The longstanding border dispute between Nepal and India over the Lipulekh, Kalapani, and Limpiyadhura region resurfaced sharply after India and China recently agreed to reopen border trade through Lipulekh Pass during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to New Delhi.

The announcement, which was formalized during discussions with Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, identifies Lipulekh—as well as Shipki La and Nathu La—as designated trading points between India and China.

Nepal, however, strongly objected to the move, issuing a formal three-point statement through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs on August 21, 2025, emphasising that Lipulekh lies within Nepalese territory and that neither India nor China has the authority to engage in bilateral arrangements involving disputed land.

The Nepalese government highlighted its updated constitutional map of 2020, which formally incorporates Limpiyadhura, Kalapani, and Lipulekh as integral parts of Nepal.

This revised political map, adopted by Nepal’s Parliament and enshrined in the constitution, was based on historical documentation—including the Sugauli Treaty of 1816, maps collected from London archives, records of land revenue payments, and orders issued during the Rana regime—asserting that territories east of the Mahakali (Kali) River belong to Nepal.

The key contention lies in the identification of the river’s origin: India maintains that the Kali River originates at Kalapani village, while Nepal argues the source lies farther northwest at Limpiyadhura. This divergent interpretation underpins the competing territorial claims, with both sides citing historical evidence and cartographic sources.

Nepal has consistently opposed unilateral activities in the area, including India’s road construction in 2020 via Lipulekh to facilitate access to Kailash Mansarovar in Tibet, which led to severe diplomatic friction.

The 2020 project sparked protests in Kathmandu, coinciding with Nepal’s decision to constitutionally endorse its new map. Diplomatic notes were exchanged, and relations between the neighbours sank to their lowest point in years.

China’s role in the dispute further complicates the matter—although regarded as a “friendly country” by Nepal, Beijing has not recognised Kathmandu’s claims. In fact, China’s 2023 official map placed Lipulekh, Kalapani, and Limpiyadhura within Indian boundaries, effectively siding with New Delhi and sparking concerns over Nepal’s diminished leverage.

From India’s perspective, the Ministry of External Affairs reaffirmed that Nepal’s claims are “unjustified” and lack historical legitimacy. Spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal stressed that India’s position has been consistent for decades, pointing out that border trade with China through Lipulekh Pass commenced as early as 1954.

According to India, this historical precedent validates its administrative and territorial control over the region. India also condemned what it described as Nepal’s “artificial enlargement” of claims and urged Kathmandu to settle outstanding border differences through dialogue rather than unilateral assertions. 

The MEA, however, reiterated its willingness to engage diplomatically with Nepal, keeping with the spirit of their longstanding ties.

For Nepal, however, the agreement between India and China is seen as particularly concerning because it excludes Kathmandu from trilateral consultations, despite Lipulekh being shown within Nepal’s territory in its constitutional map.

This sense of exclusion recalls earlier setbacks, such as the 2015 Indo-China decision to expand trade via Lipulekh, which likewise triggered protests in Nepal on grounds of unilateralism. Nepal views such bilateral arrangements as a direct violation of its sovereignty, undermining its historical claims and constitutional mandates.

The government remains committed to pressing its case diplomatically, affirming that disputes must be resolved on the basis of historical treaties, maps, facts, and evidence, rather than unilateral agreements.

The timing of the controversy is also significant as Nepalese Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli prepares for back-to-back high-level visits: first to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit (August 31–September 1, 2025), followed by an official trip to India on September 16, 2025.

The diplomatic fallout from the Lipulekh issue is expected to weigh heavily in these engagements. With both India and China strengthening bilateral cooperation in the aftermath of their strained ties post-Galwan (2020), Nepal finds itself struggling to assert its voice in a triangular power equation in which its claims are being systematically side-lined.

The dispute over Lipulekh is thus not only a cartographic and territorial issue but also one with strategic, diplomatic, and geopolitical significance. For India, the area remains crucial for border security and as a trade link with Tibet.

For Nepal, it has become a nationalist symbol of sovereignty and territorial integrity, enshrined in its constitution and public consciousness. For China, cooperation with India on trade routes through the region furthers its strategic and economic objectives, while keeping Nepal diplomatically constrained. 

As a result, the issue stands as a flashpoint in South Asian geopolitics—where historical treaties, border demarcation uncertainties, and present-day power dynamics intersect, shaping relations between three key Himalayan neighbours.

Based On ANI Report