India has once again marginally expanded its nuclear arsenal in 2025, bringing its estimated stockpile to approximately 190 warheads by early 2026, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 2026.

The report highlights that New Delhi continues to modernise its nuclear delivery systems, with increasing emphasis on long-range capabilities designed to reach deep into China, while simultaneously maintaining focus on its enduring rivalry with Pakistan.

The SIPRI assessment describes Operation Sindoor in May 2025 as an unusually severe military crisis between India and Pakistan. During this confrontation, India struck targets in Pakistan's air and missile bases believed to have nuclear-related roles. Despite the intensity of the exchanges, both sides took deliberate steps to avoid escalation into a full-scale nuclear conflict.

A notable feature of the May 2025 crisis was the integration of cyber operations into active military conflict by both India and Pakistan for the first time. This development underscores the evolving nature of deterrence and warfare between the two nuclear-armed neighbours, where cyber capabilities are now intertwined with conventional and strategic military operations.

India has retained its position as the world’s fifth-largest military spender and the second-largest importer of major arms during the 2021–25 period. Military expenditure reached $92.1 billion in 2025, marking an 8.9 per cent increase from the previous year. India ranks behind only the United States, China, Russia and Germany in defence spending.

The SIPRI report identifies 162 countries as recipients of major arms between 2021 and 2025. The five largest recipients were Ukraine, India, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Pakistan, together accounting for 35 per cent of total arms imports. India alone accounted for 8.2 per cent of global arms imports, consolidating its position as the world’s second-largest arms importer.

Globally, SIPRI notes that the nine nuclear-armed states—the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel—are increasingly relying on nuclear weapons as instruments of national power. This trend reverses decades of efforts to reduce both the numbers and the role of nuclear weapons, raising the risks of miscalculation and escalation.

At the start of 2026, these nine countries collectively possessed approximately 12,187 nuclear weapons. Of these, about 9,745 were in military stockpiles and considered potentially operationally available. An estimated 4,012 warheads were deployed with operational forces, with just over half kept in a state of high operational alert on ballistic missiles—between 2,100 and 2,200 warheads.

While the overall number of nuclear warheads worldwide continues to decline, this reduction is largely due to the dismantling of retired warheads by the United States and Russia. SIPRI warns that the pace of dismantlement is slowing, and it is likely that the rate at which new warheads enter global stockpiles will soon outpace the rate of dismantlement.

The United States and Russia together possess nearly 86 per cent of all nuclear warheads, with both countries pursuing extensive modernisation programs. China is also undergoing significant expansion, with its arsenal increasing from 600 to up to 620 warheads during 2025. India, meanwhile, has produced mainly plutonium for its nuclear weapons, similar to Israel.

Submarine-based nuclear delivery systems are proliferating, particularly among the four nuclear-armed states in the Indo-Pacific. India’s continued investment in sea-based deterrence reflects this trend, as submarine-launched ballistic missiles provide survivability and second-strike capability.

The SIPRI report also notes that the number of interstate armed conflicts doubled from three in 2024 to six in 2025, involving at least 13 countries. These conflicts included Afghanistan–Pakistan, Cambodia–Thailand, India–Pakistan, Iran–Israel/United States, Russia/North Korea–Ukraine, and Congo–Rwanda.

Karim Haggag, Director of SIPRI, stated in his introduction that the past decade has fundamentally altered the strategic environment. He emphasised that the defining feature of this current phase of great power competition is the resurgence of large-scale interstate war between technologically advanced states and the erosion of the United States’ alliance frameworks.

In Asia and Oceania, the security landscape in 2025 remained marked by intensifying strategic competition between China and the United States. India’s nuclear expansion and military modernisation are situated within this broader context of shifting power balances and heightened regional tensions.

ANI