The July 13, 2025, drone attacks on camps of the United Liberation Front of Asom (Independent), or ULFA(I), and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur, near the India-Myanmar border in Myanmar’s Sagaing Region, have ignited intense debate and speculation about their executors and the complex web of geopolitical rivalries that converge in Myanmar.

The Incident: Details And Claims

In the pre-dawn hours, several waves of drone and missile strikes targeted two ULFA(I) camps and one PLA camp close to the Indian border, killing three senior ULFA(I) leaders—including Nayan Asom, head of the Lower Council—and injuring 19 others. The attack occurred shortly after a rare visit by ULFA(I) chief Paresh Baruah to Taga in Myanmar, further fuelling speculation that strategic realignments or renewed operational alliances were underway.

ULFA(I) and its allied separatist outfits immediately blamed the Indian Army, claiming that over 150 high-end drones, reportedly of Israeli and French origin, were used in a sophisticated, coordinated operation launched from Indian territory.

Media outlets in Assam and Manipur echoed these allegations, highlighting the technical and logistical complexity of the attack—features that suggested state-level involvement. Paresh Baruah, in particular, spoke directly to the press asserting that "Kamikaze drones and Heron unmanned aerial vehicles" were employed, and that the strikes originated from multiple centres along the India-Myanmar border.

Official Denials And Counter-Narratives

Despite widespread allegations, the Indian Army categorically denied any involvement. A defense spokesperson in Guwahati told the media, “There are no inputs with the Indian Army of such an operation,” a denial mirrored by Assam’s Chief Minister and other Indian authorities. Historically, the Indian Army has crossed into Myanmar to target separatist camps—most recently in 2015—but official admissions are rare and carefully calibrated to avoid straining diplomatic relations with Myanmar.

The Myanmar military was also rumoured to be a potential perpetrator. However, after Myanmar’s military coup in 2021, the junta forged cooperation with several Manipur-based separatist groups to combat the anti-regime People’s Defence Forces. Currently, resistance groups fighting the junta are mostly active far south of the ULFA(I) camp areas, face resource shortages, and are unlikely to have orchestrated a technologically advanced drone operation at such a scale.

The Geopolitical Context

The attacks must be viewed in the light of Myanmar’s role as an arena for overlapping ambitions of neighbouring powers:

India: Long concerned with cross-border insurgency, India has previously engaged in limited, covert operations against rebel camps in Myanmar to disrupt networks threatening its north-eastern states.

Myanmar: The junta, now embattled and dependent on external support, has little incentive to antagonise India or the separatists while it faces severe pressure from resistance forces elsewhere in the country.

China: Yunnan province borders the conflict zone, and China has historical links to various separatist movements and a documented interest in maintaining leverage over both India and Myanmar through such proxies. Reports suggest that ULFA(I)’s chief travelled to Taga through conflict zones partly controlled by China-aligned groups, highlighting possible tacit approval or at least awareness by Beijing of separatist activities.

Pakistan: India has accused Pakistan, especially its intelligence services, of supporting anti-India outfits from bases in Bangladesh and elsewhere, weaving additional complexity into the region’s security fabric.

Local Factors: The timing of the attacks—after a deadly terrorist incident in Kashmir and on the eve of India’s Independence Day—points to security anxieties in New Delhi about possible spike in separatist violence and the safety of economic investments in Assam.

The Most Likely Scenario

Given the technological sophistication of the attack, the scale of drone deployment, and the historical context, many analysts and regional observers see the Indian Army or its special forces as the most probable executors—despite the official denials.

The Myanmar army’s direct involvement seems improbable given the current alignment of interests and the pressures it faces internally, though it's plausible they may have been aware of the operation or tacitly allowed it. There are no credible reports or evidence indicating that local resistance groups in Myanmar possess the means or the motive for such an attack.

The attack, therefore, appears to be the outcome—and a signal—of overlapping regional ambitions, with India moving proactively to neutralise armed groups seen as a threat to its stability and development in the Northeast. At the same time, the ambiguity and plausible deniability serve the interests of all state actors, allowing them to maintain strategic relationships and avoid direct escalation.

Conclusion

The drone attack on ULFA(I) and allied separatist camps in Myanmar stands as a stark manifestation of how the fragmented, chaotic politics of Myanmar, and longstanding insurgencies in India’s Northeast, intersect with the ambitions of regional powers.

While direct attribution remains mired in denials and accusations, the circumstantial evidence and broader strategic context point most clearly to Indian security forces as the primary actors—undertaking a calibrated strike to contain separatist threats, disrupt militant alignments, and send a message to both domestic and external stakeholders in the volatile borderlands.

Agencies