Russia's share of India's arms imports has fallen markedly over the past decade, reflecting a long-term shift rather than a sudden geopolitical break. Between 2021 and 2025, Russia accounted for 40 per cent of India's arms imports, down from 51 per cent in 2016-20 and 70 per cent in 2011-15.

India remained the world's second-largest arms importer during the period, although overall import volumes declined by 4.0 per cent.

The reduction has been driven by a combination of growing domestic manufacturing capability, stronger competition from Western suppliers and persistent concerns over Russian equipment. France now provides roughly 29 per cent of India's arms imports, while Israel accounts for about 15 per cent. Although indigenous production has expanded, major domestic programmes continue to face delays.

The decline in Russia's share began well before the Ukraine war. The 2019-23 period was the first five-year span since 1960-64 in which Russia or the Soviet Union supplied less than half of India's imported arms. The conflict accelerated an existing trend rather than creating it.

Recent figures suggest the shift has stabilised rather than intensified. Russia's share stood at 36 per cent in 2020-24 before edging up to 40 per cent in the latest rolling five-year window. As these figures are based on deliveries, they reflect decisions taken years earlier and do not indicate an accelerating decline.

The clearest example of India's changing approach is the Su-57 fighter. India had already exited the joint fifth-generation development program in April 2018, with Indian Air Force officials reportedly judging the aircraft too expensive, inadequately engineered and reliant on unreliable engines.

In 2026, New Delhi declined a Russian proposal for the export version of the Su-57, which included technology transfer and licensed production in India. This was not the cancellation of a new agreement but the rejection of an offer. Algeria remains the only publicly identified export customer, although Russia maintains that other buyers exist.

Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh indicated that India does not intend to purchase new Sukhoi fighter models in the near term. Instead, the focus is on upgrading the existing Su-30MKI fleet until the indigenous Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) enters service.

He also described the Su-30MKI as a success story and confirmed that modernisation plans remain under active consideration. Reports indicate the Indian Air Force is progressing towards a deal for 114 Rafale fighters, with 94 expected to be manufactured domestically.

India's position hardened gradually. In March, officials still described the future fighter acquisition decision as open, with Russian, American and French options under consideration. By late July, however, the Russian proposal had been firmly rejected.

Available reporting does not connect that decision to Prime Minister Narendra Modi's remarks in Bishkek. Capability requirements, costs, the AMCA program and the Rafale appear to be the more likely factors.

The strongest evidence of India's drive for greater self-reliance lies in the planned Su-30MKI upgrade programme. Approximately 75 per cent of the fleet, more than 200 aircraft out of about 272 currently in service, is expected to be modernised under the Super Sukhoi project. The goal is around 80 per cent indigenous content and service life extension into the 2050s.

Planned improvements include the domestically developed Virupaksha gallium nitride AESA radar, indigenous infrared search-and-track systems, advanced cockpit displays and new mission computers supplied by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and private-sector partners. The first prototype is expected around 2028-29, while upgraded aircraft are also expected to integrate BrahMos missiles.

Despite these changes, the aircraft will remain dependent on important Russian-origin technology. The AL-31FP engines, manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited under licence, are based on technology from the 1980s and 1990s. In 2024, the Ministry of Defence awarded a contract worth ₹26,000 crore for 240 engines. Russia has additionally proposed the newer AL-41 engine for the modernisation effort, and India continues to assess available options.

Reports available in early 2025 did not indicate plans for a domestic engine upgrade. One July 2026 report suggested that key flight-control architecture remains rooted in Russian design and that Russia may retain a limited role in integration and certification support.

The overall picture is one of Indian-developed sensors, computers and weapons being integrated into a Russian-designed aircraft powered by Russian-lineage engines. This reduces Russia's share of the value chain and gives India greater freedom to upgrade systems in future, but it does not eliminate Russian influence over the core fleet.

Evidence against a complete strategic break remains substantial. In March 2026, the Defence Acquisition Council cleared procurement proposals worth approximately ₹2.1 lakh crore, including five additional S-400 air-defence systems from Russia and a separate Rosoboronexport agreement covering Tunguska systems.

The broader defence relationship also remains institutionalised. India and Russia signed a ten-year military cooperation framework in December 2025, underlining continued collaboration even as India broadens its supplier base.

The emerging pattern is not a clean move away from Russia but a deliberate diversification strategy. India is increasing indigenous capability, expanding partnerships with countries such as France and Israel, and reducing dependency on any single supplier while continuing to retain Russia as an important part of its defence ecosystem.

Agencies