Supply chains have now emerged as one of the most decisive factors in determining whether a nation can sustain a conflict, because the availability of equipment, spare parts and essential components shapes both how a country prepares for war and how long it can keep fighting once hostilities begin, Times of India reported. 

Recognising that vulnerability, India's Defence Ministry is looking beyond the finished weapons and equipment it procures to examine what goes inside them, including platforms manufactured domestically.

The Government has moved beyond restricting direct imports to scrutinising the origins of electronics, software, sensors and critical subsystems fitted into Indian-built military platforms. The concern is security: components sourced from potentially hostile countries could be exploited to compromise communications, expose sensitive information or disrupt military operations.

This effort to secure defence supply chains has gathered momentum since 2020, following the deadly Galwan Valley clash and the wider border stand-off with China, which exposed how deeply strategic dependence could become a national security risk.

The first major step came in July 2020, when the Government amended the General Financial Rules to restrict public procurement from firms based in countries that share a land border with India.

Under that change, bidders from these countries, including China, must register with a competent authority and obtain clearance before participating in Government procurement. The competent authority is the Registration Committee constituted by the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, and the screening process involves security and political clearance.

The rules cover purchases of goods, services and works by Government entities, but they do not impose a blanket ban on every Chinese-origin component used by private Indian manufacturers, a gap that has made enforcement far more complex in practice.

The restrictions became more targeted in 2023, when, according to Reuters, India barred domestic military drone manufacturers from using Chinese-origin components, including cameras, radio transmission equipment, communication systems and software.

In 2024, an order for 200 medium-altitude logistics drones was reportedly put on hold until the manufacturer could demonstrate that the systems contained no Chinese components. The episode highlighted the difficulty of tracing individual subsystems in military equipment assembled in India using parts sourced from across the world, especially when components pass through intermediaries, are rebranded, or are embedded deep inside larger assemblies where their origin is not immediately visible.

To test what goes inside, the Army Design Bureau released a draft framework in March 2026 for assessing security vulnerabilities in drones. It covers flight controllers, electronic speed controllers, communication and navigation equipment, sensors, firmware and ground-control software.

The proposed framework includes hardware inspections, software validation, penetration testing and checks of hardware and software bills of materials. Vendors found to have provided incorrect information about the origins of critical components could face action.

A business daily reported in August that the framework was still awaiting approval, although later reporting indicated that a finalised framework had been prepared in concurrence with internal and external stakeholders and was expected to feed into future procurement rules.

The Army is also setting up AASHVAST laboratories, short for Assessment and Analysis of Electronic Systems Hardware for Vulnerabilities and Security Threats. Six such facilities are planned, with the first already operational in Delhi.

The laboratories will examine drone hardware, embedded software and firmware for hidden commands, unauthorised access and foreign-origin components. CCTV cameras installed at military establishments could eventually come under similar scrutiny, reflecting concern that surveillance and networked devices, not only weapons, can create entry points for espionage or sabotage.

Alongside inspection, the Government is also trying to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers by developing domestic alternatives. The SRIJAN portal, launched in August 2020, allows defence public sector undertakings and the armed forces to list imported items that Indian companies can indigenise.

A parliamentary committee report in March 2026 said more than 15,400 items listed on the portal had been indigenised, while later assessments put the figure above 15,700, including items drawn from the Positive Indigenisation Lists.

The Ministry of Defence's Positive Indigenisation Lists identify thousands of components that must be sourced locally after specified deadlines. By May 2026, ten such lists, five each from the Department of Military Affairs and the Department of Defence Production, had covered 5,521 items, with a sixth Department of Defence Production list later adding 405 strategically important items with an estimated business potential of ₹3,070 crore.

Meanwhile, the draft Defence Acquisition Procedure 2026 proposes raising the indigenous content requirement under the Buy (Indian-IDDM) category from 50% to 60%, alongside simpler acquisition categories, stronger support for indigenous design, and a requirement that Indian entities own the design documents, software source code, system architecture and critical technical data for a system to qualify as indigenously designed.

Together, the procurement restrictions, drone-security framework, AASHVAST laboratories and indigenisation drive signal a shift from buying finished Indian-assembled equipment to verifying, testing and ultimately replacing what lies inside it.

Agencies