Bangladesh’s decision to replace India with China in the Mongla Port project marks a major strategic setback for New Delhi, as the Bay of Bengal increasingly becomes a contested arena in the India‑China rivalry.

Mongla’s proximity to India’s border and its role in regional trade corridors make it a critical node in South Asia’s maritime geopolitics.

Bangladesh has formally signed an agreement with China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation to develop the Mongla Port Economic Zone. This project was originally reserved for India under a 2015 bilateral initiative, but delays and failure to begin construction led Dhaka to delist the Indian plan in 2025. China quickly stepped in, securing the deal during Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s first state visit to Beijing.

Mongla is Bangladesh’s second‑largest seaport after Chattogram. It lies less than 200 kilometres from Kolkata and about 80 kilometres from the Indian border, positioned near the Sundarbans delta. Its location makes it strategically sensitive, as it provides access to the Bay of Bengal and serves as a potential gateway for India’s landlocked north-eastern states.

Since 2018, India has been allowed to use Mongla and Chattogram ports for cargo, reducing dependence on the narrow Siliguri Corridor. China’s entry now threatens to alter this balance.

The Bay of Bengal has emerged as a key theatre in the India‑China rivalry. For Beijing, Mongla is part of a broader strategy to expand its Belt and Road footprint across South Asia.

It complements Chinese investments in Chattogram and links to the proposed Bangladesh‑China‑Myanmar Economic Corridor, which would connect Yunnan province to the Bay of Bengal. This strengthens China’s “String of Pearls” strategy, building a chain of ports and facilities across the Indian Ocean.

For India, the development is alarming. New Delhi views Mongla’s shift to Chinese hands as a direct challenge to its “Neighbourhood First” policy and its maritime security interests. The port’s proximity to the Indian border raises concerns about surveillance, logistics, and potential dual‑use facilities. Strategically, it could tilt regional supply chains and cargo flows towards China‑centric networks, undermining India’s connectivity initiatives.

India is responding by reinforcing its broader maritime strategy. It has expanded naval exercises such as MILAN 2026, involving dozens of warships and aircraft, and strengthened cooperation with partners like the United States, Japan, and Australia under the Quad framework.

India is also investing in its own “Necklace of Diamonds” strategy, building alliances and port access agreements across the Indo‑Pacific to counter China’s influence. Initiatives through BIMSTEC, the Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region, and bilateral exercises like Bongosagar with Bangladesh reflect India’s determination to maintain a strong presence in the Bay of Bengal.

The Mongla development underscores the shifting dynamics of South Asia. Bangladesh, seeking rapid industrialisation and foreign investment, is recalibrating its partnerships.

China’s readiness to deliver infrastructure contrasts with India’s delays, giving Beijing an edge. For New Delhi, the challenge is not only strategic but also economic—ensuring that its neighbours see India as a reliable partner in development.

The Bay of Bengal is now firmly established as a contested maritime space. Its offshore energy reserves, shipping lanes, and strategic geography make it central to the Indo‑Pacific balance.

The Mongla Port project is more than an economic zone; it is a symbol of how infrastructure and geopolitics intersect in shaping the future of South Asia.

Agencies