A recent arrival of US Air Force C-130J Super Hercules aircraft at Chittagong’s Shah Amanat International Airport signals a growing American military presence in Bangladesh. The deployment is part of ‘Operation Pacific Angel 25-3,’ a four-day trilateral exercise involving the US, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. This initiative reinforces humanitarian assistance, interoperability, and logistics cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

The exercise features three C-130J aircraft, including two from US Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), alongside Bangladesh Air Force’s Mi-17 helicopter assets. It involves over 240 personnel, with 92 from the US Air Force and 150 from Bangladesh.

Senior US diplomats and officers, including the US Chargé d’Affaires in Dhaka, have already visited the base to oversee operations, underscoring Washington’s political and military intent behind these activities.

Chittagong’s geographic position makes it central to India’s neighbourhood security calculus. Located near India’s northeast and close to Myanmar, the region commands access to the Bay of Bengal and critical maritime routes. Increased US activity here could give Washington an influential foothold in South Asia’s strategic corridor, one historically secured by India.

This is not an isolated case. Earlier, the US conducted “Tiger Lightning 2025,” a six-day combat exercise with Bangladesh’s elite Para Commando Brigade in Sylhet. Drills included counterterrorism, jungle warfare, and medical evacuation training. Repeated military engagements indicate America’s long-term strategy of embedding presence in Bangladesh, straddling both Army and Air Force partnerships.

Bangladesh’s political transition in August 2024, which forced Sheikh Hasina into exile in India, has reshaped Dhaka’s external engagements. Accusations linger that Washington was displeased with Hasina’s refusal to lease St Martin’s Island, a strategic Bay of Bengal outpost. Reports of a US Special Forces officer’s suspicious death in Dhaka last month only deepen the perception of covert American involvement. Under Muhammad Yunus’s interim government, Dhaka appears more receptive to Western defence cooperation.

For New Delhi, a strong US presence in Bangladesh is a double-edged sword. On one hand, closer US-Bangladesh ties could restrain Chinese ingress into the Bay of Bengal, limiting Beijing’s influence in ports and infrastructure.

On the other, American deployments in Chittagong risk narrowing India’s traditional security space in its eastern flank, raising concerns about surveillance, intelligence operations, and future strategic balancing.

The Bay of Bengal is turning into a new theatre of US-China rivalry. Both Washington and Beijing are also said to be eyeing Myanmar’s rebel networks, which could further complicate India’s security environment along insurgency-prone border states.

Any militarisation of Bangladesh’s ports and air bases changes the operating environment for the Indian Navy and Air Force, particularly in the Andaman–Nicobar TRI-Command security zone.

India now faces a policy dilemma: whether to tacitly welcome a US presence as a counterweight to China or to perceive it as intrusion into South Asia’s strategic architecture. New Delhi will need to recalibrate its diplomatic ties with Dhaka’s interim government while simultaneously coordinating with Washington to ensure its eastern security buffer is not eroded.

Based On First Post Report