On August 21, 2025, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) of India firmly dismissed Nepal’s objections regarding the resumption of cross-border trade between India and China through the Lipulekh Pass, asserting that Kathmandu’s territorial claim to the region is "untenable" and unsupported by historical facts or evidence.

The Indian government, through MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal, reiterated that the Lipulekh trade route has been operational since 1954 and has historically facilitated commerce and movement between India and China, though it was temporarily disrupted in recent years due to the COVID-19 pandemic and related issues.

With the stabilisation of regional conditions, both New Delhi and Beijing agreed to restore trade flows through the pass, emphasising continuity of long-standing arrangements rather than acceptance of any new territorial status quo.

India’s rejection of Nepal’s claim stems from its position that the Kalapani–Limpiyadhura–Lipulekh region (known as the "Kalapani region") has always been integral Indian territory.

According to India’s interpretation of the 1816 Treaty of Sugauli, which was signed between the British East India Company and the Kingdom of Nepal following the Anglo-Nepalese War, the boundary was to be defined along the Kali River.

India argues that the river originates at Kalapani village, hence the territory extending eastwards from there—including Lipulekh—falls within Indian jurisdiction. Conversely, Nepal contends that the Kali River originates much further north, at Limpiyadhura, making the disputed stretch of approximately 372 square kilometres rightfully Nepali territory. This divergence in interpretation has been the crux of the boundary dispute.

In response to the Indo-Chinese decision to reopen border trade, the Government of Nepal lodged a strong objection, citing that the agreement was a unilateral move that disregards Nepal’s sovereignty.

The Nepali Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement highlighting three key points: firstly, the official political map of Nepal, enshrined in its 2015 Constitution, includes Lipulekh, Kalapani, and Limpiyadhura as integral territories east of the Mahakali River; secondly, Nepal remains committed to earlier diplomatic communications in which it consistently opposed Indian activities such as road building and trade expansion in the contested area; and thirdly, it has conveyed to both India and China that these areas lie within Nepal’s sovereign domain.

Kathmandu maintains that, under the Sugauli Treaty of 1816, the Mahakali (Kali) River is the demarcating line, and the disputed tracts therefore should belong to Nepal.

India, however, has dismissed these assertions as an artificial enlargement of territorial claims, stressing that they lack historical or cartographic grounding. By invoking continuity of trade through the Lipulekh Pass since 1954, New Delhi argues that no new encroachment has occurred.

Indian officials also emphasized that they remain open to dialogue and diplomacy to resolve “agreed boundary issues” with Nepal, though they maintain that lip-service claims unsupported by treaty interpretations cannot form the basis of resolution.

India seeks to separate bilateral engagement with Kathmandu from what it regards as Nepal’s politically motivated cartographic assertions, a sentiment heightened after Nepal released an amended map in 2020 to formally incorporate the disputed territory.

Interestingly, China’s role in this trilateral dynamic adds further complexity. By agreeing with India to reopen trade via Lipulekh, China has tacitly acknowledged Indian administrative control of the pass. This comes two years after Beijing’s release of a new national map in 2023 that depicted Lipulekh, Kalapani, and Limpiyadhura as parts of India, effectively sidelining Kathmandu’s claim.

The symbolic weight of this cartographic endorsement by China—usually Nepal’s close partner—has generated unease in Kathmandu, which has traditionally leveraged its ties with Beijing as a counterbalance to India’s influence.

For Nepal, this perceived abandonment by China in the official recognition of border demarcations further weakens its diplomatic position and amplifies domestic sensitivities regarding sovereignty and territorial integrity.

At the heart of the issue lies the geostrategic importance of Lipulekh. Located at Nepal’s western frontier, nestled within the Himalayan tri-junction of India, Nepal, and China (Tibet Autonomous Region), Lipulekh is not just a trade pass but also a critical transit point for pilgrims heading to Mount Kailash and Lake Mansarovar in Tibet.

Its altitude and terrain make it strategically valuable for defence and surveillance in the Himalayan frontier. As such, the region is not merely about historical treaties or cultural exchanges but also a node of strategic competition and security significance for both India and China.

The disagreement between India and Nepal over Lipulekh, Kalapani, and Limpiyadhura has been simmering for decades but escalated sharply in 2020, when India inaugurated a new road through the pass to facilitate better access to Kailash Mansarovar.

Nepal responded by publicising a new map incorporating the contested territory, a move that significantly strained ties. Diplomatic dialogue, including the institutionalised boundary mechanisms, has since stagnated with little progress toward settlement.

The resumption of Indo-Chinese trade now reignites those tensions by positioning India and China in quiet alignment against Nepal’s territorial assertion.

To summarise, this recent development signals an increasingly triangular contest over the Himalayan frontier where India is reinforcing its historical and treaty-based interpretations, China has chosen to tacitly side with India for pragmatic trade and strategic reasons, and Nepal remains insistent on its sovereignty claims, though diplomatically isolated.

India’s outright rejection of Nepal’s protest, coupled with its call for dialogue, suggests a continued hardening of New Delhi’s boundary posture, while Nepal faces the challenge of asserting its claim without sufficient leverage.

The dispute thus remains unresolved, deeply rooted in history, evolving through geopolitics, and unlikely to abate soon given the strategic stakes associated with the Lipulekh Pass.

Based On ANI Report