Pakistan is reportedly intensifying its efforts to expand influence in Bangladesh following the ouster of Sheikh Hasina, with a particular focus on rehabilitating key figures from Indian insurgent groups. 

Sources familiar with the matter indicate that Islamabad, through its Army and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), is planning to facilitate the return of United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) chief Paresh Baruah to Dhaka from his current hideout in China's Yunnan province.

This move aligns with Pakistan's broader strategy to exploit the political vacuum in post-Hasina Bangladesh. Under the interim regime, Pakistani security elements have allegedly ramped up outreach, including support for radical groups like Jamaat-e-Islami, which played a role in the February polls. 

Rehabilitating Baruah in Dhaka would revive a notorious model from the BNP-Jamaat era, when Bangladesh served as a safe haven for northeast Indian insurgents.

Paresh Baruah, a long-time ULFA leader, has evaded capture for decades while directing operations against Indian security forces. His group has been linked to bombings, extortion, and separatist violence in Assam. Recent intelligence suggests China aided his relocation from Ruili—near the Arunachal Pradesh-Myanmar border—to Xishuangbanna Dai in Yunnan, positioning him closer to regional networks.

Pakistan's interest stems from hopes of installing a sympathetic regime in Dhaka. Experts on Bangladesh affairs note that a favourable government could enable insurgent groups to regroup and operate from Bangladeshi soil, much like the 2004 Chittagong arms smuggling plot. Baruah was allegedly involved in that failed attempt to ferry 10 truckloads of arms into Bangladesh, highlighting his historical ties to such logistics.

The interim Bangladesh administration's fragility provides an opening for external actors. Pakistan's ISI has reportedly cultivated contacts within Bangladeshi military and political circles, aiming to counter India's dominance in the region. This includes reviving dormant terror infrastructures that Hasina's Awami League had dismantled through aggressive counter-insurgency measures.

India views these developments with alarm, given ULFA's role in destabilising its northeast. Baruah's rehabilitation could embolden other groups like the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) factions or People's Liberation Army, potentially reigniting cross-border incursions. New Delhi has bolstered border surveillance along the 4,096-km India-Bangladesh frontier in response.

China's involvement adds a geopolitical layer. Beijing's facilitation of Baruah's movements underscores its strategy to needle India via proxies in the neighbourhood. Yunnan province, with its proximity to Myanmar's turbulent borders, serves as a conduit for arms and militants, intersecting with the Golden Triangle's illicit networks.

Historical precedents abound. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Bangladesh under BNP-Jamaat alliances hosted over 170 training camps for Indian insurgents, funded by Pakistan. Operations like the 2004 arms haul—destined for ULFA and other outfits—were intercepted, leading to a crackdown under Hasina. Pakistan now seeks to reverse these gains.

Bangladesh's interim leadership, led by figures with Islamist leanings, has shown reticence in curbing such influences. Reports of ISI operatives in Dhaka hotels and meetings with ex-military personnel fuel suspicions. If successful, Baruah's return could normalise insurgent activities, including fund collection from Assam's tea gardens and recruitment drives.

India's countermeasures include diplomatic pressure on Dhaka and enhanced intelligence sharing with Myanmar. The Ministry of Home Affairs has flagged ULFA as a priority threat, with Assam Police reporting sporadic ULFA(I) activities despite peace talks with a pro-talks faction. Baruah's hardline stance rejects negotiations, aligning him perfectly with Pakistani objectives.

Regional implications extend to the Bay of Bengal. A Pakistan-China axis in Bangladesh could challenge India's Act East Policy, complicating infrastructure projects like the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway. Maritime security in the Andaman Sea might also suffer if insurgents gain sea access via Chittagong.

International actors remain watchful. The US and Quad partners have urged Bangladesh to prevent terror safe havens, invoking UN resolutions on cross-border terrorism. Yet, economic dependencies—Bangladesh's garments sector relies on Western markets—may temper responses.

Pakistan's gambit carries risks. Overreach could provoke Indian surgical strikes, as seen in Myanmar (2015) and Pakistan (2016, 2019). Dhaka's army, battle-hardened from Hasina-era operations, might resist ISI meddling to preserve sovereignty.

Pakistan's bid to reposition Paresh Baruah signals a calculated resurgence of proxy warfare against India. Success hinges on Dhaka's political trajectory, but failure could expose Islamabad's overextension amid its domestic crises. India must sustain vigilance to safeguard its north-eastern flanks.

Based On ET News Report