The November 2025 crash of a Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) TEJAS light combat aircraft at the Dubai Air Show—the third-largest aviation exhibition globally—represents far more than a singular tragedy. The death of Wing Commander Namansh Syal on 21 November symbolises a systemic crisis in India's defence manufacturing architecture, one that has festered for over four decades while private sector alternatives have flourished in parallel domains.

The TEJAS Program: Seven Decades Compressed Into Delay

The Light Combat Aircraft TEJAS program encapsulates institutional dysfunction with almost tragicomic clarity. Sanctioned in 1983 to replace the ageing Soviet-origin MiG-21 fleet—itself in service for six decades—the program consumed 18 years merely to achieve first flight on 4 January 2001.

Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee renamed the aircraft "TEJAS" (lustre) in 2003, a patriotic gesture that masked the fundamental delays afflicting the project. Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) arrived in 2011, a full decade after first flight; Final Operational Clearance (FOC) followed in 2019. From project initiation to full operational status, the TEJAS consumed 36 years—more than a generation's working lifetime.​

The government allocated ₹5.75 billion (approximately ₹78 billion in 2023 values) to launch the program, with full-scale development commencing only in 1993, three years after design finalisation. Technical problems plagued the prototypes throughout the 1990s; first technology demonstrators (TD-1 and TD-2) suffered from flight control system deficiencies and structural failings that kept them grounded for extended periods.

When the TEJAS finally achieved Initial Operational Clearance in 2011, it marked merely the threshold to operational evaluation rather than readiness for service. The MiG-21 itself operated continuously throughout this entire period, serving for 62 years before final retirement in September 2025—making the replacement timeline profoundly emblematic of India's defence capability lag.​​

The indigenous engine program meant to power the TEJAS proved even more catastrophic. The Kaveri engine, developed by the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) under DRDO, commenced in 1986 with an anticipated 93-month development cycle and ₹382.21 crore budget. The project required expertise in advanced metallurgy, aero-thermal systems, single-crystal turbine blade fabrication, and sophisticated digital engine control that India had not yet mastered. International sanctions imposed following India's 1998 nuclear tests further constrained access to critical materials and technical knowledge.

By 2008, after consuming ₹2,106 crore—more than five times the initial estimate—with only 73 hours of successful flight testing, the Kaveri program was officially delinked from TEJAS. The aircraft was consequently fitted with General Electric F404-IN20 engines, locking India into permanent dependence on American engine technology.​

Engine Delays And Export Hopes Shattered

Current TEJAS MK-1A procurement difficulties remain entangled in this same supply chain vulnerability. The Indian Air Force ordered 180 advanced MK-1A variants, with the contract valued at ₹48,000 crore for 83 aircraft. HAL targeted first delivery in August 2024, but the GE Aerospace F404-IN20 engine supply schedule has proven persistently unachievable.

Originally scheduled for delivery in 2023, GE postponed supply dates repeatedly—first to 2024, then to early 2025, and latterly to April 2025. The delay extends approximately ten months beyond original scheduling, with widespread aerospace industry supply chain pressures attributed as the reason. This engine bottleneck cascaded backwards, preventing HAL from fulfilling its commitment to deliver 16 fighters in the FY2024-25 financial year and threatening the entire ₹48,000 crore contract schedule stretching to 2028-29.​

The Dubai crash exerts devastating impact upon export ambitions that constitute India's only pathway to generating revenue that could underwrite future development. HAL has pursued modest marketing campaigns in Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America, positioning TEJAS against platforms such as Sweden's JAS-39 Gripen in the light combat aircraft segment. In 2022, HAL planned to establish a marketing office in Malaysia, though the initiative never materialised. The crash has instantaneously destroyed years of credibility-building efforts. International defence purchasing decisions—particularly from military budgets worth hundreds of millions of dollars—rest fundamentally upon demonstrated reliability, operational maturity and field-proven deployment records, not patriotic sentiments or government endorsements.​

HAL, operates perpetually within bureaucratic constraints. Government ownership, direct Ministry of Defence administration, personnel policies bound by civil service regulations, and procurement structures tied to government audit requirements collectively strangled innovation and agility. The Private sector, unrestricted by such bureaucratic frameworks, has begun demonstrating superiority in defence manufacturing precisely through operational speed and adaptability that government structures cannot match. Companies like TATA Advanced Systems (TAS), Paras Defence & Space Technologies, Alpha Design Technologies and IG Drones transitioned from niche roles to central defence stakeholders within recent years.​

Defence By Entrepreneurship

India has progressively opened defence manufacturing to private sector participation, commencing in 2001 when government lifted the exclusive public sector monopoly. Since that opening, over 5,000 defence micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) emerged, alongside 369 defence industrial licences issued through FY2018-19. Government has liberalised Foreign Direct Investment policies from 26% ceiling (2001) to 74% through the automatic route (2020) and 100% through government approval. These policy shifts have attracted global defence majors—most notably the Tata-Airbus partnership for C-295 military transport aircraft manufacturing at India's first private defence aircraft facility in Vadodara, Gujarat.​

