Operation Sindoor (May 6-10, 2025) represents a watershed moment in India-Pakistan military history and the evolution of nuclear deterrence under South Asian conditions. In a precisely executed 88-hour campaign, India demonstrated that Pakistan's nuclear doctrine of "Full Spectrum Deterrence"—which weaponized the threat of nuclear escalation to shield cross-border terrorism—had fundamentally failed. 

By conducting deep-penetration precision strikes on Pakistani military and terrorist infrastructure despite Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, India empirically proved that significant conventional military action remains possible and necessary under the nuclear overhang.

This operation reshaped the strategic calculus by establishing decisive conventional military asymmetry, redefining escalation thresholds, and nullifying Pakistan's long-held assumption that nuclear weapons provide immunity for terror operations.

I. Strategic Trigger

The Pahalgam terror attack (22 April 2025) killed 26 tourists, mostly Hindu pilgrims, in Baisaran Valley, claimed by LeT affiliate TRF. This crossed India's redlines amid Kashmir's post-Article 370 revival. Pakistan's COAS Asim Munir's pro-terror rhetoric, amid domestic crises (Baloch attacks, TTP, IMF woes), aimed to internationalise Kashmir under nuclear cover. India responded with diplomacy (Indus Waters Treaty suspension) and a sustained offensive, forcing ceasefire in 88 hours.

II. Tactical Execution

Initial Phase: Terror Infrastructure Strikes (May 7, 2025)

On the night of May 6-7, India launched Operation Sindoor proper with coordinated strikes on nine terror-related targets across both Pakistan-administered Azad Kashmir (PoK) and mainland Pakistan:

Targets in PoK (5 sites):
Sawai Nala camp (Muzaffarabad)
Syedna Bilal camp (Muzaffarabad)
Abbas and Gulpur camps (Kotli District)

Targets in Pakistan proper (4 sites):
Markaz-e-Taiba headquarters (Muridke) — LeT's principal command center
Markaz Subhan Allah headquarters (Bahawalpur) — JeM's training academy
Sarjal and Mehmoona camps (Sialkot)
Weapons storage facility (Sarjal, Tehra Kalan)

The operation lasted precisely 25 minutes (01:05 to 01:30 IST), involving coordinated tri-service action: the Indian Air Force (IAF) deployed Dassault Rafale aircraft equipped with SCALP-EG cruise missiles and AASM Hammer precision-guided munitions; the Indian Army deployed SkyStriker loitering munitions on targets close to the Line of Control; air defense was provided jointly by both services.
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Critically, India announced it would cease operations if Pakistan did not retaliate—an explicit off-ramp offer that Pakistan rejected within hours. The strikes reportedly eliminated approximately 100 terrorists, including Abdul Rauf Azhar (perpetrator of the 1999 IC-814 hijacking) and family members of JeM chief Masood Azhar. Pakistan confirmed strikes on six sites but disputed the "terrorist camp" designation of Barnala and Gulpur, claiming these were civilian areas including mosques and residential zones.

Escalation (8-9 May): Pakistan's "Marka-e-Haq" involved LoC artillery, drone/missile strikes on Indian cities (Amritsar, Jammu, Srinagar, Gujarat), Fatah-I/II missiles, and religious site attacks. India countered with SEAD: Harop/Warmate munitions destroyed Lahore/Gujranwala HQ-9BE/HQ-16FE radars.

Decisive Phase (9-10 May): IAF struck 11 PAF bases (3-hour campaign), destroying ~20% air force infrastructure using BrahMos (Su-30MKI, 15-18 fired, 300+ km), SCALP-EG (Rafale), RAMPAGE/Hammer, Harop/Warmate—all from Indian airspace. Chinese SAMs failed against supersonic terrain-followers.

III. Aerial Battle

Largest BVR engagement since WWII: 72 IAF vs 42 PAF fighters, 52 minutes. Losses: Pakistan 5 jets + SAAB-2000 Erieye AEW&C (S-400, 300 km kill). IAF ROE restrained initial strikes. Rafale/Meteor outclassed J-10C/PL-15; S-400 created no-fly zones.

IV. Nuclear Bluff Dismantled

Pakistan's FSD assumed nuclear/TNW threats deterred conventional response, shielding terror. Sindoor invalidated this:

Strikes on terror/military sites proved no immunity.
India ignored rhetoric ("water or blood"), proceeded despite warnings.
No nuclear consideration (per CDS Chauhan, Pak CJC Mirza).
Destroyed PAF (nuclear vector); naval blockade neutered subs; land missiles vulnerable.
US fears (Nur Khan strikes near nuclear HQ) drove ceasefire, but India's restraint prevailed.

