After the May 2025 India-Pakistan stand-off, which culminated in air domain engagements, subsequent developments have shifted attention decisively towards the maritime theatre. Naval movements, capability demonstrations, and official statements by both sides suggest a recalibration of posture, with readiness for potential escalation at sea. This evolution of the crisis is marked by the transition from aerial skirmishes to sustained maritime signalling.

On 2 October 2025, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh issued a pointed warning to Pakistan, invoking the historic precedent of the 1965 war. He signalled that any provocation in the Sir Creek region could invite a “resounding response” capable of altering Pakistan’s “history and geography.” Sir Creek remains strategically sensitive, with Pakistan expanding its military infrastructure there since 2023. Historically perceived as a Pakistani edge point, this area is now a visible focal zone in India’s deterrent signalling.

Earlier in August, Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Dinesh Tripathi declared that the Navy would be the first to take offensive action against Pakistan in any future conflict. This marked a deliberate shift in Navy operational philosophy — positioning the service for a proactive role rather than a supporting one. Operation Sindoor itself was framed as a forward-deterrent posture designed to highlight readiness for maritime crisis participation, contrasting sharply with the Navy’s limited role in the air-led stand-off of May.

India’s induction of the indigenously designed diving support vessel, INS Nistar, adds a specialist capability to underwater operations. Alongside this, India’s first joint patrols with the Philippines in the South China Sea signal its integration into a wider Indo-Pacific strategy. The persistent Chinese presence at Pakistan’s Karachi and Gwadar ports is among the strategic drivers behind this expanded naval footprint, ensuring that local signalling has a regional dimension.

In parallel, Pakistan has reinforced its maritime signalling since May. Anticipating vulnerability, it dispersed naval assets from Karachi to Gwadar. Key developments include the launch of the Hangor-class submarine PNS Mangro, built in China, and the showcasing of the domestically developed P282 ship-launched ballistic missile. Overlapping NOTAMs, missile tests, and live-fire drills — sometimes occurring as close as 60 nautical miles apart — have maintained a cycle of alerts in the Arabian Sea, sustaining operational friction.

Naval activities post-Sindoor raise questions about whether exercises are routine or deliberate shows of force. The air domain resolution left an undercurrent of strategic uncertainty at sea. Both navies appear to be signalling readiness not only for deterrence but also for the possibility that future confrontation may begin in the maritime theatre. Capability perceptions are shifting — India retains numerical and geographic superiority, but an ageing fleet and modernisation gaps are juxtaposed against Pakistan’s steady expansion through Chinese-designed submarines and Turkish Babur-class corvettes.

Recent statements by India’s Navy Chief have acknowledged Pakistan’s “surprising growth” in naval capacity. While India’s edge endures, the narrowing gap complicates assumptions of uncontested dominance in the Indian Ocean. This evolving balance matters in three critical ways: escalation control, external involvement, and shifting naval doctrines.

Sea-based confrontations inherently carry higher escalation risks than aerial skirmishes. Maritime engagements linger longer and are less amenable to rapid de-escalation. Pakistan’s strategic memory of 1971, when Indian naval operations severely impacted its war effort, underpins its pursuit of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. The modernisation of Gwadar port under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is part of a deterrence-by-denial approach, designed to avoid repeat vulnerabilities.

Chinese presence at both Karachi and Gwadar raises the possibility of direct PLAN support to Pakistan in a crisis. Türkiye’s role, particularly in supplying Babur-class corvettes and potentially training crews, adds further uncertainty to India’s strategic calculations. For New Delhi, visible demonstrations of maritime capability and risk acceptance are aimed at retaining initiative and shaping adversary perceptions.

Both India and Pakistan appear invested in shaping a future “conflict-template” at sea. The dispersal of Pakistani assets from Karachi following Indian deployments reflects an imposed psychological cost without escalation. However, Pakistan’s enhanced capabilities may make such coercive strategies less effective going forward. Simultaneously, India’s rising profile in Indo-Pacific patrols creates expectations for more prominent naval crisis roles.

A potential danger lies in both sides relying on historical precedents from past crises, without fully integrating new technologies like hypersonic missiles and drones into decision-making. The escalatory ladder in maritime confrontations is shifting, and outdated assumptions risk miscalculation. The maritime domain will likely serve as the testing ground for this cognitive gap.

For India, the strategic decision is whether to treat the maritime theatre as an early signalling arena or hold it back as a reserve escalation space. Commissioning of stealth frigates, Indo-Pacific joint patrols, and localised capacity-building show preparation for both roles. The Indian Navy is being positioned for regional power projection and as a crisis-specific coercive lever, with questions remaining on whether it will enter the frontline earlier than in past India-Pakistan crises.

Agencies