Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) exemplifies a profound failure in India's defence indigenisation ambitions, trapped in a cycle of technological dependency that has persisted for over a decade. The organisation's approach to engine development, characterised by prolonged delays, excessive reliance on foreign technology transfers, and a preference for "screwdriver technology" over genuine research and development, has created a systematic drain on public resources without delivering the strategic capabilities India desperately needs.

The HTFE-25 Engine: A Decade of Delays Without Progress

The Hindustan Turbo Fan Engine-25 (HTFE-25) project stands as perhaps the most damning indictment of HAL's institutional inefficiencies. Initiated in 2013 with an ambitious six-year completion timeline, the 25 kN turbofan engine was positioned as a cornerstone of India's indigenous aerospace capabilities. However, more than eleven years later, the project remains mired in developmental trials with no clear production timeline in sight.

The engine's development trajectory reveals a pattern of systemic mismanagement that has become characteristic of HAL's operations. By 2019, HAL had produced only two core engines that completed 339 test runs, achieving basic milestones such as cold starting tests and reaching maximum operational speed. While these achievements were celebrated as significant progress, they merely represented the fundamental prerequisites for engine development that should have been completed within the initial project timeline.

The delays have been attributed to multiple factors including delayed land clearances for test facilities, unplanned procurement activities, and technology gaps that were not adequately identified during the project's conceptualisation phase. These challenges collectively pushed back HAL's original timeline, with current projections indicating completion by 2029-2030, representing a staggering 16-17 year development cycle for what was initially planned as a six-year project.

The financial implications of these delays are substantial. The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) identified cumulative impaired expenses of ₹159.23 crore due to HAL's lack of risk management and poor planning. These cost overruns represent not merely financial inefficiency but a fundamental failure of institutional accountability that has characterised HAL's approach to engine development.

AL-31 Engine Production: Licensed Assembly Masquerading As Indigenous Manufacturing

HAL's claims of building the AL-31 engine "from scratch" represent a particularly egregious example of institutional self-deception that masks the organisation's continued technological dependence on foreign suppliers. Under the licensing agreement with Russia, HAL assembles AL-31FP engines at its Koraput facility, achieving what appears to be impressive local production statistics with over 87% of engine components manufactured domestically.

However, this apparent success story dissolves under closer examination. The critical "hot parts" of the engine—including turbine blades, combustion chambers, and advanced metallurgical components—remain entirely dependent on Russian technology and materials. HAL cannot independently modify, upgrade, or even maintain these engines without Russian approval and continued supply of proprietary materials.

The licensing agreement explicitly restricts HAL from substituting components with locally manufactured alternatives or utilising Indian alloys without Russian authorisation. When HAL and the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) developed plans to replace certain assemblies with indigenously produced equivalents, Russia warned that such modifications would void the engines' warranty. This restriction effectively maintains India's technological dependence while providing the illusion of indigenous capability.

The recent ₹26,000 crore contract for 240 AL-31FP engines, while touted as a significant achievement for domestic manufacturing, actually reinforces this dependency structure. HAL will continue producing engines using Russian-supplied kits and materials, with indigenous content limited to 54-63% by value but concentrated in non-critical components. The organisation's inability to increase indigenous content beyond this threshold, despite decades of production experience, demonstrates the fundamental limitations of its approach to technology development.

Technology Transfer Agreements: A Web of Dependencies Without Genuine Capability Development

HAL's extensive portfolio of licensing agreements and technology transfer arrangements with global aerospace original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) creates an appearance of technological sophistication while actually reinforcing the organisation's fundamental dependence on foreign suppliers. These agreements span partnerships with virtually every major aero-engine manufacturer, including General Electric, Safran, Rolls-Royce, and others, covering both military and commercial applications.

The relationship with Rolls-Royce exemplifies the pattern of sophisticated dependency that characterises HAL's approach. While HAL manufactures Adour engine components under license and has established authorised maintenance centres for international customers, the organisation remains entirely dependent on Rolls-Royce for technical specifications, quality standards, and proprietary technologies. Recent agreements for manufacturing LEAP engine components with Safran follow the same model, with HAL serving as a manufacturing hub for foreign-designed systems rather than developing indigenous capabilities.

Perhaps most revealing is HAL's exploration of joint ventures for the Combat Air Teaming System (CATS) Warrior drone engine. Despite decades of engine development experience and substantial investments for domestic capability development, HAL is seeking partnership with Rolls-Royce for developing a relatively modest propulsion system for an unmanned platform. This dependency on foreign collaboration for even modest engine requirements demonstrates the organisation's failure to develop genuine indigenous design and development capabilities.

The Pattern extends to HAL's approach to the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) engine development as well, where the organisation continues to seek foreign partnerships rather than leveraging its accumulated experience and resources to develop indigenous solutions.

Screwdriver Technology Vs Genuine Research And Development

HAL's operational model fundamentally reflects what critics describe as "screwdriver technology"—sophisticated assembly operations that create the appearance of indigenous manufacturing while maintaining complete dependence on foreign-designed and supplied components. This approach, while enabling HAL to claim impressive production statistics and indigenous content percentages, fails to develop the fundamental design and development capabilities that would enable genuine technological independence.

The institutional preference for imported solutions is evident even in HAL's recent decisions regarding indigenous programs. The organisation's abandonment of indigenous radar and electronic warfare systems for the TEJAS MK-1A program in favour of Israeli ELTA systems represents a particularly stark example of this institutional bias against indigenous development. This decision, made despite the successful demonstration of indigenous capabilities and the organisation's official commitment to indigenisation, reflects a fundamental lack of confidence in domestic technological capabilities.

Institutional Accountability

HAL's continued existence as a defence production monopoly, despite its documented failures in delivering strategic capabilities, raises fundamental questions about institutional accountability in India's defence sector. The organisation's ability to secure continued funding and contracts despite chronic delays, cost overruns, and technological dependencies reflects broader systemic failures in India's defence procurement and industrial policy frameworks.

Conclusion: The Need For Fundamental Reform

HAL's approach to engine development and aerospace manufacturing represents a fundamental failure of India's defence indigenisation strategy. The organisation's preference for licensing agreements and technology transfers over genuine indigenous development, combined with chronic project delays and cost overruns, has created a systematic drain on public resources without delivering the strategic capabilities India requires.

The HTFE-25 project's eleven-year delay, HAL's continued dependence on Russian technology for AL-31 production, and the organisation's reliance on foreign partnerships for even modest engine development requirements demonstrate the institutional failures that have characterised HAL's operations for decades. These failures not only represent financial waste but also strategic vulnerabilities that compromise India's defence autonomy and technological sovereignty.

Addressing these challenges requires fundamental institutional reforms that go beyond incremental improvements or additional funding. HAL's monopolistic position in Indian aerospace manufacturing, combined with its demonstrated inability to deliver strategic capabilities within reasonable time-frames and budgets, suggests the need for comprehensive restructuring that introduces genuine competition and accountability into India's defence industrial base.

Without such reforms, HAL will continue to function as a sophisticated assembly operation that consumes substantial public resources while failing to deliver the indigenous capabilities that India's strategic position and security requirements demand. The organisation's current trajectory ensures continued technological dependence and strategic vulnerability at a time when genuine indigenous capabilities have become essential for national security and strategic autonomy.

IDN