Interrogation reports from recently surrendered Maoist leaders, Takkelapalli Vasudeva Rao alias Ashanna and Mallojula Venugopal alias Sonu, have shed light on the outlawed CPI (Maoist)'s thwarted ambitions in technological warfare.

Accessed by The Times of India, these documents reveal daring attempts to deploy drones for reconnaissance and attacks against security forces, though the group failed to acquire them in sufficient numbers for large-scale 'drone warfare'.

Intelligence agencies played a pivotal role in foiling these plans through sophisticated bugging operations reminiscent of Mossad tactics. Sources indicate that trackers were surreptitiously planted in the Naxals' electronic communication devices, including walkie-talkie sets, which severely compromised their networks.

Both slain People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) commander Madvi Hidma and Ashanna reportedly tested drones, amid growing suspicions that the outfit's supply chains were being exploited for espionage. Ashanna, a former head of military intelligence for the Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee (DKSZC), detailed trial runs conducted in the South Bastar area.

These trials aimed to explore drones' potential for reconnaissance and monitoring security movements. The Dandakaranya Special Zone organised its structure to bolster technical operations, drawing support from supply lines in East Bastar and West Bastar.

The Maoists depended heavily on electronic components and chips integrated into explosive devices, such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Notably, interrogation reports confirm no ammunition or cash dumps currently exist in the Bastar region, with all IEDs in the MAAD area defused prior to Ashanna's surrender.

Sonu's account highlights how the communication network was infiltrated well before several senior leaders fell in encounters. After repeated exposures of clandestine operations, the Dandakaranya communication team uncovered trackers and chips covertly embedded in equipment procured via couriers from the Telangana State Committee area.

Affected devices included inverters, printers, walkie-talkies, laptops, chargers, cellphones, and radios. Cadres grew vigilant, routinely checking for disturbances or tampering in these items to detect surveillance.

Vartha Shekar, a Special Zonal Committee member, and his team in Dandakaranya honed skills in identifying trackers within mobiles, walkie-talkies, mobile chargers, radios, laptops, and similar gadgets. This expertise stemmed from the mounting pressure on the outfit's technical wing amid intensifying surveillance.

Facing these setbacks, the Maoists shifted towards encrypted email services like Proton Mail to preserve secrecy. Such platforms aligned with the party's strategy to circumvent technical surveillance and maintain operational security.

The reports underscore a broader struggle with technical limitations, forcing reliance on overground supply chains vulnerable to infiltration. Intelligence operations not only neutralised drone initiatives but also dismantled communication and explosive capabilities across key regions.

Ashanna's disclosures on drone trials in South Bastar reveal tactical ambitions that never materialised due to procurement hurdles. Similarly, Sonu's insights into device tampering expose how everyday electronics became vectors for counter-intelligence.

The absence of dumps in Bastar signals a depleted logistical base, exacerbated by successful IED neutralisation in MAAD. This has left the CPI (Maoist) increasingly isolated in Dandakaranya, their stronghold.

Couriers from Telangana funnelling equipment unwittingly aided the compromise, as agencies exploited these channels for implantation. Routine cadre checks for anomalies marked a desperate adaptation, yet proved insufficient against persistent surveillance.

Proton Mail's adoption reflects a pivot to digital anonymity, though vulnerabilities in encrypted communications persist under advanced monitoring. Overall, these interrogations paint a picture of an outfit outmanoeuvred by superior intelligence tactics.

The sophistication of trackers in walkie-talkies and chips in printers mirrors high-stakes global espionage, tailored here to Maoist operations. Security forces' proactive defusing and supply chain disruptions have significantly eroded the group's threat potential.

As Maoist technical efforts falter, encounters continue to claim leaders, further unravelling their structure. These revelations from Ashanna and Sonu offer critical intelligence for ongoing operations in left-wing extremism hotspots.

Based On TOI Report