A teardrop in the Indian Ocean

by KN Pandita

Failing to grab Kashmir through proxy wars, including the ongoing one, Islamabad concentrated on two major policy decisions. One was to clandestinely carry fundamentalist-jihadist ideology to the Indian administered Kashmir, particularly the valley, and the second was to strive for strategic depth westward. The second policy decision was the direct outcome of her ignominious defeat in the Bangladesh war.

Pakistan’s home security formula is evolved along two trajectories, viz. bleed India in Kashmir through a thousand cuts and secondly, radicalise Afghanistan to the extent that it becomes fully dependent on Pakistan.

One lasting impact of the Bangladesh war on Pakistani policy planners is that of an India-phobia eating into their vitals. Therefore, Pakistan’s home security formula is evolved along two trajectories, viz. bleed India in Kashmir through a thousand cuts and secondly, radicalise Afghanistan to the extent that it becomes fully dependent on Pakistan.

Thus we have the formation and upbringing of the Afghan Taliban brainwashed and indoctrinated in thousands of Islamic seminaries in Pakistan, particularly in Sindh and Quetta.

The ISI got deeply involved in the two-decade-old Afghan war against the US. It played an insidious game when it went hunting with the hound and running with the hare in Afghanistan. Despite several warnings by the US during the Trump administration, Pakistan managed to secretly lend support to the Taliban.

Islamabad had two fundamental objectives. One was to dilute the nationalist sentiment of Afghan political leadership and see to it that the writ of the fundamentalists ran through the entire country. The second objective was to oust India from Afghanistan because Islamabad considered Indian influence in Afghanistan a serious obstruction to her Machiavellian policy. Islamabad was desperate to force India out of Afghanistan because India had no political or military agenda in Afghanistan.

Out of age-old good and warm relations with the Afghans, India had offered to help Afghanistan develop her infrastructure through big Indian companies persuaded by the Indian government to invest lavishly in building roads, hospitals, bridges, dams, and a variety of buildings. India had thus won the hearts of the Afghans. Besides that, India provided visas without hassles to Afghans desirous of finding better health services and education in India for the needy.

Pakistan played all the tricks up its sleeve to sideline India in prolonged negotiations that the US had over time in Qatar with the Taliban. Pakistan claimed it had facilitated the peace dialogue and assured the Taliban that the deal would be in their favour.

When the Taliban captured Kabul, Pakistan celebrated as they had felt that they had succeeded in achieving both objectives.

Then in August last, The Americans abandoned Afghanistan and the Afghans and took to heels leaving behind enormous war machinery at the Bagram airport. These spoils were shared by the Pakistanis also and in Peshawar, arms dealers were seen selling American made sophisticated weaponry part of which has also been seized from the captured terrorists in Kashmir.

When the Taliban captured Kabul, Pakistan celebrated as they had felt that they had succeeded in achieving both objectives. India was made to eat the humble pie and the ISI echelons walked the Kabul streets as victorious heroes who had procured strategic depth for their country. Even when the Panjsheer warriors offered resistance to the Taliban, Pakistan deployed its tanks and air power to cow down the warriors of legendry Ahmad Shah Masud.

Thus Pakistan projected itself as the ultimate seat of power and influence that would shape the future policy of the Taliban regime in Kabul. The then ISI Chief Faiz Hameed flew into Kabul to arbitrate the dispute that had erupted between the chief of the Taliban government and the Haqqani Network over the distribution of portfolios.

Hardly eight or nine months have passed, and the Pakistan-Taliban bonhomie has developed cracks and fissures that are becoming wider and wider. At the root of the Taliban’s dislike and even angst against the Pakistanis is their realization that Islamabad wants to boss over them and put restrictions on their freedom. We know that the Afghans are the last of human societies to submit to a foreigner’s dictation.

The fundamental irritant between the two is the Durand Line drawn by the British colonisers during their rule over India. The Durand Line divides the families of Pashtuns of NWFP. It was never accepted by the Afghans whosoever ruled in Kabul. The same is true about the Taliban. They removed the fence on the border and when the Pakistani border security personnel tried to resist, the Afghans issued a strict warning that they should not do anything that would get them annihilated.

The first serious challenges from the Taliban’s ascension would be felt by Pakistan, not the West, which has come true with near-daily violent incidents along the contentious Durand Line, as well as further inland.

