Iran’s Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has become increasingly reliant on the generals of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps to manage the country following the injuries he sustained in the US-Israeli strikes that killed his father, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on 28 February.

According to The New York Times, Mojtaba is effectively treating the governance of Iran as though he were directing a board, with the generals acting as board members who collectively make decisions. 

Abdolreza Davari, a politician and former aide to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, explained that Mojtaba leans heavily on their advice and guidance.

Mojtaba has remained in hiding since the attack, which also killed his wife and son. His access is tightly restricted to doctors and medical staff, with senior Iranian leaders avoiding visits to prevent Israeli tracking and further strikes.

His treatment is overseen by the health minister and President Masoud Pezeshkian, who is himself a heart surgeon. Despite being gravely wounded, Mojtaba is described as mentally sharp and engaged. 

His injuries include severe burns to his face and lips, which make speaking difficult, multiple surgeries on his leg that will require a prosthetic, and operations on his arm, which is slowly regaining function. 

Officials have indicated that plastic surgery may be necessary. To avoid appearing vulnerable, Mojtaba has refrained from issuing verbal statements, relying instead on written communications.

Given his condition and the difficulty of reaching him, decision-making has been delegated to the generals. The report highlights that ultra-hard-liners remain active in political discussions, while the influence of clerics is diminishing.

Iran’s power structure is now firmly steered by the Revolutionary Guards, led by Ahmad Vahidi. Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, a former hardline commander, heads the Supreme National Security Council, while Yahya Rahim Safavi continues to exert influence as a senior adviser to both father and son supreme leaders.

Meanwhile, the elected government has been relegated to a supporting role, tasked primarily with maintaining internal stability, ensuring supplies of essentials such as food and fuel, and managing day-to-day governance.

Diplomatic authority has also shifted, with Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s role diminished. Parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has assumed greater prominence in shaping Iran’s external engagement.

Strategic military decisions, including operations against Israel and Gulf nations, closure of maritime routes, and ceasefire arrangements with Washington, are now driven by the Guards. For the first time, senior Guard commanders have been directly included in Iran’s negotiating team with the United States.

Iran’s political system has never functioned as a unified bloc, deliberately accommodating overlapping centres of power where disagreements are common. Figures such as Pezeshkian and Araghchi still retain positions on the National Security Council.

However, the current balance of power is clearly tilted towards the military establishment. For now, the generals remain aligned, with little evidence of internal fractures.

Agencies