In the wake of the deadly Pahalgam terror attack in Jammu and Kashmir, which Indian authorities attribute to Pakistan-based militants, India took the unprecedented step of suspending the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), a water-sharing agreement that has endured through decades of conflict between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. Outraged by New Delhi’s move, Pakistan has unveiled a four-point plan to challenge India’s decision, aiming to secure the continued flow of Indus basin waters vital for its agriculture and energy needs.

Pakistan’s Four-Point Plan

Pakistan’s response, as articulated by Minister of State for Law and Justice Aqeel Malik, includes the following actions:

1. Initiating legal proceedings at the World Bank, which facilitated the original treaty
2. Approaching the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)
3. Taking the matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, alleging a violation of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
4. Raising the issue at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)

Pakistani officials argue that the IWT cannot be unilaterally suspended, as the treaty contains no such provision, and warn that any attempt to block or divert water would be considered an act of war.

Why Pakistan’s Plan Is Unlikely to Succeed

Despite the urgency and breadth of Pakistan’s diplomatic and legal efforts, multiple structural and legal barriers render the four-point plan largely ineffective:

International Court of Justice (ICJ): India’s acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction includes explicit exceptions. Notably, India has excluded disputes with Commonwealth nations (which includes Pakistan) and matters related to hostilities, national security, or self-defence from ICJ purview. This means Pakistan cannot compel India to appear before the ICJ for this dispute, making any such legal move null and void.

Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA): While the PCA has previously entertained disputes under the IWT, its jurisdiction also depends on the consent of both parties. India’s current stance and objections significantly limit the PCA’s practical ability to enforce decisions or compel participation beyond the treaty’s own dispute resolution mechanisms.

The World Bank’s role is strictly as a facilitator, not an enforcer or guarantor of the treaty. It can mediate, appoint neutral experts, or help constitute arbitration panels, but it cannot unilaterally enforce the treaty’s provisions or ensure compliance. Its recommendations are non-binding and can be rejected by either party.

United Nations Security Council (UNSC): While Pakistan can raise the issue at the UNSC, such matters are typically seen as bilateral disputes. The Council is unlikely to intervene decisively unless the situation escalates into a broader threat to international peace and security. Historically, the UNSC has refrained from direct involvement in the IWT, deferring to bilateral or treaty-based mechanisms.

Underlying Realities

The IWT, signed in 1960, has survived wars and persistent hostilities, largely because it is critical to Pakistan: over 80% of its agriculture and a third of its hydropower rely on the Indus basin waters. 

However, the treaty grants India, as the upper riparian state, control over the three eastern rivers and limited rights over the western rivers, which flow into Pakistan. While India cannot immediately halt water flows due to technical and treaty constraints, its decision to suspend the treaty signals a willingness to use water as leverage in response to cross-border terrorism.

The current legal and diplomatic landscape leaves Pakistan with very limited recourse. The international mechanisms it seeks to invoke either lack jurisdiction, require mutual consent, or have only advisory roles. As a result, Pakistan’s four-point plan is unlikely to yield tangible results or force India to reverse its suspension of the treaty.

Pakistan’s legal and diplomatic avenues are constrained by jurisdictional limitations, treaty provisions, and the political realities of India-Pakistan relations. The four-point plan is thus more a signal of intent and frustration than a viable path to resolution. The deadlock underscores the fragility of trans-boundary water agreements in zones of deep geopolitical tension and the limits of international law in resolving such bilateral disputes when state consent is lacking.

NDTV Report