehicle (PBV) for individual warhead release and targeting.​

Miniaturisation Issues

True MIRV requires miniaturised warheads, a reliable post-boost vehicle for independent targeting, and high-precision guidance—areas where Pakistan struggles despite Chinese tech inputs.

Warheads must shrink dramatically without sacrificing explosive power or reliability, requiring advanced metallurgy and electronics resilient to re-entry heat exceeding 2,000°C. Guidance systems for each re-entry vehicle (RV) need independent inertial or GPS navigation accurate to tens of meters over thousands of kilometres, a feat complicated by space constraints and vibration.​

A core challenge lies in warhead miniaturisation, essential for MIRVs to pack multiple lightweight nuclear payloads into a single nose cone. Pakistan struggles to produce such compact, reliable warheads, often relying on larger designs that compromise range and efficiency. This limitation stems from inadequate materials science expertise and restricted nuclear testing history, which hampers the verification of re-entry vehicle performance under hypersonic conditions

Post-Boost Complexity

The PBV, operating post-burnout in zero-gravity, must orient, dispense 3-10 RVs sequentially with decoys, and impart precise velocity corrections—any misalignment dooms accuracy. This demands lightweight composites, cold-gas thrusters, and fault-tolerant avionics, where even minor failures cascade.

The post-boost vehicle, or bus, required to manoeuvre and release multiple warheads on divergent paths, represents another formidable barrier. Pakistan lacks indigenous mastery of the sophisticated thrusters, high-pressure plumbing, and control systems needed for this component. Dependence on Chinese assistance for similar technologies in earlier Shaheen missiles highlights a persistent gap in self-reliant propulsion and attitude control engineering.​

Pakistan's broader industrial base exacerbates these issues through chronic energy shortages and high costs, which disrupt continuous manufacturing processes vital for missile assembly. Frequent power outages and load shedding delay production timelines, while elevated electricity prices erode profitability and deter investment in advanced facilities.

Resource Constraints

Pakistan faces significant hurdles in developing the Ababeel MIRV missile primarily due to its underdeveloped industrial infrastructure and limited technological capabilities. The Ababeel, intended as a medium-range ballistic missile capable of carrying multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, demands precision engineering far beyond Pakistan's current manufacturing prowess. 

Programs require vast fissile material like plutonium for multiple warheads, plus extensive flight testing (dozens of missions) to validate RV separation and survivability, straining budgets and infrastructure for emerging powers. These factors explain persistent delays in systems like Pakistan's Ababeel.​

Evidence Suggests Modification of Existing Chinese Supplied Ballistic Missiles

Evidence points to Pakistan's Ababeel missile deriving from established designs like the Ghaznavi and Shaheen series, with modifications such as an enlarged payload fairing to simulate MIRV capability rather than pioneering new technology.​ The Ababeel's airframe and solid-fuel motors closely resemble the Shaheen-III, including shared warhead configurations where Shaheen-III carries one and Ababeel purportedly multiples of the same unit. Defence analyses note its basis on the shorter-range Ghaznavi missile, extended with a dummy fairing that mimics MIRV payloads without proven independent targeting.​

Ababeel's structural ties to the Shaheen series stem from shared airframe dimensions, propulsion systems, and staging architecture, indicating evolutionary adaptation rather than a clean-sheet design.​ Both missiles measure 21.5 meters in length and 1.7 meters in diameter, with Ababeel featuring an enlarged payload fairing atop the Shaheen-III's body to accommodate the purported MIRV bus. This fairing widening preserves the core fuselage while extending the second stage slightly for post-boost vehicle integration.​

Solid-fuel motors from Shaheen-III provide the two-stage configuration, enabling the 2,200 km range, with Ababeel retaining identical booster nozzles and interstage lattice fins for aerodynamic stability. Wreckage analyses from failed tests reveal matching graphite composite casings and thrust vector control vanes, confirming interchangeable lower stages.​

Development Indicators

CSIS Missile Threat reports highlight shared characteristics with Shaheen II/III and China's CSS-7 SRBM, suggesting mid-2000s evolution aided by Chinese engineers working on MIRV tech around 2010. Expert sources confirm it's a Shaheen-III derivative with a widened fairing, not a from-scratch MIRV platform, aligning with Pakistan's pattern of incremental upgrades. This reliance underscores resource limits, prioritising adaptation over innovation.

Bogus Posturing

Pakistan pushes Ababeel to counter India's BMD and ensure second-strike amid arsenal parity (170 vs. India's 172 warheads), but resource limits prevent salvo saturation of defences.

Still not deployed after years, it strains fissile materials without proven penetration, serving more as deterrence signalling than capability. This mirrors broader patterns in Pakistan's missile program reliant on foreign aid yet plagued by quality issues.​

IDN (With Agency Inputs)