The United States plays a complex role in the Saudi–Pakistan defence pact, using it as a tool of leverage while carefully protecting its strategic partnership with India. Over 70 percent of Saudi Arabia’s defence imports originate from the US, ranging from F-15 fighter jets and Patriot missile systems to advanced drones, which ensures that any Saudi military collaboration—including with Pakistan—cannot occur without Washington’s tacit approval. This dependence grants the US a significant veto power and deep influence over Riyadh’s military policies.

At the same time, India remains central to Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy aimed at countering China’s regional expansion. New Delhi’s growing defence ties with the US, including advanced technology transfers and interoperability initiatives, make it highly unlikely that Washington would support Saudi–Pakistan alignments that directly undermine Indian security. Instead, the US seeks to extract benefits from the Saudi deal while preventing its escalation against India’s interests.

With Pakistan, the US finds an indirect advantage. Pakistan, despite strained ties with Washington in recent years, retains a residual value as a former major non-NATO ally. The Saudi–Pakistan agreement could offer the US a discreet backchannel into Islamabad, especially useful at a time when Chinese strategic and economic influence stretches deep across Pakistan. Maintaining this connection gives Washington optionality without overtly re-engaging with Pakistan’s leadership.

By remaining close to Riyadh, Washington retains some ability to indirectly monitor and moderate Pakistan’s military posture, ensuring it does not tilt fully under Beijing’s influence.

Energy security provides another hidden layer of interest. Given Saudi Arabia’s vital role in global oil markets, the United States is committed to preventing Riyadh from using energy leverage in ways that destabilise supply chains, particularly against India—a key energy importer. The pact therefore becomes another arena where US influence is exercised to moderate Saudi behaviour in line with international stability.

Economically, the US defence industry also benefits heavily from Saudi arms deals—over $3 billion in 2022 alone. As one of the world’s largest arms suppliers, Washington uses such defence ties with Riyadh to sustain its own industrial and employment base, all while projecting itself as an indispensable security partner in West Asia.

Arms sales remain a straightforward but powerful driver. In 2022 alone, US–Saudi arms deals exceeded $3 billion, sustaining American defence manufacturers and maintaining a critical economic relationship. Allowing Saudi Arabia to expand its military diplomacy with Pakistan lowers the risk of Riyadh leaning on alternatives like China or Russia, while still anchoring it to the US supply chain.

Ultimately, Washington plays what can be described as a strategic double game. It permits a degree of Saudi–Pakistan defence cooperation as long as it does not cross lines that provoke India, thus securing arms revenues and diplomatic leverage.

At the same time, the US continues to invest in deeper strategic ties with New Delhi, ensuring India’s role as a balancing power against China. This calibrated approach enables the US to sit at the centre of three interlocking relationships—Saudi security, Pakistan’s military dynamics, and India’s strategic rise—leveraging each to maintain influence without allowing open confrontation.

Based On WION Report