The drone sector exemplifies private sector effectiveness particularly vividly. Whilst DRDO and HAL developed unmanned systems throughout the 1990s and 2000s, most critical capability gaps were filled through Israeli systems (Searchers, Herons) imported post-Kargil War recognition of surveillance requirements. Private companies including ideaForge, IG Drones, Paras Defence, Alpha Design and others subsequently pioneered indigenous drone manufacturing. Operation Sindoor—a 2025 military operation—visibly demonstrated how private defence firms now supply critical systems: drones, electronic warfare platforms, radar systems and missiles.​

Most significantly, India's defence ministry cleared ₹30,000 crore procurement for 87 medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) unmanned aerial vehicles specifically restricting bidding to Indian firms exclusively, mandating 50%+ local content and emphasising technology transfer into propulsion and artificial intelligence targeting systems. This tender structure explicitly incentivise private sector participation and scalable manufacturing. Drone Federation of India data suggests over 550 companies now operate in the drone sector with 5,500 certified pilots. Government objectives explicitly target positioning India as a global drone hub and exporter by 2030.​​

The Immediate Imperative: Privatisation Acceleration And Manufacturing Focus

The Dubai crash has crystallised urgent imperatives for India's defence establishment. First, government must accelerate privatisation of defence manufacturing beyond rhetorical commitment toward substantive structural reform. HAL's continued monopoly in fighter aircraft manufacturing, despite persistent delays and quality concerns, prevents competitive pressure that markets naturally enforce. Private companies entering defence sectors immediately import operational disciplines, supply chain efficiency and accountability mechanisms that generations of HAL management have failed to internalise.​

Second, government must recognise that technological gaps between Indian indigenous systems and global standards require pragmatic solutions beyond patriotic manufacturing narratives. The TEJAS—despite genuine engineering accomplishment in indigenous aircraft design and integration—remains immature as an export platform precisely because development delays prevented field-proven operational experience. By contrast, competing systems (Gripen, F-16, Rafale) accumulated decades of combat deployment data that customers trust. India cannot award itself "brownie points for indigenous products"; military buyers select systems based on reliability, support ecosystems and demonstrated performance under operational stress.​

Third, drone warfare ascendancy offers India strategic opportunity precisely because the private sector has achieved technological parity with global incumbents faster than traditional defence PSUs could accomplish fighter aircraft development. The ₹30,000 crore MALE procurement should prioritise rapid private sector scaling over perfect indigenisation. Mixed strategies—deploying proven imported HALE systems (MQ-9B) for strategic surveillance whilst developing indigenous UCAV platforms for tactical operations—maximise capability whilst distributing development risk.​

Structural Reform Requirements

Government must restructure HAL's governance to grant operational autonomy comparable to ISRO's model rather than preserving direct Ministry of Defence administration that strangles decision-making. 

Whether through board restructuring, leadership selection reforms or strategic decentralisation, HAL cannot compete with private defence firms operating under commercial disciplines whilst remaining ensnared in bureaucratic hierarchies. Some successful PSUs—NTPC, NDDB—achieved global competitiveness precisely through institutional autonomy protection.​

Budget allocation requires rebalancing. Current defence spending concentrates over half on personnel costs, leaving insufficient modernisation and research funding. Government's targeting of 75% of defence modernisation budget specifically for Indian firms in FY2025-26 signals positive intent, yet implementation requires privatised competition to drive cost efficiency. Without competitive pressure, even government-funded procurement often results in inflated costs and delayed delivery that plagued traditional HAL contracts.​

Conclusion: Strategic Manufacturing As Security Imperative

The Dubai crash ultimately reflects not engineering failure but institutional failure—the failure of bureaucratic governance structures to nurture innovation, reward performance, and maintain operational urgency. India's space program succeeded because Vikram Sarabhai designed autonomy into its architecture; HAL failed because government designed subordination into its structure. As drone warfare transforms conflict parameters, India's strategic security increasingly depends upon manufacturing agility, supply chain resilience and technological innovation—capabilities that private sector discipline can deliver but government bureaucracy fundamentally constrains.

India must urgently complete the privatisation transition that commenced in 2001 yet remained suspended between rhetorical commitment and substantive implementation.

The TEJAS program's forty-year gestation—whilst private companies scaled drone capabilities within a decade—renders this conclusion unmistakable. Strategic manufacturing autonomy constitutes security imperative; bureaucratic manufacturing chains constitute existential vulnerability. The Dubai crash delivered that message with tragic clarity.

IDN (With Agency Inputs)