Pakistan's Chasma Nuclear Power Station built by China based on its CNP-300 design

India and Pakistan have exchanged lists of their nuclear installations and facilities on 1 January 2026, marking the 35th consecutive annual exchange under a longstanding bilateral agreement. This ritual persists despite ongoing tensions between the two nuclear-armed neighbours, underscoring a rare channel of communication amid frosty diplomatic relations.

The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) confirmed the simultaneous transmission through diplomatic channels in New Delhi and Islamabad.

The Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities forms the basis of this practice. Signed on 31 December 1988 by then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, it entered into force on 27 January 1991.

The pact mandates that both nations inform each other annually on 1 January about the nuclear sites protected from attack, fostering a minimal deterrent stability.

This exchange originated in the shadow of regional military escalations during the 1980s. India's Operation Brasstacks in 1986 heightened Pakistani concerns over potential strikes on facilities like Kahuta, echoing Israel's 1981 Osirak raid on Iraq. Such fears prompted negotiations leading to the agreement, available in Hindi and Urdu versions to ensure mutual comprehension.

Over three decades, the mechanism has endured multiple crises, including the 1999 Kargil conflict, the 2001-2002 standoff, the 2016 Pathankot and Uri attacks, the 2019 Balakot airstrikes, and hostilities in May 2025. Exchanges continued uninterrupted, even as broader ties froze over Kashmir and cross-border terrorism. The 2026 iteration reaffirms its resilience as a confidence-building measure (CBM).

While the lists remain classified, past disclosures hint at India's coverage of sites like Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) in Trombay, Kakrapar and Tarapur reactors, and Kalpakkam facilities. 

Pakistan typically lists Chashma, Karachi Nuclear Power Plant, and Kahuta Research Laboratories. Neither side comments publicly on additions or omissions, preserving strategic ambiguity.

Strategic analysts view this pact as a foundational nuclear CBM, reducing miscalculation risks in South Asia's volatile security environment. It complements other lapsed measures like the 1989 non-attack on air defence early warning systems or 2005 ceasefire understandings. Amid India's expanding civil nuclear program and Pakistan's plutonium pursuits, annual notifications adapt to evolving arsenals.

Bilateral relations languish post the four-day military clashes in May 2025, with suspended trade, visa restrictions, and minimal high-level dialogue. Pakistan-occupied Kashmir disputes and terrorism allegations dominate MEA statements. Yet, nuclear risk reduction endures, as evidenced by this exchange defying geopolitical chill.

India's no-first-use nuclear doctrine contrasts Pakistan's more opaque posture, yet both honour the non-attack commitment. Global observers, including the UN and think tanks like the Stanley Centre, praise its durability. Future viability hinges on averting escalatory incidents that could test these safeguards.

This 35th exchange signals continuity in a tense neighbourhood, where nuclear shadows loom large. As both nations modernise arsenals—India with Agni-VI and Surya missiles, Pakistan with Ababeel MIRVs—the pact's role in averting catastrophe remains vital. Diplomatic channels, though narrow, prove essential for such existential reassurances.

Based On PTI Report