by G H Kumar

The catastrophic crash of IAF's TEJAS MK-1 during its aerobatic demonstration at the Dubai Air Show on 21 November 2025 has inflicted immediate and potentially enduring damage to the aircraft's export prospects, yet the true significance of this mishap extends far beyond the visible wreckage and global optics.

This marks only the second catastrophic loss in the aircraft's 23-year development history—the first being an engine failure in March 2024 near Jaisalmer from which the pilot successfully ejected. Before this incident, the TEJAS suffered zero hull losses during its entire gestation period—a record unprecedented for any single-engine fighter aircraft globally.​

Immediate Export Implications

Export potential for the TEJAS was never substantial, despite ministerial optimism. Prior to the Dubai crash, Malaysia had effectively terminated procurement discussions by selecting South Korea's FA-50 over the TEJAS.

Argentina, Egypt, the Philippines, Nigeria, and Indonesia have periodically expressed interest, yet no concrete export orders materialised in 2025. Malaysia had indicated preferences for indigenous 30 per cent local manufacturing, within-36-month delivery timelines, and mid-air refuelling capabilities—conditions that proved difficult to reconcile with HAL's manufacturing realities.​

A former senior HAL executive stated bluntly that the crash in Dubai "rules out exports for now." This assessment reflects an uncomfortable truth: potential customers in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America—HAL's target demographic—operate with constrained defence budgets and prioritise demonstrable reliability, operational robustness, and safety pedigrees.

The high-visibility crash at one of the world's three largest aerospace exhibitions, preceded by a week of intense competition with Pakistan's JF-17 Thunder Block III (which Pakistan announced would be supplied to an unnamed "friendly nation"), delivered an inverse signal to exactly those markets HAL sought to cultivate.​

The crispness of the negative publicity is compounded by timing. Pakistan, India's principal strategic rival, showcased battle-tested systems at Dubai, distributing marketing materials emphasising the JF-17's combat deployment during the May 2024 aerial confrontation between the two nations—an encounter in which Indian officials allege Pakistani F-16s utilised PL-15E missiles. The TEJAS, by contrast, remained associated with a fatal demonstration failure just as HAL was attempting to project operational maturity to sceptical buyers.​

Structural Vulnerabilities Already Constraining Exports

The Dubai crash has illuminated pre-existing export vulnerabilities that analysis in specialist defence publications had already articulated. Despite HaL's frequent indigenisation claims, the TEJAS MK-1 remains fundamentally dependent on foreign-sourced systems for its most critical functions.

The GE F404-IN20 engine, Israeli ELTA EL/M-2052 radar, missile systems, avionics packages, electronic warfare suites, and ejection seats are all foreign procurements.

Whilst these imported components represent a small numerical percentage of total fitted parts, they account for a disproportionately large share of the aircraft's overall value and strategic capability.​

This dependency creates a systemic constraint: HAL cannot independently export TEJAS without securing case-by-case approvals from the United States (for the engine), Israel (for the radar), and other component suppliers. Each nation possesses de facto veto authority over which countries may acquire the aircraft, effectively allowing supplier nations to influence HAL's sales and constrain India's strategic autonomy. The United States, for example, could at any time block re-export of GE F404-powered TEJAS to potential customers deemed strategically undesirable.​

The TEJAS MK-1A, currently undergoing flight trials and scheduled to enter production, addresses this vulnerability partially through integration of the indigenous Uttam active electronically scanned array radar and upgraded indigenous electronic warfare suites. However, the variant still retains the GE engine and remains subject to American export controls.​

Production Delays And Institutional Credibility Erosion

A more fundamental institutional crisis confronts HAL—one that extends beyond the TEJAS and which the Dubai crash has intensified rather than initiated. In September 2025, Air Chief Marshal BR Radha Krishnan challenged HAL regarding failure to deliver even a single TEJAS MK-1A out of an 11-aircraft commitment supposedly fulfilled by February 2025. The ACM's critique was withering: persistent over-promising without delivery discipline has characterised HAL's execution across multiple programmes.​

