During India’s Operation Sindoor, launched as a decisive pre-emptive strike targeting terror camps and military infrastructure in Pakistan in response to the Pahalgam terror attack, the Pakistani Navy suffered a comprehensive operational collapse, exposing critical weaknesses in readiness, technology, and strategic execution.

While the Indian Navy demonstrated impressive maritime dominance through a swift, layered deployment of surface combatants, stealth submarines, and coordinated air support that established a near-total maritime exclusion zone in the Arabian Sea, the Pakistan Navy was largely confined to its harbours, unable to challenge or effectively respond to Indian naval manoeuvres.

The Pakistan Navy’s initial reaction was sluggish, caught unprepared and unable to transition rapidly from peacetime protocols to combat readiness. This delay reflected systemic deficiencies in threat detection, maritime domain awareness, and readiness doctrines.

Technically, Pakistan’s frontline warships, especially the Chinese-origin F-22P Zulfiquar-class frigates and Type-054A frigates, suffered recurring sensor failures, including radar blackouts and poor command-and-control integration, undermining their ability to detect and engage Indian forces.

Critical defence systems such as Close-In Weapon Systems (CIWS) and LY-60N Surface-to-Air Missiles reportedly malfunctioned during critical moments, leaving vessels exposed to aerial threats. Compounding these issues were fuel shortages and logistical constraints that forced several ships to prematurely return to port, severely limiting operational endurance.

The Pakistan Navy’s air assets similarly underperformed. The Chinese Z-9EC naval helicopters, vital for anti-submarine warfare, experienced frequent sonar pod failures and maintenance-related grounding, with only a fraction considered mission-ready during the operation.

These helicopters were also ineffective in adverse weather and played little role in countering Indian submarine incursions. Pakistan’s Maritime Patrol Aircraft fleet faced reduction in operational capability due to aging platforms, accidents, and outdated sensor systems. Moreover, intelligence dissemination was slow and hampered by obsolete data-link infrastructure, contributing to poor situational awareness.

At the command level, Pakistan’s centralized naval command structure proved inadequate for high-intensity maritime conflict, suffering from delayed decision-making, weak inter-service coordination, and restrictive rules of engagement, which led to operational paralysis and a defensive posture limited to littoral zones.

This was starkly highlighted by the fact that not a single Pakistani combat vessel or submarine sortie confronted the Indian Navy’s 36-ship fleet during or after the operation, effectively ceding control of critical sea lanes.

The operational collapse extended beyond the tactical sphere to strategic consequences, notably endangering Pakistan’s maritime interests including the security of China’s Gwadar Port, a key node in the Belt and Road Initiative.

The lack of a credible naval deterrent has allowed India to assert uncontested dominance over the Arabian Sea, increasing patrols and surveillance deep into Pakistan’s exclusive economic zone, while Pakistan’s navy remains docked, burdened by an aging and technically disparate fleet, maintenance backlogs, and low morale among personnel.

In sum, Operation Sindoor starkly revealed the Pakistan Navy’s inability to sustain modern naval warfare, marred by technological failures, logistical shortcomings, and command deficiencies.

The Indian Navy’s operational prowess during the campaign underscored a growing maritime imbalance in South Asia, highlighting India’s transition into a blue-water navy capable of strategic sea control against an increasingly vulnerable Pakistan Navy.

Agencies