The Communist Party of Nepal–Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML), under the leadership of former Nepalese Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli, has strongly opposed the India-China agreement to reopen trade through the Lipulekh Pass, a territory claimed by Nepal.

At its recently concluded policy convention in Lalitpur, the party passed a special document calling for both India and China to immediately withdraw from the arrangement, while urging the Nepalese government to assert its territorial rights east of the Kali (Mahakali) River.

The UML emphasised diplomatic initiatives at the highest level to resolve the issue and included this demand within a broader 28-point proposal adopted at the convention. The resolution highlighted Oli's firm stance during his China visit from August 30 to September 3, where he publicly opposed the Lipulekh trade arrangement agreed upon in Beijing-New Delhi talks, a position the UML claims enhanced Nepal’s international standing and reinforced Kathmandu’s consistent assertion of sovereignty.

The current flashpoint arises from the agreement between Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi during the latter’s visit to New Delhi in August. Both sides decided to reopen border trade through three long-established routes: Lipulekh Pass, Shipki La, and Nathu La.

India’s Ministry of External Affairs stated that trade across Lipulekh is not new but a traditional route that was disrupted in recent years due to COVID-19 and other developments, and hence, resuming it is a routine diplomatic decision.

The ministry also rejected Nepal’s objections as “historically untenable” and not supported by verifiable evidence. By contrast, Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a strong protest, reiterating Kathmandu’s position that Lipulekh, along with Limpiyadhura and Kalapani, lies east of the Kali River and thus belongs to Nepal under the 1816 Sugauli Treaty.

This border issue is neither new nor isolated. In May 2020, Nepal amended its constitution to incorporate a revised administrative and political map that included Limpiyadhura, Kalapani, and Lipulekh within Nepalese territory.

The move came after strong protests in Kathmandu over India’s November 2019 revised political map and the subsequent inauguration in May 2020 of a Border Roads Organisation (BRO)-constructed road that passed through Lipulekh up to the Kailash Mansarovar pilgrimage route in Tibet.

Kathmandu formally objected, citing the Sugauli Treaty and archival documents including historical maps, revenue records, and orders issued by Prime Minister Chandra Shumsher as evidence of Nepalese sovereignty over the area.

The updated map, approved by Nepal’s Cabinet on May 18, 2020, and publicly released on May 20, added approximately 335 square kilometres of disputed land and included Gunji, Nabhi, and Kuti villages previously omitted from earlier versions.

The Lipulekh issue had already soured Nepal-India relations in 2015, when India and China included the pass in their joint statement during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to China. The declaration about expanding trade via Lipulekh was made without prior consultation with Nepal, leading to widespread protests in Kathmandu and raising diplomatic tensions.

For Nepal, the matter transcends trade and connectivity, representing both a sovereignty dispute and a test of its international standing. What complicates the situation further is Beijing’s shifting maps. While India and China continue to reference Lipulekh in their bilateral arrangements, in 2023 China released a new map that depicted Lipulekh, Kalapani, and Limpiyadhura as part of Indian territory, indirectly contradicting Nepal’s claim and adding another layer of complexity to the dispute.

The underlying historical disagreement revolves around the interpretation of the Kali River as demarcated in the 1816 Sugauli Treaty following Nepal’s defeat at the hands of the British East India Company. Nepal maintains that the river originates at Limpiyadhura and thus places Lipulekh, Kalapani, and adjacent areas east of it within its sovereign territory.

India contests this definition of the river’s origin and holds that the areas fall within its own Uttarakhand state, citing historical administrative and security presence, regular trade across the pass, and infrastructural development in the region.

For India, the Lipulekh corridor has long been seen as strategically significant, not only for providing access to Kailash Mansarovar but also for ensuring supply and mobility in sensitive high-altitude border terrain.

Today, the Lipulekh issue has re-emerged as a triangular point of friction between Nepal, India, and China. While New Delhi and Beijing seek to normalise relations through economic and confidence-building agreements, Kathmandu perceives itself side-lined in decisions concerning territory it claims as its own.

The UML’s latest resolution under KP Oli’s leadership is consistent with Nepal’s assertive approach since 2020 and reflects growing domestic expectations that Kathmandu will not allow external powers to decide on matters concerning Lipulekh without its consent.

With India dismissing Nepal’s objections as unfounded, and China officially recognising the area in recent maps as Indian territory despite earlier agreements, Nepal finds itself in a diplomatic predicament, compelled to rely on historic treaties and international lobbying to reinforce its claim.

Whether this renewed push by UML and Oli compels a stronger Nepalese government response or escalates into another round of overt disputes will depend on how Kathmandu balances domestic nationalist sentiments with its pragmatic need to maintain working relations with both its giant neighbours.

Based On ANI Report