Pakistan’s reluctance to engage India in major combat across the desert fronts of Rajasthan and adjoining sectors is rooted in clear strategic and structural asymmetries.

Whereas the mountainous regions of Kashmir provide defensive advantages through difficult terrain and local familiarity, the open desert plains expose the Pakistan Army’s vulnerabilities in manoeuvre, fire support, and sustainment.

Over decades, the Indian Army has refined its desert warfare doctrine through large-scale annual manoeuvres such as Exercise Trishul and others under the South Western Command. These integrated drills simulate high-tempo operations involving armoured corps, mechanised infantry, precision artillery, logistics echelons, and close air support.

They also stress rapid deep thrusts, fluid regrouping, and seamless command integration across joint formations—capabilities that are central to India’s concept of decisive warfare in the region.

India’s advantage in desert logistics and infrastructure is unmatched. A network of forward bases, fuel and ammunition depots, and advanced road and rail links allow for quick mobilisation towards the border.

In addition, India’s aerospace assets—both manned and unmanned—provide real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, enabling precise targeting and rapid concentration of firepower over vast distances. These factors combine to give Indian forces dominance in open manoeuvre battles.

Pakistan, by contrast, faces structural and financial constraints that limit its ability to sustain high-intensity warfare on such terrain.

The country’s defence budget, stretched by internal security operations, weapons modernisation, and economic pressures, cannot accommodate the costly logistics of prolonged operations in arid zones. Establishing and maintaining forward sustainment infrastructure would impose an unsustainable burden on its limited resources.

Another limitation lies in Pakistan’s force composition and training orientation. Its armoured and mechanised formations are fewer, and focused more on defensive counterthrusts rather than sustained offensives.

Training cycles and large-scale manoeuvres of comparable scale to India’s exercises are also rare, owing to both budgetary and geographic constraints. The result is a notable gap in operational readiness for broad, fast-moving desert warfare.

Moreover, the vast openness of the Rajasthan desert negates Pakistan’s traditional reliance on tactical concealment, infiltration, and positional warfare. Its formations would remain highly exposed to India’s superior networked fires and satellite-supported command systems. The risk of rapid attrition—both material and morale—would be significant.

Consequently, Pakistan’s military strategy consciously avoids a full-scale desert engagement. Instead, its operational thinking places emphasis on limited, high-impact raids or hybrid actions in sectors where terrain and defensive advantages mitigate India’s numerical and material superiority. The focus remains on attrition by manoeuvre in restrictive geography rather than decisive warfare in open plains.

In Pakistan’s calculus, the desert theatre represents not just unfavourable ground, but one that plays directly into India’s evolved operational strengths.

For New Delhi, however, maintaining that edge remains an ongoing priority—requiring continuous investment in training, logistics, and technological integration across its southern and western commands.

IDN (With Agency Inputs)