The 2026 Annual Threat Assessment before the United States Senate Intelligence Committee has placed Pakistan among the most significant nuclear‑missile threats to the American homeland, with Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard identifying Islamabad’s long‑range ballistic‑missile program as a potential pathway to intercontinental reach.

Gabbard’s testimony underscores that Russia, China, North Korea, Iran and Pakistan are all actively developing advanced or traditional missile delivery systems that can carry both nuclear and conventional payloads into range of the US mainland. Within this broader global missile build‑up, the US intelligence community now estimates that the total number of threatening missiles could rise from over 3,000 today to more than 16,000 by 2035.

Pakistan’s missile trajectory is of particular concern because the intelligence community assesses that Islamabad’s long‑range ballistic‑missile development could eventually include ICBMs capable of reaching US soil.

This judgment flows from the steady advancement of solid‑fuelled and mobile land‑based systems over the past two decades, which have already given Pakistan regional reach stretching into South Asia and beyond, as well as the country’s status as a nuclear‑armed state with a large and expanding arsenal.

The concern is not only about range but also about survivability and penetration, as the US notes that rivals like China and Russia are fine‑tuning advanced delivery systems designed to bypass existing missile‑defence architectures.

Against this backdrop, the Trump administration faces a difficult balancing act. On the public stage, President Trump has repeatedly praised Pakistan’s civilian leadership, including Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, and the country’s military establishment, even claiming that he personally averted a major India–Pakistan war and that Pakistani leaders credit him with saving millions of lives.

These warm personal remarks stand in stark contrast to the classified and unclassified assessments that now explicitly bracket Pakistan among the countries whose missile programmes pose a direct risk to the US homeland. The policy community in Washington is therefore grappling with how to reconcile on‑the‑record gratitude for Islamabad’s counter‑terrorism cooperation and regional diplomacy with the hard security reality that a closer‑to‑ICBM Pakistan would complicate the strategic balance.

One plausible lever for Washington is to deepen missile‑defence and layered‑detection architecture, including space‑based sensors, boost‑phase and mid‑course interceptors, and enhanced radar coverage across the Pacific and Atlantic.

The 2026 threat assessment already notes that Chinese and Russian systems are being honed specifically to evade current defences, so the US is likely to accelerate investments in hypersonic‑defence and multi‑orbit tracking constellations that could also monitor any Pakistani long‑range launches.

At the same time, Washington may seek to tighten export‑control and technology‑denial regimes, restricting access to guidance, propulsion and materials that could shrink Pakistan’s timeline for an effective ICBM capability.
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Politically, President Trump’s instinct has been to compartmentalise relationships, presenting Pakistan as a valuable partner in South‑Asian stability and counter‑terrorism while quietly raising concerns about its nuclear‑missile trajectory behind closed doors.

In private diplomacy, the administration is expected to press Pakistan to cap or at least slow its long‑range ballistic‑missile program, using aid, security‑assistance packages and high‑level political visits as both incentives and levers.

There may also be an effort to expand trilateral or multilateral dialogues that include India and other regional stakeholders, so that missile‑build‑ups are refracted through broader deterrence and transparency frameworks rather than interpreted purely as bilateral threats.

From an Indian‑strategic perspective, the US‑centric framing of Pakistan’s missile advance is significant because it implicitly validates long‑standing New Delhi concerns about Islamabad’s nuclear overreach and its aspiration for strategic reach beyond the subcontinent.

India is likely to push Washington to treat Pakistan’s nuclear‑missile ambitions as a joint challenge, especially given the risk of horizontal proliferation and the potential for crisis‑instability in the India–Pakistan nuclear dyad. At the same time, New Delhi may be wary of any US‑Pakistan rapprochement that comes at the expense of regional transparency or that allows Pakistan to continue modernising its arsenal under the guise of “strategic restraint.”
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Tulsi Gabbard’s assessment flags a junction where Pakistan’s missile ambitions are no longer treated as a purely regional or South‑Asian issue, but as one element of a global threat matrix that could touch the American mainland.

The Trump administration’s response will probably blend public reassurance about Pakistan’s role as a partner with behind‑the‑scenes pressure on missile‑proliferation limits, even as Washington simultaneously boosts its own missile‑defence and surveillance posture.

The tension between the President’s glowing tributes to Pakistani leaders and the intelligence community’s sober warnings will remain a defining feature of US‑Pakistan ties over the coming decade.
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Agencies