The recent study by the German Marshall Fund, titled "If China Attacks Taiwan," assesses the military and geopolitical consequences of a Chinese attempt to seize Taiwan by force. It concludes that an all-out amphibious invasion would likely fail, impose extremely high costs on Beijing, and still result in only limited territorial gains such as the offshore Kinmen and Matsu islands.

The report models a major war scenario in which China launches amphibious landings on Taiwan, synchronised with large-scale strikes against Taiwanese military targets and United States forces stationed in Japan and Guam.

Although the People’s Liberation Army is assessed as capable of reaching Taiwan’s shores, its logistics would be severely degraded by effective Taiwanese and US interdiction of ships and aircraft moving across the Taiwan Strait. Sustained attrition of Chinese transport and support assets is seen as the critical factor undermining the invasion.

Over several months of intense fighting, the study estimates that Chinese forces could suffer up to 100,000 fatalities. These “massive losses” would, in the authors’ view, create political and military pressure on Beijing to agree to a withdrawal from Taiwan’s main island. The report suggests that China would ultimately have to accept terms allowing its surviving troops to be repatriated to the mainland unharmed, effectively acknowledging the failure of the campaign while trying to save face domestically.

Taiwan, however, would also pay a very high price. The study projects approximately 50,000 military and 50,000 civilian casualties for Taiwan in a full-scale conflict. The United States is estimated to lose around 5,000 military personnel and 1,000 civilians, while Japan could incur about 1,000 military and 500 civilian deaths. These figures underscore the scale of destruction and human cost even in a scenario where the invasion is repelled and Taiwan’s core territory remains under its control.

Despite China’s eventual withdrawal from Taiwan proper, the report judges it likely that Chinese forces could retain control of the nearby Kinmen and Matsu islands. This outcome would amount to a partial territorial loss for Taiwan, illustrating that even a failed invasion could still shift the local balance of control along the maritime frontier in Beijing’s favour.

Beyond battlefield dynamics, the report evaluates the probable international responses to both a major war and a more limited crisis. Drawing on precedents such as the sanctions and diplomatic backlash following the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, the 2014–2015 Umbrella Movement, the 2019–2020 Anti-Extradition protests in Hong Kong, and Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the authors map out a spectrum of possible reactions and their perceived costs for China.

In a major war scenario, only four potential measures are assessed as imposing a “high cost” on Beijing. The most likely of these is freezing the assets of Chinese leaders, which the study judges as having a relatively high probability. Three more severe steps are considered low probability: forming a NATO-style collective defence alliance in Asia, formal recognition of Taiwan’s independence by key states, and the conclusion of a treaty alliance with Taipei. The report implies that while Western powers might impose serious targeted sanctions, they would hesitate before making irreversible strategic commitments on Taiwan’s status.

By contrast, under a minor conflict scenario, the anticipated international response would be significantly more restrained. This lesser crisis is defined as involving weeks of air and naval confrontations, repeated incursions into Taiwan’s airspace and waters, and the imposition of a “quarantine” on Taiwan’s major ports without an outright amphibious assault.

In such a case, most governments are expected to limit themselves to issuing critical public statements, updating travel advisories, and perhaps taking narrowly focused diplomatic steps.

From Beijing’s perspective, these actions are characterised in the report as “low cost,” suggesting that Chinese leaders might view limited coercive operations as carrying manageable international risks compared with the extreme dangers of a full-scale invasion.

The timing of the report, arriving just a week after large Chinese military exercises around Taiwan, underscores concerns that calibrated displays of force and grey-zone tactics may remain Beijing’s preferred tools while the costs of an outright invasion appear prohibitive.

Based On ANI Report