Saudi Arabia is accelerating the expansion of its domestic ballistic missile infrastructure with significant Chinese technical support, signalling a major shift in the kingdom’s long-term deterrence strategy as it faces persistent missile and drone threats from Yemen’s Houthi movement and growing uncertainty over the reliability of US military support.
Recent satellite imagery has revealed extensive construction activity at the Al-Duwadimi missile complex, situated around 200 kilometres west of Riyadh. The facility is at the centre of Saudi Arabia’s efforts to strengthen indigenous production of solid-propellant ballistic missiles and reduce dependence on imported strategic weapons.
Construction reportedly began in April 2025 on major new infrastructure, including a substantially enlarged motor-casting hall that is roughly twice the size of older facilities. The structure features casting pits measuring between five and six metres in depth, alongside blast-deflection walls designed to support the manufacture of larger and more powerful missile motors.
An adjacent complex is also under development and is believed to be intended for the storage of missile components, raw propellant materials or other critical production inputs. Analysts assess that the upgraded facilities could become fully operational during late 2026.
The expansion reflects Saudi Arabia’s increasing emphasis on solid-fuel missile technology. Compared with older liquid-fuel systems, solid-propellant missiles require significantly less launch preparation, can remain stored for extended periods and offer greater operational flexibility during crises.
The kingdom’s missile ambitions are closely linked to decades of cooperation with China. Saudi Arabia first entered the ballistic missile domain in 1988 through the acquisition of Chinese DF-3 intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Riyadh later strengthened those capabilities by obtaining DF-21 systems from Beijing in 2007.
Evidence gathered between 2022 and 2026 from intelligence assessments and commercial satellite imagery indicated that facilities at Al-Watah and Al-Duwadimi were increasingly resembling Chinese missile manufacturing sites, reinforcing assessments that Beijing has played a central role in supporting the kingdom’s missile industrial base.
Reports have also suggested that Saudi Arabia may have used a Chinese-designed DF-15A ballistic missile in combat against Houthi forces in Yemen. Missile debris bearing DF-15A markings was reportedly discovered in the Yemeni desert, raising the possibility that Riyadh had employed the weapon operationally for the first time.
The DF-15 is a road-mobile, short-range ballistic missile capable of delivering substantial conventional payloads over regional distances. Its potential use against Houthi targets would represent an important evolution in Saudi military doctrine, which has traditionally relied heavily on combat aircraft for strike operations.
The shift towards ballistic missile employment comes as the kingdom seeks alternatives to air campaigns that have exposed aircraft and air bases to increasing threats from drones, missiles and other asymmetric attacks. Saudi planners also appear to view missile forces as a means of maintaining deterrence without placing additional strain on air assets.
The expanded Al-Duwadimi facility could ultimately enable Saudi Arabia to manufacture longer-range missiles capable of carrying heavier payloads. Such capabilities would significantly extend Riyadh’s strike reach and could place strategic targets across Iran within range, strengthening the kingdom’s deterrence posture amid continuing regional tensions.
The program is unfolding against a broader backdrop of security uncertainty in the Gulf. Continued Houthi missile and drone attacks, concerns regarding regional stability and reports of US munitions shortages have all contributed to Saudi efforts to diversify its strategic partnerships and build greater self-reliance in critical defence sectors.
Despite the growing defence relationship with Beijing, analysts note that China is unlikely to replace the United States as Saudi Arabia’s primary security partner. Nevertheless, Chinese missile technology has become increasingly important to Riyadh’s long-term military planning as the kingdom pursues a more independent and resilient strategic posture.
The missile expansion is also expected to intensify concerns about a wider regional arms competition, with Gulf states investing heavily in advanced missile, air-defence and strike capabilities in response to evolving threats across the Middle East.
Agencies
