India’s intelligence and security establishment has reportedly uncovered a significant terror plot involving Pakistan-backed organisations Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), with Bangladesh emerging as a critical staging ground.

According to intelligence inputs cited in recent media reports, a group of terrorists based in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) is preparing to move into Bangladesh on the instructions of the Lashkar-e-Taiba leadership. This movement is believed to be part of a broader strategy to organise and execute serial bomb blasts inside India.

The plot is being viewed as an ISI-directed operation in which Bangladesh is being used both as a transit point and as an operational hub. Intelligence sources indicate that trained operatives, including experts in explosives, are being sent to Bangladesh for the purpose of training local recruits and coordinating with existing extremist networks.

The presence of such specialists suggests that the planned attacks could be complex, synchronised and designed to cause mass casualties and widespread disruption.

Reports suggest that both Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba have intensified efforts to revive their dormant or weakened modules in West Bengal and India’s north-eastern states. These regions, due to their porous borders and historical exposure to cross-border networks, have long been considered vulnerable to infiltration and subversion.

Intelligence officials quoted in the reports argue that the renewed activity of these groups, especially the dispatch of explosives experts into Bangladesh, is a strong indication that a major terror operation is in the advanced stages of preparation.

On the Indian side, security and border-guarding forces have reportedly been placed on high alert, particularly along the border with Bangladesh. Agencies anticipate attempts by these trained cadres to infiltrate into Indian territory using traditional smuggling routes, illegal crossing points and the cover of local populations living along the border.

The apprehension is that once inside India, these operatives could team up with sleeper cells or newly recruited modules in West Bengal and the Northeast to execute a series of coordinated bomb blasts.

Intelligence assessments also highlight an uptick in Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)-linked activity inside Bangladesh. While India has faced threats for years from Bangladesh-based or Bangladesh-linked terror groups, officials say this time the pattern is different.

Instead of independent local outfits being the primary drivers, Pakistan-based organisations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed are reportedly playing the central role, using Bangladeshi territory and contacts as enablers for a larger India-focused campaign.

According to these reports, several teams from both LeT and JeM have already visited Bangladesh multiple times over recent months. Their objective has been to establish and strengthen linkages with local extremist groups, radical networks and sympathetic facilitators.

These interactions are said to encompass recruitment, ideological indoctrination, training in the use of explosives and firearms, and the provision of logistical support such as safe houses, travel documents, finances and communication channels.

One of the more alarming inputs refers to the reported visit of a close aide of Hafiz Saeed, the chief of Lashkar-e-Taiba, to Bangladesh. This aide is claimed to have met local extremist elements to motivate and energise them for operations directed against India.

Intelligence reports further indicate that Hafiz Saeed himself is expected to travel to Dhaka sometime this month, where he would allegedly interact with members of his own organisation as well as local terrorist elements to fine-tune plans and ensure alignment with broader strategic objectives.

A key component of this architecture is allegedly the use of ISI-run or ISI-influenced madrasas in Bangladesh. These religious schools are reported to have teachers and administrators who are either members of or closely linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed.

Some of these institutions, according to the intelligence narrative, were not merely centres of religious instruction but were specifically repurposed or set up to facilitate radicalisation, recruitment and operational planning for attacks in India.

These madrasas are said to have served as hubs where young, impressionable students could be indoctrinated with extremist ideology, systematically radicalised and then channelled into Lashkar or Jaish ranks.

Beyond ideological work, the facilities reportedly provided safe spaces for planning, training and covert meetings among operatives. Handlers could discuss target selection, bomb-making techniques, methods for evading surveillance and infiltration routes into India without drawing excessive attention from local authorities.

However, intelligence agencies have noted a sudden trend of these madrasas being shut down or suspended, at least temporarily. The closure is believed to be a deliberate move to erase or obscure evidence now that the planning phase of the operation is nearing completion.

If such institutions remained active during the execution of a major terror strike, they could more easily be traced, inspected and linked back to Pakistan-based handlers, exposing the role of the ISI and its affiliated groups in the operation.

Officials describing this pattern have termed it a “classical ISI-style operation.” The model involves outsourcing much of the visible activity to actors based in a third country—in this case, Bangladesh—while Pakistan-based masterminds remain in the background.

This arrangement creates plausible deniability for Islamabad and its security establishment. If a major attack takes place inside India and investigations trace the trail to networks and madrasas in Bangladesh, the immediate diplomatic and political heat would fall on Dhaka rather than on Pakistan.

In this framework, Bangladesh risks being positioned as the primary country of origin or staging ground, even if the ideological direction, strategic guidance, training doctrine and funding emanate from across the border in Pakistan.

This not only complicates India’s security landscape but also introduces a potentially serious strain in India–Bangladesh relations if such activities are not fully acknowledged, disrupted and neutralised by Bangladeshi authorities. The ISI, by design, seeks to exploit gaps in governance, local radical ecosystems and transnational fault lines for its objectives.

For India, the reported plot underscores the multi-front nature of the terror threat. The involvement of PoK-based cadres, Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus, networks in Bangladesh and modules in eastern and north-eastern India creates a complex, layered challenge.

The possibility of serial blasts, rather than a one-off strike, raises concerns that the aim could be to spread panic across multiple cities or states, overwhelm local law-enforcement and generate widespread psychological impact on the population.

Operationally, Indian agencies would be expected to intensify surveillance along the India–Bangladesh border, enhance human intelligence penetration into cross-border networks and closely monitor known sympathisers and past operatives within the country.

Urban centres in West Bengal and the Northeast, transport hubs, religious gatherings, markets and critical infrastructure could become priority areas for enhanced vigilance and security audits. Coordination with Bangladesh’s security apparatus would be crucial for tracking movements, shutting down suspected training sites and intercepting communications.

Strategically, the plot, if confirmed in all its details, would highlight the continued relevance of Pakistan-based jihadist organisations as instruments of asymmetric warfare against India, even as the regional and global geopolitical environment evolves.

It also illustrates the adaptability of these groups and their handlers in shifting geographies, building new local partnerships and exploiting vulnerabilities in neighbouring states. Bangladesh’s internal security policies, counter-radicalisation measures and willingness to confront Pakistan-linked elements on its soil will play a decisive role in shaping the trajectory of this threat.

In the political and diplomatic domain, such revelations are likely to strengthen India’s longstanding case about Pakistan’s continued use of terrorism as a state-backed tool, even after repeated international commitments and pressure.

At the same time, New Delhi will need to balance its messaging so as not to undermine its growing cooperation and goodwill with Dhaka, instead framing the issue as a shared challenge that both countries must tackle together through intelligence-sharing, joint operations and robust border management.

Ultimately, the reported conspiracy involving Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, under the guidance of the ISI and routed through Bangladesh, epitomises the evolving nature of cross-border terrorism in South Asia.

It underscores the importance of constant vigilance, agile intelligence operations, regional cooperation and the dismantling of ideological and logistical ecosystems that enable such plots. Whether or not the full scope of this particular plan materialises, the pattern it represents will remain a central concern for India’s national security planners in the foreseeable future.

Agencies