This production malaise stems partly from GE Aerospace's chronic delays in supplying F404-IN20 engines. GE had to reactivate production lines that remained dormant for five years, having suspended F404 manufacture when the US Air Force ceased ordering this engine variant. By mid-2025, GE had delivered only two engines to HAL despite contractual commitments signed in 2021 for a USD 716 million engagement. The company subsequently revised timelines, committing to supply six engines before March 2025—a promise that analysis suggests remains unfulfilled.​

HAL's restructured production plan now anticipates only eight TEJAS MK-1A deliveries over 24–36 months in the initial phase, falling far short of the IAF's operational requirements and export ambitions. If HAL cannot assure the IAF regarding timely production, quality consistency, and delivery discipline, potential international customers will be justifiably sceptical. The credibility gap between ministerial pronouncements and HAL's execution capacity has become a chasm.​

Medium-Term Export Prospects—A Bifurcated Assessment

Analysis from brokerage firms suggests a bifurcated medium-term outlook. Export sentiment will likely experience "temporary setback," with international negotiations delayed or suspended pending accident investigation completion and safety rectification. However, brokerages maintain that HAL's "long-term fundamentals remain strong," supported by robust domestic order visibility (HAL has 180 TEJAS MK-1A aircraft on Indian domestic order) and the strategic relevance of the TEJAS to India's defence modernisation.​

By the time export opportunities regain momentum—estimated at 18–24 months post-accident—brokerages predict that investor and customer concerns will have normalised, particularly if investigation outcomes attribute the crash to pilot error or ephemeral technical conditions rather than systemic design flaws. The TEJAS MK-1A variant, with enhanced indigenous systems, may attract renewed interest once production discipline improves and the aircraft demonstrates consistent operational reliability.​

However, this optimism requires HAL to execute flawlessly on multiple fronts: completing court of inquiry investigations with transparent findings; achieving consistent MK-1A production and delivery against revised schedules; resolving GE engine supply constraints; and providing substantive evidence of quality control and manufacturing discipline. Failure on any of these dimensions will render export prospects dormant for the remainder of the decade.​

Transparency And Investigative Imperative

A critical factor determining export recovery timelines is transparency regarding investigation outcomes. Previous IAF accident investigations have remained confidential—a protocol that proved problematic in public perception contexts. Observers have urged that an exception be made in the TEJAS case, citing precedents such as transparency surrounding General Bipin Rawat's helicopter crash.​

If investigation findings are released promptly, comprehensively, and in the public domain—detailing cause(s), systemic implications, and corrective measures—HAL and the IAF can begin rebuilding credibility with international customers and defence analysts. Conversely, if investigations conclude with protracted silence and vague official statements, the reputational damage will ossify into lasting scepticism regarding TEJAS reliability and HAL institutional competence.​

Conclusion

The TEJAS crash at Dubai has dealt a significant blow to near-term export prospects, extending export campaigns by 18–24 months and likely eliminating near-term sales opportunities in competitive markets. For HAL, the incident serves as a clarifying moment: export credentials rest fundamentally on demonstrable production discipline, quality consistency, and transparent institutional accountability—attributes that HAL has struggled to demonstrate across prior programmes.

However, the crash does not constitute a terminal event for TEJAS export potential. The aircraft's long-term significance likely lies less in foreign military sales than in the industrial and technological foundation it creates for India's future combat aircraft programmes.

Export momentum may recover if HAL executes disciplined production ramps, investigation findings are transparently disclosed, and operational reliability is demonstrated over 18–24 months. Conversely, if HAL continues to prioritise domestic procurement obligations over delivery commitment, export prospects will likely remain attenuated throughout the remainder of the decade.​

The fundamental challenge confronting India's defence export ambitions is institutional rather than technical: HAL must transform from a company known for chronic production delays and limited after-sales accountability into one exemplifying modern aerospace manufacturing standards. The Dubai crash, in this sense, represents not a terminal failure but a confrontation with institutional imperatives that will determine whether India's defence export vision can transition from aspiration to sustained reality.

G H Kumar is a historian, author, military enthusiast and a cyber geek. Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of IDN. IDN does not assume any responsibility or liability for the same