by Darpan Agarwal

For years, Indian strategic planners have grappled with the possibility of a two-front war a simultaneous conflict with Pakistan in the west and China in the north. Even this scenario poses daunting challenges, but a more sobering possibility now looms: a three-front war in which Bangladesh, under external influence or shifting political dynamics, turns hostile.

While such a situation is unlikely in the immediate future, the exercise of examining it is not an act of alarmism. Rather, it is a necessary reflection on India’s vulnerabilities and the urgent reforms required to safeguard its security.

On the western front, Pakistan remains the most persistent adversary. The dispute over Kashmir, combined with state-sponsored terrorism, ensures a constant source of friction. In a full-scale conflict, Pakistan’s strategy would be to launch sharp, high-intensity offensives designed to draw in global attention before India could leverage its superior resources. Its nuclear arsenal further constrains India’s options, making every escalation fraught with risk.

China, meanwhile, presents a more formidable and long-term challenge. Over the past two decades, the People’s Liberation Army has transformed itself into a modern fighting force. It has built extensive infrastructure across Tibet, enabling rapid mobilisation of troops and heavy equipment. Skirmishes in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh have demonstrated Beijing’s willingness to test India’s defences.

A war with China would stretch the Indian Army along high-altitude fronts and divide the already limited strength of the Indian Air Force, which operates just over 30 combat squadrons against a sanctioned 42.

A third front involving Bangladesh would alter India’s strategic landscape dramatically. India and Bangladesh currently enjoy close ties, but should Dhaka align with hostile powers, the implications would be severe.

India shares over 4,000 kilometers of porous border with Bangladesh, much of it difficult to defend. The narrow Siliguri Corridor India’s “chicken neck” could become a focal point of pressure, threatening to cut off the entire northeast. Additionally, hostile activity in the Bay of Bengal would force India to defend its eastern seaboard and maritime routes, stretching the Navy across both coasts.

Managing three active fronts would test India’s military structure like never before. The dispersion of forces would dilute combat power, while supply lines to Ladakh, Arunachal, Rajasthan, and Bengal would be pushed to their limits. The Air Force, already stretched thin, would face the impossible task of sustaining air superiority in three distinct theaters. The Navy would have to secure both the Arabian Sea against Pakistan and the Bay of Bengal against potential China-Bangladesh cooperation.

How then could India manage such a scenario? The answer lies in a blend of military modernization, organizational reform, and diplomatic foresight. On the military front, India must urgently invest in force multipliers such as mid-air refuelers, airborne early warning systems, drones, and precision-strike capabilities.

Expanding the Air Force to at least its sanctioned strength and pushing ahead with indigenous programs like the TEJAS MK-2 and AMCA will reduce dependence on imports and provide flexibility in crises. Equally vital is the creation of joint theatre commands, which would ensure synergy across the Army, Navy, and Air Force, allowing resources to be deployed more efficiently.

Diplomacy remains India’s first line of defense against encirclement. Strengthening ties with Bangladesh through trade, energy, and connectivity projects can prevent Dhaka from slipping into an adversarial camp.

With China, India must continue to balance confrontation with engagement while deepening partnerships with the United States, Japan, Australia, and ASEAN states to counter Beijing’s regional influence. Pakistan, meanwhile, can be further isolated internationally by highlighting its continued support for terrorism and limiting its ability to gain external backing in times of crisis.

Strategically, India must prepare for short, intense wars that aim for rapid dominance before international pressure forces a ceasefire. This requires not only battlefield readiness but also resilience in cyber networks, communications, and energy infrastructure to withstand multi-domain attacks. A credible nuclear deterrent against both Pakistan and China must remain intact to prevent adventurism.

A three-front war would represent the gravest test of India’s security apparatus in the modern era. It is a scenario no policymaker would wish to see unfold, yet it is precisely by planning for the worst that India can safeguard peace. The path forward lies in diplomacy that prevents encirclement, military modernization that enhances deterrence, and strategic foresight that ensures India is never caught unprepared. Preparedness does not invite war; it ensures that if war comes even on three fronts India can face it with confidence and resolve.

Darpan Agarwal is a defence enthusiast. This essay reflects author's opinions alone