India Weighs Russian Su‑57 Stealth Jet Deal; Considering To Acquire Initially 2 Squadrons In Fly‑Away Condition
India is examining a proposal from Russia to acquire the Su‑57
fifth‑generation fighter jet, with the deal structured in two phases. Under
the preliminary offer, two squadrons would be purchased in fly‑away condition,
while another three to five squadrons could be licence‑built at HAL’s Nashik
facility.
This would mark the most ambitious Indo‑Russian defence collaboration since
the BrahMos missile project.
A central feature of Moscow’s pitch is full technology transfer, access to
source codes, and integration rights for Indian missile systems. Such
concessions are designed to address long‑standing Indian concerns over
dependency on foreign OEMs and difficulties in integrating indigenous weapons
with imported platforms. If realised, India would have significant control
over avionics, mission data, and weapons integration—benefits that have rarely
been assured in past major aircraft procurements.
The Su‑57E package is being positioned as a cost‑effective and
sanction‑resistant alternative to western fighters. U.S. tariff disputes with
India, coupled with delays in finalising the 114‑fighter Rafale MRFA contract,
provide Russia an opening to push its jet as a faster, less politically
encumbered solution. Moscow has also highlighted lower operational costs
compared to Western stealth platforms like the F‑35, while stressing long‑term
sustainment through local manufacturing.
For the Indian Air Force, the deal could partially address the fighter
squadron shortfall expected over the next decade as MiG‑21s and older Jaguars
retire. Induction of fifth‑generation fighters would be a significant
capability leap, enhancing stealth penetration, sensor fusion, and
network‑centric warfare capacity. However, the proposal also arrives as India
advances its own AMCA stealth fighter program, raising questions about
overlap, timelines, and resource allocation.
For Russia, the export of Su‑57 fighters to India would provide critical
funding for scale production of its fifth‑generation fleet at a time of high
sanctions pressure and limited international buyers. Unlike past joint
ventures like the cancelled FGFA program, this pitch is more aggressive and
appears designed to exploit a window where India is squeezed between Western
pressures and urgent operational needs.
Key decision points will rest on Indian evaluation of the Su‑57’s maturity,
given slow domestic induction within the Russian Aerospace Forces. Concerns
remain about engine reliability, supply‑chain stability under sanctions, and
the risk of investing in a platform still evolving. Further, integrating
Russian fighters into an IAF fleet already dominated by French, American, and
indigenous projects may complicate logistics and training pipelines.
The proposal is currently under preliminary assessment by the Ministry of
Defence. If negotiations proceed, India could pursue a mixed fleet acquisition
strategy—Rafales for medium combat roles, Su‑57s for deep‑strike and stealth
dominance, and AMCA for indigenous long‑term needs. The decision will reflect
not only operational requirements but also India’s broader geopolitical
balancing act between Washington, Paris, and Moscow.
Comparative table of Su‑57E Vs Rafale F5 Vs AMCA MK-1 focused on timelines,
capabilities, and strategic fit for the IAF:
Comparative Table: Su‑57E vs Rafale F5 vs AMCA MK-1
| Parameter | Su‑57E (Russia) | Rafale F5 (France) | AMCA Mk1 (India) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Generation | 5th Gen (stealth, sensor fusion) | 4.5+ Gen (advanced stealth features, not full stealth) | 5th Gen (indigenous design with stealth) |
| Acquisition Plan | Proposal: 2 squadrons fly‑away + 3–5 licence‑built by HAL | 114 MRFA plan (slow procurement progress; interim F4 in IAF service) | Prototype under development; induction around 2030–31 |
| Stealth Features | Full stealth shaping, internal weapons bays, radar cross‑section reduction | Reduced signature upgrades (limited stealth) | Full stealth design with LO (low observable) features |
| Avionics & Sensors | AESA radar, IRST, sensor fusion, data‑link | AESA radar (RBE2-AA), advanced spectra EW, AI‑driven upgrades in F5 | Indigenous AESA (Uttam), AI‑enabled systems, sensor fusion planned |
| Engines | Saturn AL‑41F1 initially, future Izdeliye‑30 (117/117S variant) | Snecma M88 with growth roadmap (T‑Rex engine in F5) | Indigenous Kaveri‑derived 110 kN class with early GE F414 integration |
| Weapons Compatibility | Designed for Russian A2A/A2G; Russia offering Indian missile integration (Astra Mk1/2, Rudram, BrahMos‑NG) | Full integration with Western/IAF weapons; partial integration of Indian missiles possible | Fully indigenous integration (Astra, Rudram, SAAW, BrahMos‑NG later) |
| Technology Transfer | Russia offering full ToT, source‑code access, integration rights | Limited ToT, focus on local assembly; France protective on codes | 100% indigenous design/manufacture (with initial foreign engine support) |
| Operational Status | Limited service in RuAF (around 30 delivered, still maturing engines & avionics) | Combat‑proven, mature platform serving many NATO countries | Prototype stage; flight testing expected 2026–27 |
| Delivery Timeline | If signed, fly‑away squadrons could arrive ~2027–28; HAL licence build into 2030s | New F5 deliveries likely only after 2032–34 due to backlog | First production squadron expected ~2031–32 |
| Cost (per unit, est.) | ~70–80 million USD (export config) | 120–130 million USD (F5 standard) | Projected ~80–100 million USD (depending on scale and localisation) |
| Strategic Fit | Immediate stealth boost, sanction‑resistant, high Russian dependence | Continuity with existing Rafale fleet, trusted Western ecosystem, costly | Long‑term indigenous solution, strategic autonomy, delayed timelines |
IDN (With Agency Inputs)
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