India is intensifying its regional outreach through a renewed push under its ‘Connect Central Asia’ policy, placing Chabahar Port at the centre of its strategic calculus.

Against the backdrop of shifting global trade alignments and China’s recalibrated overseas investment posture, New Delhi has chosen to double down on its engagement with Iran, seeing Chabahar not merely as an infrastructure project but as a vital geo-economic and geopolitical lever.

The significance of this move comes as Washington’s tariff reordering has disrupted trade flows while Beijing rethinks its Belt and Road Initiative commitments in politically volatile environments.

China’s recent withdrawal from a core component of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) signals a new caution that weakens Islamabad’s hand, even as Pakistan grapples with financial instability and security risks to Chinese nationals. This retreat creates additional space for India’s deepening partnership with Iran and its ambitious plans for Central Asian access.

At the diplomatic level, the focus on Chabahar was reinforced during a high-level phone call on September 7 between India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and his Iranian counterpart Ali Akbar Ahmadian.

Both sides reaffirmed the importance of strategic cooperation, placing the port at the centre of discussions. The facility, located on the Gulf of Oman, is Iran’s only oceanic port and serves India’s long-term objective of bypassing Pakistan-controlled transit routes to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

The port’s operationalisation under India’s stewardship is gaining traction. A long-term agreement signed on May 13, 2024, grants India responsibility for developing and managing the general cargo and container terminals at the Shahid Beheshti terminal for a decade.

Financially, India has allocated ₹400 crore to the project since FY 2016-17, of which nearly half has already been invested. Operational metrics underscore this momentum—the port registered a 43% increase in vessel traffic and a 34% surge in container movement in FY 2023-24, highlighting rising utility and commercial relevance.

The wider geopolitical implications are striking. China once explored the option of leveraging Chabahar within its Belt and Road framework, an idea that generated concerns in New Delhi given Beijing’s entrenched backing of Pakistan.

With Beijing now stepping back from risk-heavy projects, Islamabad finds itself strategically squeezed, losing leverage in potential trilateral port-related negotiations involving Tehran and India. This dynamic complicates Pakistan’s already delicate balancing between Chinese patronage and Iranian proximity.

For India, however, the trajectory is clearer. New Delhi is not only investing in Chabahar’s port facilities but also in associated rail connectivity, viewing the project as integral to its long-term strategy of bridging South Asia with the energy-rich and resource-laden expanse of Central Asia.

In the wider matrix, Chabahar boosts India’s energy security, strengthens trade corridors, and enhances its role as a credible alternative partner in regional connectivity at a time when China’s infrastructural assertiveness faces headwinds.

Ultimately, Chabahar serves as both gateway and symbol—an anchor in India’s Eurasian diplomacy and a counterpoint to China’s CPEC-driven outreach.

By positioning itself as a stable, reliable, and forward-looking stakeholder, India is playing the long game of embedding itself as a central connector in the evolving Eurasian trade and geopolitical order.

Agencies