Chairman Xi Jinping is continuing his determined effort to restore order within the People’s Liberation Army, as the upper ranks of China’s military remain in constant flux. Senior officers are repeatedly promoted and then discarded, with Xi himself driving this cycle.

His inability to select reliable leaders raises questions about his judgement, or perhaps it simply exposes the depth of corruption and factionalism within the PLA.

According to data compiled by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 101 senior officers have been removed since 2022, representing more than half of the PLA’s leadership.

This scale of purge is unprecedented and reflects Xi’s drive to eliminate entrenched patronage networks and enforce absolute loyalty to the Communist Party. His recent promotions of General Zhang Shuguang and General Wang Gang are intended to stabilise the command structure after years of turmoil.

General Zhang now leads the PLA’s Discipline Inspection Commission and Supervisory Commission, making him central to Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. His appointment is not about battlefield experience but about ensuring political control and internal rectification. Analysts suggest he could be elevated to the Central Military Commission at the next Party Congress.

General Wang, meanwhile, heads the Air Force. His background as an aerobatic pilot and his visit to Pakistan after the 2025 border clash with India highlight his operational credibility. His promotion is seen as a move to reassure the PLAAF amid corruption investigations into figures such as Yang Wei, designer of the J-20 fighter.

These appointments bring the number of active generals to six, including Defence Minister Dong Jun and Eastern Theater Commander Yang Zhibin. Yet the absence of younger officers in top positions shows Xi’s cautious approach. Experts argue that while these moves strengthen political reliability, they may weaken combat readiness. John Culver of Brookings warns that PLA effectiveness could suffer, though Xi is prioritising loyalty over capability, especially in case of internal unrest similar to Tiananmen.

The purge has been sweeping. In June 2026, six deputies were removed from the National People’s Congress, including generals Xu Xueqiang and Li Fengbiao. Earlier, in February, three generals, two admirals, and several other senior officers were expelled.

High-profile arrests included CMC Vice-Chairman Zhang Youxia and Joint Staff chief Liu Zhenli, leaving only Zhang Shengmin alongside Xi in the CMC. This collapse of the top command is extraordinary, with discipline and personnel issues now overshadowing operational leadership.

Analysts such as Ying Yu Lin emphasise that Xi views internal management as the most urgent task. The PLA will continue exercises and missile tests, but its core focus is on morale, stability, and control. 

Taylor Fravel notes that rebuilding leadership will take years, as many theatre command and deputy positions have been gutted. This creates a shortage of experienced officers, complicating any large-scale operations such as a Taiwan blockade or amphibious assault.

Joel Wuthnow warns that while disruption might appear to weaken the PLA, it could embolden Xi. If he believes corruption has been eradicated and professional officers are in place, he may be more optimistic about military action. New generals may lack the authority to resist Xi’s ambitions, raising the risk of miscalculation similar to Putin’s wars in Georgia and Ukraine.

Xi’s purge is therefore a double-edged sword. It strengthens his grip and ensures loyalty, but it undermines operational capacity and creates instability.

The PLA is being reshaped into a force that is politically reliable but potentially less effective in combat. Whether this will deter Xi from external adventures or encourage him to gamble on Taiwan remains uncertain.

ANI