India’s nuclear arsenal has undergone a notable transformation, with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reporting that the country expanded its stockpile from 180 to 190 warheads in 2025. 

The most striking revelation is that India may now be deploying some of these warheads during peacetime, with around 12 reportedly placed onboard a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine. 

This marks a departure from India’s long-standing practice of keeping warheads de-mated from launchers, suggesting a shift in operational nuclear posture while its declaratory policy remains unchanged.

This change is not entirely sudden, as India has been modernising its nuclear arsenal for over a decade. Developments include cannisterised missiles that reduce launch times, long-range and multiple-warhead systems, and sea-based deterrence patrols.

China appears to be following a similar trajectory, with reports indicating it has deployed 34 warheads at sea alongside a rapid missile silo expansion. These moves highlight the interconnected strategic chain in Southern Asia, where China’s nuclear build-up aimed at the United States drives India’s readiness, which in turn prompts Pakistan to modernise its own arsenal.

India’s nuclear posture is shaped by the dual challenge of China and Pakistan. China’s conventional superiority and growing nuclear arsenal, now at 620 warheads, has been accompanied by quick-launch solid-fuel missiles, silo deployments, and a launch-on-warning capability.

These developments cast doubt on China’s no-first-use pledge. India’s response has been to strengthen its second-strike capability through long-range and sea-based systems, but this inevitably alarms Pakistan.

Pakistan’s arsenal remains at around 170 warheads, yet its fissile material accumulation and new delivery systems remain a concern. India’s conventional superiority has led Pakistan to rely on nuclear brinkmanship, as seen during the May 2025 conflict when India struck Pakistani bases suspected of supporting nuclear weapons, prompting Islamabad’s National Command Authority to convene.

The risks of inadvertent escalation are heightened by these developments. India and China have historically been classified as having assertive nuclear command and control systems, keeping warheads de-mated and centralising authority. Pakistan, by contrast, employs a conditional system that delegates authority during crises.

Recent changes challenge these classifications, leading scholars to propose a new “Segmented-Delegative Assertive Control System.” This framework suggests that while political authority remains centralised, segments of the arsenal—such as SSBNs—may be granted quasi-delegated authority to ensure survivability and credibility in the event of a decapitation strike.

China’s launch-on-warning capability and India’s pursuit of alternate chains of command reflect this nuanced shift.

The trade-off between readiness and escalation risk remains uncertain. Enhancing combat readiness can deter adversaries but also incentivises similar moves, raising the risk of misinterpretation. India’s credible minimum deterrence cannot offset conventional skirmishes with China, as seen in Doklam and Galwan, but a ready arsenal signals to Pakistan that conventional superiority will not be neutralised by nuclear threats.

Yet this readiness risks pushing Pakistan towards greater decentralisation and heightened alert levels, potentially destabilising the region further.

To mitigate these dangers, confidence-building measures are essential. Expanding agreements to cover pre-notification of missile tests, especially sea-based ones, establishing crisis hotlines, and extending transparency dialogues into domains such as cyber, space, and autonomous systems could help reduce risks.

Regular military exchanges would also be vital to prevent misinterpretation and unintended escalation. Without such measures, Southern Asia’s nuclear chain risks spiralling into instability as each state seeks to outpace the other in readiness.

Agencies