China’s official People’s Liberation Army (PLA) newspaper has sharply criticised Japan’s imminent deployment of upgraded long-range missiles, branding it a provocative “kill network” designed to threaten neighbouring states, China's bullhorn SCMP reported. 

The PLA Daily highlighted the enhanced Type-12 surface-to-ship missiles, now boasting a range of approximately 1,000 km—five times their original 200 km reach—along with improved stealth and offensive features.

These missiles are slated for deployment by month’s end at Camp Kengun in Kumamoto prefecture, southwestern Kyushu, positioning them to dominate the East China Sea. From Kyushu, the Type-12s could strike coastal cities across mainland China, serving as a deterrent against PLA naval operations in a hypothetical Taiwan Strait crisis.

Beijing views Taiwan as an inseparable territory, prepared to enforce reunification by force if needed, while Japan and the US back the island’s defence without recognising its independence. Tensions between Tokyo and Beijing have intensified recently, exacerbated by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s November remarks hinting at potential military intervention if Taiwan faces attack.

The PLA Daily analysis, penned by Hua Dan and Zhang Li from the PLA Army Engineering University, argues the Type-12 marks a shift from defensive to aggressively offensive capabilities.

Japan is pairing these with the Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP), a ground-launched hypersonic glide vehicle deploying on 31 March at Camp Fuji in Shizuoka prefecture.

The HVGP offers 500–900 km range, with an advanced variant in development exceeding 3,000 km, enabling it to pierce enemy air defences at high speeds early in conflict. Together, these systems form a “strike combination” within Japan’s emerging stand-off arsenal, which also incorporates hypersonic cruise missiles, US Tomahawk imports, and air-launched Joint Strike Missiles.

PLA analysts warn this multilayered network would empower Japan’s Self-Defence Forces to target both coastal and inland sites in neighbours, fundamentally altering regional power dynamics. Kyushu’s strategic location amplifies the threat: Type-12s could neutralise PLA ships far offshore, while HVGP breaches defences for follow-on cruise missile strikes.

Japan’s military buildup reflects a broader pivot under right-wing influence, leveraging perceived external threats—namely China—to justify offensive weapon development. The PLA Daily accuses Tokyo of pursuing “military power” status, cautioning that such “self-destructive” escalation risks regional instability.

Japan’s enhancements stem from 2022 policy shifts allowing “counterstrike” capabilities, accelerating indigenous hypersonic and stand-off tech amid US alliances. The US-Japan security pact underpins this, with Tomahawk integrations enhancing interoperability against shared threats like PLA expansionism.

Ultimately, the PLA Daily’s rhetoric serves propaganda ends, yet reveals genuine strategic anxieties over Japan’s transformation into a formidable stand-off power. Deployment timelines signal urgency: Type-12s operational by late March 2026, HVGP shortly after, with full network maturity projected within years.


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