V. Military Asymmetry

Operation Sindoor established, for the first time since the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, a decisive and measurable military asymmetry between India and Pakistan. Key metrics:
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Air Defence Superiority: India's Integrated Air Defence System (IADS), comprising the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) and Akashteer networking system, successfully intercepted approximately 99 percent of Pakistan's incoming drone, missile, and loitering munition attacks. Pakistan launched over 600 drones in concentrated saturation attacks; legacy Indian air defence guns (L-70, Zu-23-4 twin-barrel), originally slated for replacement but kept in service due to procurement delays, proved remarkably effective against small drones when upgraded with modern sights and proximity-fused ammunition.

Pakistan's HQ-9BE (short-range, 30-45 km) and HQ-16FE (medium-range, 120 km) SAM systems, sourced from China, failed to intercept Indian cruise missiles. The S-400 system, by contrast, with its 400 km range, 600 km detection range, and ability to simultaneously track 80 targets and engage 36, functioned as a force multiplier. The S-400's effectiveness in achieving the 300 km kill on the Saab-2000 AEW&C aircraft demonstrated the qualitative gap: India's air defence can engage targets well beyond Pakistan's ability to defend or strike back.

Degradation Metrics:

Operational capability: 100% to 30%
Air bases: 100% to 8%
Radar coverage: 100% to 15%
Fighters: 100% to 25%

IX. Analytical Assessment

Pakistan's Failed Nuclear Deterrent Strategy: Pakistan's military doctrine since the 1998 nuclear tests has been predicated on Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD): the notion that nuclear weapons—especially tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) with low yield and flexible use doctrines—create a ceiling effect that prevents Indian conventional military response. The logic: any significant Indian military action risks leading to Pakistani nuclear first-use, given Pakistan's declared willingness to use nuclear weapons "if the state's existence is threatened." By lowering the nuclear threshold artificially, Pakistan sought to make the cost of Indian conventional response prohibitively high, thereby providing a "free hand" for cross-border terrorism.

X. Conclusion

Operation Sindoor marks the definitive conclusion of an era in South Asian strategic history: the era during which Pakistan could conduct cross-border terrorism under the assumption that nuclear weapons provided immunity from significant conventional response. The operation's success—measured by Pakistan's ceasefire request after 88 hours, destruction of 20% of Pakistan's air force, and degradation of critical military infrastructure—empirically demonstrated that nuclear weapons do not prevent conventional military action and that strategic asymmetry can be weaponized below the nuclear threshold.

The operation's implications extend beyond the tactical destruction of terror camps and military installations:

Reframed Deterrence: India has shifted from "deterrence by denial" (preventing terror attacks through defence) to "deterrence by punishment" (imposing costs after terror attacks). This is sustainable only if India maintains overwhelming conventional superiority—a condition Operation Sindoor established for the first time since 1971.

Expanded Escalation Space: By demonstrating that 88 hours of intensive conventional warfare did not trigger nuclear escalation, India has empirically expanded the "space" for conventional conflict under nuclear conditions. Future conflicts may operate in this space, though risks remain.

Redefined Strategic Autonomy: India's rejection of international (U.S.) claims to have brokered ceasefire and assertion of bilateral military negotiations reasserts India's strategic autonomy. India is no longer constrained by narratives of nuclear apocalypse; instead, it claims the right to determine its own response to terrorism.

Pakistan's Existential Challenge: Pakistan faces an existential challenge of a different order: not invasion or territorial conquest (which nukes deter), but degradation of conventional capability and economic collapse. Pakistan's internal situation—TTP insurgency, Baloch nationalism, economic crisis, IMF dependency—poses greater threats than any external military force. Operation Sindoor exposed this reality by demonstrating that Pakistan's military cannot protect against either terrorism or conventional retaliation.

Strategic Weapons Development Priorities: India's success validates indigenous system development (BrahMos, Akash, Akashteer) and accelerates future acquisition of critical capabilities (AAR, AEW&C, cyber defence, theatre commands). These investments will further entrench India's conventional dominance.

International Implications: The operation challenges prevailing assumptions about nuclear deterrence in multipolar South Asia. It suggests that nuclear weapons provide deterrence against existential threats (invasion, regime change) but do not constrain conventional conflict management or asymmetric warfare. This reframing may influence strategic thinking globally, particularly among nuclear-armed states facing asymmetric threats.

Operation Sindoor thus represents not merely a military campaign, but a strategic inflection point—the moment at which India called Pakistan's nuclear bluff and found it hollow, reshaping the subcontinent's security landscape for the foreseeable future.

IDN (With Agency Inputs)