Pakistan has reignited tensions over the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) by accusing India of deliberately blocking the regional body's progress.

The SAARC charter, established in 1985, unites Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka to foster economic and cultural ties.

Yet, the organisation has languished for years, with Pakistan's Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Tahir Hussain Andrabi, pointing the finger squarely at New Delhi during a briefing on Thursday.

Andrabi described India's stance as "regrettable," claiming it has consistently disrupted SAARC processes. He expressed hope for a resumption but underscored Pakistan's frustration amid reports of Islamabad's pivot towards a new alliance. This comes as Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Ishaq Dar, explores forming an alternative grouping with Bangladesh and China, explicitly excluding India to sidestep perceived obstructions.

The spokesperson rejected India's narrative that Pakistan bears responsibility for SAARC's inertia. He recalled historical precedents, noting that India stalled a SAARC summit in the 1990s—not due to Pakistan, but by blaming another member state. Andrabi insisted that New Delhi's actions alone hinder regional cooperation, a charge that echoes long-standing bilateral frictions.

SAARC's decline traces back to the 2016 summit cancellation, when India refused to attend a scheduled gathering in Islamabad following the Uri terror attack. Prime Minister Narendra Modi cited cross-border terrorism as the reason, prompting boycotts from Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Afghanistan. This effectively paralysed summits, with no heads-of-state meeting held since 2014 in Kathmandu.

Pakistan has repeatedly invoked SAARC to counter India's regional dominance. In recent months, amid economic woes and diplomatic isolation, Islamabad has sought alternatives. Whispers of a "new SAARC-like bloc" involving China and Bangladesh gained traction after high-level talks in Kunming, where trilateral cooperation on trade and security was discussed.

Bangladesh's role in this emerges as pivotal. Under Sheikh Hasina's government, Dhaka has balanced ties with India while deepening economic links with China via the Belt and Road Initiative. Pakistan views Bangladesh as a key partner to dilute India's influence, potentially creating a China-backed forum for infrastructure and defence collaboration.

China's involvement adds a geopolitical layer. Beijing, already a major investor in Pakistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), has shown interest in broader South Asian frameworks. Analysts suggest this new alliance could mirror the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), focusing on counter-terrorism, economic corridors, and maritime security—areas where India and China clash.

India, for its part, dismisses these overtures as futile. Officials in New Delhi argue that SAARC's revival hinges on Pakistan ceasing terror sponsorship, referencing groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. Bilateral trade between India and Pakistan remains suspended since 2019, post-Pulwama attack, underscoring the trust deficit.

Historical parallels abound. In the 1990s, SAARC summits faltered amid Kashmir tensions and India's nuclear tests. The 1999 Colombo summit collapse, blamed by Pakistan on India's inflexibility, mirrors today's rhetoric. Andrabi's reminder serves as a diplomatic jab, framing India as the perennial spoiler.

Regionally, SAARC's stasis has spurred alternatives. BIMSTEC, linking Bay of Bengal states including India, Bangladesh, and Bhutan, has gained momentum with multiple summits since 2016. India champions BIMSTEC as a terrorism-free platform, sidelining Pakistan entirely—a move Islamabad decries as exclusionary.

Economically, SAARC's potential remains unrealised. Intra-regional trade hovers below 5% of total commerce, dwarfed by ASEAN's 25%. Pakistan's push for a new bloc eyes China's funding to boost connectivity, from Gwadar port to Chittagong, challenging India's SAGAR maritime vision.

Defence implications loom large, given the user's focus on strategic affairs. A China-Pakistan-Bangladesh axis could enhance military interoperability, with joint exercises and tech transfers. Pakistan's JF-17 fighters, co-produced with China, might integrate into such frameworks, countering India's Rafale and Tejas advancements.

India's response strategy emphasises "neighbourhood first." Recent pacts with Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka underscore this, including defence supply deals amid Beijing's debt-trap concerns. The Quad alliance further bolsters India's position against Chinese expansionism.

Pakistan's timing aligns with domestic pressures. Economic revival under IMF bailouts requires allies, and SAARC-bashing rallies nationalist sentiment. Yet, Bangladesh's enthusiasm remains tempered; Dhaka relies on Indian water-sharing and border stability.

Internationally, reactions are muted. The UN and US urge SAARC revival but prioritise counter-terrorism. Russia's India ties and Israel's defence partnerships with New Delhi limit Pakistan's options, pushing it deeper into China's orbit.

In essence, Andrabi's salvo signals no thaw. Pakistan's new alliance gambit risks further fragmenting South Asia, perpetuating a zero-sum dynamic. For defence watchers, it heightens vigilance on trilateral drills and procurement shifts, with indigenous production like India's HAL projects gaining urgency.

As tensions simmer, SAARC's fate hangs in balance—revivable only if trust rebuilds, or doomed to irrelevance amid rival blocs.

Agencies