Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) and France's Safran Electronics & Defence have forged a 50:50 joint venture to manufacture guidance kits for the HAMMER precision-guided weapon system in India. This partnership, approved by BEL's board on 15 February 2026, establishes a Centre of Excellence in Pune for production, maintenance, and repair, primarily serving the Indian Air Force and Navy.

Signed on 24 November 2025 in New Delhi, this 50:50 partnership aims to localise production, supply, and maintenance of these air-to-ground weapons for the Indian Air Force and Navy, with indigenisation levels targeting up to 60 per cent over time.

India's pursuit of indigenous equivalents through DRDO and BEL highlights persistent gaps, despite decades of experience in missiles like Prithvi, Akash, and BrahMos. DRDO has developed glide bombs such as Gaurav (up to 100 km range, 1,000 kg) and TARA (INS/GPS with laser seeker, CEP under 3 m), alongside SAAW and others, yet none fully replicate HAMMER's modularity, propulsion, and multi-mode guidance versatility. These systems prioritise longer glides or specific seekers but lag in the agile, rocket-boosted precision bridging bombs and missiles.

The HAMMER system, known for its modular design and extended range, represents a leap in precision strike capabilities, yet India's public sector defence organisations, including DRDO and DPSUs like BEL, have struggled to independently develop analogous weapons despite decades of experience.
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This JV underscores a broader pattern where foreign collaboration fills critical gaps in indigenous design and production, raising questions about the efficacy of India's public sector in high-technology weaponry.
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India's public sector defence entities have amassed considerable experience since the 1950s, producing items from small arms to missiles like Akash and Prithvi, yet precision-guided munitions akin to HAMMER remain elusive without external aid.
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Projects such as the Multi-Calibre Individual Weapon System (MCAR) exemplify repeated failures, abandoned in favour of imported AK-203 rifles due to design inadequacies in accuracy and reliability.
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Similarly, the Kaveri aero-engine for the TEJAS fighter faced insurmountable hurdles in materials and expertise, forcing reliance on foreign engines and delaying timelines.

Systemic issues abound, starting with protectionism within DRDO, which has long monopolised development, resisting private sector or international integration until recent reforms. A 2023 committee recommended DRDO overhaul, but by 2025, implementation stalled amid internal opposition, perpetuating inefficiencies across nine Navratna DPSUs.

Technical complexities exacerbate these woes; integrating radar, seekers, and propulsion for precision weapons demands expertise that India's public sector labs often lack, as seen in Akash missile's modest range and reliability issues.

System integration remains a perennial challenge, with early Akash tests revealing radar inaccuracies and performance shortfalls against modern benchmarks like the S-400.
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Ballistic Missile Defence Phase-II struggles with hypersonic targets, highlighting deficiencies in advanced seekers and platform stability for sea-based systems. Import dependency compounds this; critical components like high-temperature alloys, avionics, and metallurgy-grade steels are sourced abroad, undermining self-reliance and exposing supply chains to disruptions.

India's metallurgy base remains weak, necessitating imports for military-spec materials, a bottleneck unchanged despite 'Atmanirbhar Bharat' initiatives.

Bureaucratic hurdles further impede progress, with protracted decision-making, funding delays, and frequent revisions to General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQR) misaligning projects with user needs. Armed forces' late involvement in design phases leads to ambitious specifications that exceed domestic technological maturity, resulting in cost overruns and timeline slippages.

Inadequate infrastructure plagues the sector, from insufficient testing ranges to a shortage of skilled manpower in niche areas like composite armour and aero-engines. DRDO's historical inward focus precluded meaningful foreign tie-ups, hampered by export controls and policy restrictions, even as private sector potential went untapped.

Reform efforts, including the 2024 committee report, face resistance from DRDO seniors, delaying structural changes needed for agility. Budgetary constraints allocate insufficient R&D funds relative to modernisation demands, with procurement delays averaging years due to procedural red tape.

Long gestation periods for defence projects—often decades—discourage innovation, as industry awaits uncertain outcomes amid shifting priorities.

Private sector exclusion until recent years stifled competition; firms like Tata and L&T now contribute, but public sector dominance lingers.

The HAMMER JV reflects strategic pragmatism, leveraging Safran's expertise in modular munitions while building BEL's assembly and testing capacities.

BEL assumes final integration responsibilities, phasing in local sub-assemblies, yet core design IP remains French, revealing public sector's developmental lag.

This mirrors past collaborations, like Rafale offsets, where technology transfer is partial, leaving full indigenous mastery elusive.

Critics argue that without radical restructuring—greater private involvement, streamlined procurement, and merit-based accountability—public sector will continue outsourcing high-end designs.

Reforms under 'Make in India' have boosted production to ₹1.27 lakh crore by FY2023, but value addition in complex systems lags.

Geopolitical pressures, including border tensions, necessitate rapid capability infusion, favouring JVs over protracted indigenous efforts. User preferences for indigenous products notwithstanding, practical realities demand hybrid models to bridge expertise gaps swiftly. Future success hinges on absorbing transferred know-how; BEL-Safran must prioritise skill-building to avoid perpetuating dependency.
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Parliamentary scrutiny and Vice President-led committees urge halving DRDO labs and empowering users in development, steps yet to materialise fully. While experience abounds, systemic inertia, technological deficits, and institutional rigidities hobble India's public sector from stand-alone innovation in precision weapons like HAMMER.

IDN (With Agency Inputs)