India has firmly rejected the ex parte ruling delivered by the Court of Arbitration at The Hague concerning maximum pondage at Indian hydroelectric projects on the Indus system.

The Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson clarified on 16 May that the body was constituted in contravention of the Indus Waters Treaty and therefore lacked legitimacy.

India also dismissed the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s assertion that the CoA had competence to hear the matter, reiterating that any attempt to bypass the sequential provisions of the treaty is without locus standi.

India maintains that it has every right to fully utilise the waters allocated to it under the treaty, which has been held in abeyance following the Pahalgam terrorist attack.

In 2023, India requested the World Bank to appoint a Neutral Expert to examine technical issues raised by Pakistan. That track continues its work.

Pakistan, however, pressed the World Bank to initiate a parallel process through a CoA at The Hague, which India regards as legally questionable. The World Bank President at the time approved both tracks simultaneously, thereby violating the principle of sequentiality.

According to the treaty, only when the Neutral Expert concludes the investigation or certifies that the matter is beyond technical remit and constitutes a legal dispute does the CoA process come into play.

The sanctity of the structures under the IWT is crucial. Article IX and Annexures F and G establish a clear sequence: the Permanent Indus Commission for Questions, a Neutral Expert for Differences, and finally a Court of Arbitration for Disputes.

This sequence has been disrupted by parallel proceedings despite India’s refusal to participate. Pakistan has invoked the doctrine of competence‑competence, under which an arbitral body determines its own jurisdiction once constituted.

India rejected the CoA process in 2023 and declined to nominate its two members to the seven‑member panel, while Pakistan proceeded with its own nominations. The remaining members included a legal expert, a technical expert, and the Chair, appointed through the World Bank‑backed process.

The CoA operates under the PCA structure, which is distinct from the International Court of Justice. The UN Charter provides all member states with automatic association with the ICJ Statute, but only 74 countries have opted for compulsory jurisdiction under the Optional Clause.

Among the permanent members of the Security Council, only the UK has done so. India signed the declaration with several reservations.

While the ICJ and PCA are separate institutions located in The Hague’s Peace Palace, they retain operational links, including the PCA’s role in nominating ICJ judges. India remains a contracting party to the PCA but rejects the legitimacy of the IWT‑specific CoA.

The PCA is essentially an administrative institution providing secretariat support for ad hoc arbitration panels under various treaties. India’s boycott is directed at the legitimacy of the IWT‑specific CoA, not the PCA itself.

India’s rejection of the CoA ruling parallels China’s rejection of the 2016 South China Sea ruling under UNCLOS, where neither country participated in the proceedings. Other global powers have also resisted judicial overreach: the UK bypassed rulings on the Chagos Archipelago, and the US withdrew its acceptance of ICJ compulsory jurisdiction in 1985 over the Nicaragua dispute.

India, however, has respected international law when the process is transparent and legitimate, as demonstrated by its acceptance of the 2014 UNCLOS arbitral award in favour of Bangladesh in the Bay of Bengal dispute.

Pakistan has a long record of legal manoeuvring before the PCA on the IWT and before the ICJ in the Kulbhushan Jadhav case. Historical parallels exist, such as Pakistan’s attempts to circumvent the sequential process envisaged in the 1948 UN Security Council resolutions on Kashmir.

Long before the treaty was held in abeyance after the Pahalgam attack, India had invoked Article XII(3), calling for formal intergovernmental negotiations to review and modify the 1960 treaty in light of new realities.

If dialogue with Pakistan resumes, India insists that a comprehensive review of the IWT must be foremost on the agenda to secure its national interests.

Agencies