There were sceptics from the very beginning who had reservations about whether Pakistan’s pursuit of its strategic goals even with the Taliban in power would be smooth sailing. The first serious challenges from the Taliban’s ascension would be felt by Pakistan, not the West, which has come true with near-daily violent incidents along the contentious Durand Line, as well as further inland.

The relationship between the Taliban and Pakistan has deteriorated to the extent that Islamabad has felt it necessary and appropriate to launch unilateral airstrikes well within Afghan territory (Khost and Kunar provinces), and the Taliban has responded by warning of war between the two countries.

In a speech on 24 April, the Taliban’s Defence Minister Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob said that the Taliban would not any longer tolerate “invasions” from neighbouring Pakistan. He said, “We can’t tolerate the invasion. We have tolerated that attack. We tolerated that because of national interests; next time, we might not tolerate it”. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid called the airstrikes “a cruelty” that would pave the “way for enmity between Afghanistan and Pakistan”. He asserted that “The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) condemns in the strongest possible terms the bombardment and attack that has taken place from the Pakistan side on the soil of Afghanistan.

The IEA strongly condemns Pakistan’s attacks on refugees in Khost and Kunar. The IEA calls on the Pakistani side not to test the patience of Afghans on such issues and not repeat the same mistake otherwise it will have bad consequences”.

The Northern Afghanistan-based National Resistance Front (NRF), led by Ahmad Masud and Amrullah Saleh, Afghanistan’s former vice-president, while condemning Pakistan’s airstrikes, blamed the proxy status of the Taliban as having allowed Pakistan to carry out the strikes in the first place. An NRF statement highlighted that the “Taliban occupying regime is the main cause of foreign aggression in Afghanistan. We emphasize the dismantling of the occupiers and proxy groups in Afghanistan”.

The Taliban wants an open border for Pashtun tribesmen inhabiting the region.

The airstrikes have added to the growing Taliban anger against Pakistan for building a 2,700 km long fence along the countries’ contentious colonial-era border created in 1893. The Taliban wants an open border for Pashtun tribesmen inhabiting the region. As Zahid Hussain, writing in the Pakistani daily Dawn, stressed, the growing tensions between the Taliban and Pakistan cannot solely be attributed to the TTP’s Afghan sanctuaries, as repeated border clashes were also souring relations between the two.

A major concern of the Taliban was the border fences, which they had been removing at various places claiming that Pakistan did not have the authority to build barriers along the Durand Line.

Pakistan’s real headache is that the TTP is strongly fraternized by the Afghan Taliban while Pakistan wants the Taliban to deny any favour or facility to them. Pakistan claimed that it had ordered air strikes in Kunar and Khost because the TTP had assembled there and were planning incursions into Pakistan.

Terrorism is condemnable in whatever form it appears but it is equally true that what groups such as the TTP and the Baluch organizations are accused of doing to Pakistan today is exactly what Pakistan has done for several decades to both its western and eastern neighbours, Afghanistan and India, respectively. It is an irony that Pakistan vociferously sells recognition of the Taliban to the international community even while it accuses them of harbouring terrorists inimical to it.

Summing up the fast deteriorating relations between the two peoples, Umair Jamal, the Lahore-based correspondent for The Diplomat writes on Pakistan’s air attack as this: “While the death toll of TTP fighters remains unclear, the attack caused significant civilian casualties, with some reports claiming that at least 47 people were killed in the attack. Pakistan’s decision to carry out military action inside Afghanistan is unprecedented and shows a significant change in Islamabad’s policy towards the TTP.

Thus at the end of the day, the Taliban have understood Pakistan’s so-called “goodwill gestures”…

Previously, Islamabad reportedly relied on targeting TTP commanders in Afghanistan through assassinations. However, this tactic has failed to hinder the group’s attacks inside Pakistan”. Jamal postulated that “In the coming days and weeks, we can expect more such strikes from Pakistan if the TTP continues its attacks on Pakistani forces. The change in policy carries the risk of undermining Pakistan-Taliban ties significantly with impact on trade links and bilateral diplomacy”.

Thus at the end of the day, the Taliban have understood that Pakistan’s so-called “goodwill gestures” during the war with the Americans were less out of any sympathy or religious fraternity with the Afghans but more out of undisclosed expansionist designs masked under the outreach of religion.

Twist in the Tail –The visit by a multi-member Indian delegation led by a Joint Secretary from the Ministry of External Affairs met the Taliban Officials in Kabul on June 2, 2022. What that augurs for Pakistan and the notorious ISI is yet to be seen.